नेपालमा प्राकृतिक श्रोतकोरुपमा पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ, हिरा जस्ता बहुमूल्य पत्थर, सुन जस्ता बहुमूल्य धातु इत्यादिका खनिजहरु अहिलेसम्म पाइएको छैन, पाइने सम्भावना न्यून छ । तर प्रकृतिको वरदानस्वरुप नेपालले प्रचुर मात्रामा जलश्रोत पाएकोछ, जसको समुचितरुपमा दोहन भएकोछैन । जलश्रोतले नेपालको समृद्धिको भाग्यरेखा कोर्न सक्छ । जलश्रोतबाट विद्युत उत्पादनको अतिरिक्त यसको समुचित दोहनबाट खानेपानी सुरक्षा र खाद्यान्न सुरक्षा हासिल हुन्छ भने जलमार्गपनि “निर्माण” गर्न सकिन्छ ।
तर भारतसंग द्विपक्षीय सन्धी सम्झौता अन्तर्गत जलश्रोतको दोहन गर्दा नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तामा पटक पटक आँच आएको छ । साथै लगानीको सुरक्षाको प्रश्नले गर्दा पनि सार्वभौमिकतामा आघात पर्ने अवस्था छ ।
“अन्तरराष्ट्रिय” नदी
कोशी, गण्डकी, कर्णाली र महाकाली जस्ता नदीहरु चीनमा उत्पत्ति भएर नेपालबाट भारत र बंगलादेश हुँदै बंगालको खाडीबाट हिन्द महासागरमा समाहित हुने हुनाले कतिपयले यी नदीहरुलाई “अन्तरराष्ट्रिय” नदी भन्छन् । भारतमा यी नदीहरु धेरै उचाइबाट नखस्ने हुनाले यसबाट भारतमा ठूलो परिमाणमा बिजुली उत्पादन हुंदैन । थोरै उचाइबाट कम क्षमताका जलविद्युत आयोजना निर्माण सम्भव छ ।
वास्तवमा भारतले नेपालमा यी नदीहरुबाट बिजुली भन्दा धेरै पानी चाहन्छ, सुख्खायाममा थप÷नियन्त्रित पानीबाट उत्तर प्रदेश, बिहार र बंगालमा सिंचाइ गर्नका साथै पानीको प्यास मेट्न सप्त कोशी उच्चबाँध, कर्णाली चिसापानी, पञ्चेश्वर जस्ता आयोजना निर्माण गरेर वर्षातको पानी नेपालमा भण्डारण गर्न चाहन्छ, जसबाट भारतमा बाढी नियन्त्रण पनि हुन्छ ।
साथै भारत यी नदी दोहन गरेर बाह्रमासै जलमार्ग पनि सञ्चालन गर्न चाहन्छ गंगा नदीलगायतमा । नेपालका समकक्षीलाई भारतीय प्रधानमन्त्रीले जलमार्गबाट “सागरमाथा” र सागर जोड्ने सपना देखाइसकेकोछ । यसकोलागि नेपालका खोंचहरुमा बाँध बाँधेर नेपालका उपत्यकाहरुमा वर्षातको पानी संचय गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ, जुन भारतको उत्तर प्रदेश, बिहार वा बंगालमा सम्भव छैन । स्मरणिय छ, नेपालमा यस्ता संरचना निर्माण गरिए नेपालको भूभाग डुबानमा पर्छ र स्थानिय बासिन्दा विस्थापित हुन्छन् । डुबानमा परेका जमिनबाट उत्पादन हुने कृषि उपज र वन पैदावार आदिबाट नेपाल बंचित हुन्छ, दशकौंसम्म ।
भारतका तत्कालिन जलश्रोत मन्त्री सैफुद्दिन सोजले भनेका थिए्, नेपालका नदीहरुबाट भारतको पहिलो प्राथमिकता बाढी नियन्त्रण र सिंचाइ हो, जलविद्युत बोनस मात्र । त्यसैले भारत नेपालमा जलाशययुक्त आयोजनाहरु बनाउन चाहन्छ । अनि चाहन्छ यी आयोजनाहरु पनि बिद्यमान कोशी र गण्डक बाँधकै अवधारणामा बनाउन ।
कोशी र गण्डक सम्झौता अनि बाँधहरु
“बिहारको शोक” कहलिएको कोशी नदी नियन्त्रण गर्ने उद्देश्यले सन् १९५४ अप्रिलमा सम्पन्न कोशी सम्झौता १९६६ डिसेम्बरमा संशोधन गरिएको थियो । यसको प्रमुख उद्देश्य थियो बिहारमा वर्षामा बाढी नियन्त्रण गर्ने र बांकी ८ महिना जति सुख्खायाममा सिंचाइबाट खाद्यान्न उत्पादन र उत्पादकत्वमा अभिबृद्धि । १९५८ बाट शुरु भएको बाँध लगायतको संरचनाको निर्माण १९६२ मा सम्पन्न भएको थिया ।
सम्झौताको धारा ३ मा यी बाँध लगायतका संरचनाहरु रहेको नेपालको भूभाग भारतको नियन्त्रणमा रहने व्यवस्था छ र अद्यापि भारतको नियन्त्रणमै छ । यो सम्झौताको अवधि १ सय ९९ वर्षको हुनाले यो भूभाग अर्को एक शताब्दी भन्दा बढी समय भारतको नियन्त्रणमा रहन्छ । अर्थात ५० वर्ष देखि नेपालको यो भूभागको सार्वभौमसत्ता भारत अधिनस्थ थियो र अर्को एक शताब्दी भन्दा बढी समय यो भूभागको सार्वभौमसत्ता भारत अधिनस्थ रहन्छ ।
यो संरचना निर्माण गरिएर भारतको बिहारमा २१ लाख हेक्टरमा बाढी नियन्त्रण हुन्छ, जसको लाभको मूल्यांकन हुनसकेको छैन । अनि यहि बाँधबाट उत्पादन हुने पानीबाट भारतले १३ लाख २१ हजार हेक्टरमा सिंचाइ गर्दछ । अफ्रिकि देश लेसोथोले दक्षिण अफ्रिकालाई १८ घनमिटर प्रति सेकेन्ड पानी आपूर्ति गरेर वार्षिक अढाइ करोड अमेरिकि डलर भुक्तानि पाएको आधारमा भारतले सिंचाइको लागि कोशीको पानी उपयोग गरेबापत वार्षिक ६१ करोड डलर (विद्यमान विनिमय दर अनुसार वार्षिक ६६ अर्ब रुपैया) नेपाललाई भुक्तानि दिनुपर्ने हुन्छ । जुन आज पर्यन्त गरिएको छैन ।
उक्त बाँधले नेपालको ९ हजार ८ सय हेक्टर भूमि डुबानमा परेकोछ भन् ३३ हजार हेक्टरमा जलजमाउ हुन्छ । यसकारणले नेपाल कृषि उपज, वन पैदावार आदिबाट बंचित भएको छ बिगत ६ दशक देखि र अर्को १ शताब्दी भन्दा बढी स्थिति यहि रहनेछ । यसरी बंचितिकरण परेकोबाट नेपाललाई हुने घाटाको आकलन हुन सकेको छैन । यस अतिरिक्त उक्त बाँधको कारण हरेक वर्षातको मौसममा नेपालका थप कृषियोग्य जमिन र वनजंगल डुबानमा पर्छ, अनि स्थानिय बासिन्दा विस्थापित हुन्छन् । यस्तो नोक्सानको आकलन भएकोछैन ।
अहिले मध्य वर्षातमा बाढी उत्कर्षमा छ । तर यो बाँधको ५६ ढोका मध्ये आधा पनि खोलिएका छै्रनन् । बाढीले ताण्डव मच्चाएइरहेको छ ।
हुन त उक्त बाँधको पानीबाट भारतको कटैयामा उत्पादिन ६ मेगावाट जति विद्युत नेपालले पाएको छ भनिन्छ जसको मूल्य साढे १७ लाख डलर जति हुन्छ (१९ करोड रुपैया जति) । तर यो लाभ भारतले वार्षिक ६६ अर्ब रुपैया बराबरको सिंचाइमात्रैबाट पाउने लाभको तुलनामा नगण्य हो । बाढी नियन्त्रणबाट हुने लाभको आकलन गरिएकोछैन ।
गण्डक सम्झौता र बाँध पनि यस्तै छ, एउटा अपवाद बाहेक । गण्डक सम्झौतामा कुनै अवधि नतोकिएकोले गण्डक बाँध लगायताका संरचना निर्मित भूभाग भारतको नियन्त्रणमा अविछिन्न कालसम्म रहने छ । अर्थात गण्डक बाँध लगायतका संरचना रहेको भूभागको सार्वभौमसत्ता अनन्तकाल सम्म भारतको नियन्त्रणमा रहने भयो ।
यी दुबै बाँध द्वि–राष्ट्रिय सम्झौता अन्तर्गत निर्मित हुनाले नेपाल र भारतले संयुक्तरुपमा संचालन गरिनुपर्ने हो । तर त्यसो हुन नसकेकोले नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तामा आँच आएको हो । नेपालको सिंचाइ विभागका अनुसार कोशी बाँधलगायतको संरचनाकोलागि ९ हजार हेक्टर र गण्डकीकोलागि ५ सय हेक्टर भूमि भारतको नियन्त्रणमा छ ।
कर्णाली चिसापानी बहुउद्देश्यिय आयोजना
यो विषयको अर्को पाटो हो कर्णाली चिसापानी बहुउद्देश्यिय आयोजना, जुन अहिलेसम्मपनि कार्यान्वयन गरिएकोछैन । यो आयोजना कार्यान्वयन गर्न भनेर सन् १९८० को दशकमा ४ सय भन्दा बढी विद्यार्थी छात्रवृत्तिमा भारतको रुड्की कलेजमा इन्जिनियरिंग अध्ययन गर्न पठाइएकामा ती मध्ये धेरै अहिले सेवानिवृत्त भैसके । तर पनि उक्त आयोजना कार्यान्वयनमा आएको छैन । यस सम्बन्धमा कुनै आधिकारिक अभिलेख छैन । तर तत्कालिन राजा वीरेन्द्रले नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तामा आँच आउने देखेरे यो आयोजना अगाडी नबढाउने निर्णय गरेका थिए, जसको कुनै अभिलेख उपलब्ध छैन ।
यस सम्बन्धमा भारतका तत्कालिन बिदेश मामिला सचिव जगत मेहता भनाई मननीय छ । उनका अनुसार भारतले यो आयोजनामा आफ्नो सुरक्षा संवेदनशीलता हुने हुनाले यसको सुरक्षा भारतले गर्न पाउनु पर्ने दावी गर्दा नेपालको सार्वभौकितामा आँच आउने महसूस गरिएको थियो । यो कुरा उनले आफ्नो एक लेखमा समाबेश गरेका छन्, जुन अब्जर्भर रिसर्च फाउन्डेशन नामक संस्थाले प्रकाशित गरेको पुस्तकमा समाबिष्ट छ ।
भारतीय पूर्वसचिव मेहताको भनाइबाट के प्रष्टिन्छ भने भारत नेपालमाथि निर्भर हुन चाहंदैन । नेपालको नियन्त्रणमा रहे “नेपालले कुनै पनि बेला विद्युत आपूर्ति बन्द गर्नसक्छ, जुन भारतको लागि सुरक्षा संवेदनशिलताको कुरा हुन्छ” । यस परिप्रेक्षमा नेपालमा आगतमा निर्माण हुने आयोजनाहरुमाथि भारत निर्भर हुने अवस्थामा भारतले आफ्नै सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्ने छ, कोशी र गंडकीमा गरे झै अनि कर्णाली चिसापानीमा गर्न खोजे झै ।
लगानीको सुरक्षा
राष्ट्रिय सभाका वर्तमान सांसद राधेश्याम अधिकारीले “यो साता” नामक पत्रिकामा “कर्णाली आयोजनामा माओवादी नीति” शिर्षकमा जनवरी २०१० मा प्रकाशित लेखमा “भारतले आफ्नो लगानी सुरक्षित गर्न आवश्यक सुरक्षा आफैले गर्नुपर्ने प्रस्ताव पेश गर्नसक्छ । शक्ति राष्ट्रहरुद्वारा यस्ता प्रस्ताव राख्नुलाई अस्वाभाविक भन्ने गरिंदैन” भनेकाछन् ।
मतलब भारतले नेपालमा कुनै आयोजनमा लगानी गर्ने भएमा त्यो आयोजनामा भारतले आफ्नै सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्ने चाहना राख्नु “अस्वाभाविक भन्ने गरिंदैन” र भारतलाई आफ्नो सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्न दिनुपर्छ ! यस्तो अवस्थामा नेपालको सार्वभौकिता, स्वाधीनता र राष्ट्रियतामाथि आँच आउने कुरा सांसद अधिकारीलाई ठूलो कुरा रहेनछ !
सांसद अधिकारीले नेपाली कांग्रेसको प्रतिनिधित्व गर्छन् । अब प्रश्न उठ्छ, यो उनको व्यक्तिगत अभिव्यक्ति हो कि, उनले प्रतिनिधित्व गर्ने दलको धारणा पनि यहि हो ? साथै महाकाली सन्धी सम्पन्न गर्न तत्कालिन एमाले दल पनि सक्रियतापूर्वक लागेका थियो र वर्तमान प्रधानमंत्रीले उक्त सन्धीको पक्षमा पैरवी गरेका थिए । अब प्रश्न उठ्छ के सत्तारुढ नेपाल कम्निस्ट पार्टी र यसका पदाधिकारीहरुको धारणा पनि यस्तै हो ?
यदि पञ्चेश्वर आयोजना कार्यान्वयनमा गए के महाकाली नदीको पूर्वी किनार, जुन नेपालको भूभाग हो, मा निर्माण हुने पावरहाउसमा भारतले आफ्नो सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्छ ? किनभने यो आयोजनाले उत्पादन गर्ने विद्युत भारतले आयात गर्छ र भारत सुरक्षा संवेदनशीलताको कारणले आफ्नै सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्न चाहन्छ । यसो भएमा नेपालको सार्वभौमिकतामा यहाँ पनि आँच आउने हुन्छ ।
अरुण ३ लगायतका बैदेशिक लगानीका आयोजनाहरु
भारतीय कम्पनी सतलज जलविद्युत निगमको लगानीमा अरुण ३ आयोजना नेपालमा निर्माण हुनै लागेकोछ । के त्यसो भए सांसद अधिकारीको सिद्धान्त अनुसार भारतले यो आयोजनामा पनि आफ्नो सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचान गर्छ ?
भारतलाई यस्तो सुविधा दिएको अवस्थामा समानताको सिद्धान्तको आधारमा अन्य देशहरुलाई पनि आआफ्नै सुरक्षाकर्मी परिचालन गर्न दिनुपर्ने हुन्छ र बिदेशी लगानी आकृष्ट गर्ने नाममा नेपाल त बिभिन्न देशहरुका सुरक्षाकर्मीहरु परिचालित भएर बैदेशिक सुरक्षाकर्मीहरुले चलखेल गर्ने देश हुन पुग्छ, यदि अधिकारी सिद्धान्त कार्यान्वयन भएमा !
सार्वभौमसत्ताको अक्षुण्णता
नेपालको क्षेत्रफल झण्डै १ लाख ४७ हजार २ सय वर्ग किलोमिटर छ । जसमध्ये सीमावीद बुद्धिनारायण श्रेष्ठका अनुसार भारतले ६ सय वर्ग किलोमिटर भन्दा बढी सीमा मिचेकोछ । कोशीमा ९० वर्ग किलोमिटर र गण्डकमा ५४ वर्ग किलोमिटर भारत अधिनस्थ छ । यसरी अहिल्यै झण्डै १ हजार वर्ग किलोमिटर नेपालको भूभागको सार्वभौमसत्तामा आँच आएको छ । यो क्रमलाई भंग नगरे जलश्रोतको द्विराष्ट्रिय दोहन र बिदेशी लगानी सुरक्षाको नाममा नेपालको सार्वभौमिकता खुम्चिंदै जानेछ ।
एकातिर नेपाललाई प्रकृतिको वरदानस्वरुप प्राप्त जलश्रोतको भारतको लागि दोहन गर्दै यसको क्षमता निख्रिंदै जान्छ भने संगै नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तापनि खुम्चिंंदै जान्छ । यहि गति र मति रहे नेपालको जलश्रोतको सम्भाव्यता सकिंदासम्म सार्वभौम भूभागपनि थोरै मात्र बाँकी रहनेछ ।
अबको बाटो
यस सम्बन्धमा नेपालका नीतिनिर्माताहरु बेलैमा सचेत हुन वान्छनिय छ । तर भनाइको तात्पर्य जलश्रोतको दोहन नै गर्नु हुन्न वा अन्धराष्ट्रवाद अवलम्बन गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने हैन । आवश्यकता छ, मध्य मार्गको । नेपालको जलश्रोत नेपालको लागि दोहन गर्ने र सार्वभौमिकता पनि अक्षुण्ण राख्ने ।
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
२०७५ साउन २४ गते नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
Thursday, August 9, 2018
Monday, July 2, 2018
Security Ramifications of Harnessing Water Resource
Nepal is not endowed with natural resources like fossil fuel, minerals, etc. However, nature’s best gift to Nepal is water resources, which has yet to be properly harnessed. Harnessed properly, it can draw Nepal’s lifeline leading to prosperity. Water resource is important not only from the perspective of generating hydropower but also from the perspective of water supply for drinking and sanitation, to irrigate agricultural land for increased agricultural production and productivity as well as for animal husbandry, fisheries, recreation, navigation, etc.
However, harnessing water resource at bilateral level with India is seen to be fraught with security ramifications. Bilateral exploitation of water resource with India has compromised Nepal’s security at several levels due to transboundary nature of rivers. Then there is question of security of foreign investment.
Transboundary Rivers
India cannot generate much hydropower from rivers that flow from Nepal to India for lack of head (only low head projects are possible in India on these rivers). In reality, India hankers after stored water much more than electricity due to high population growth for drinking and sanitation and for irrigation to increase food crop production to feed over a billion mouths. Besides, India hopes to control flood in UP, Bihar, West Bengal, etc. by building dams in Nepal. Electricity to be generated by these is secondary for India. The then Indian water resource minister Saifudin Soz has admitted in September 2008, “Our main interest is flood control and irrigation. Those are our first and second priority. If we get hydroelectricity as by product, that will be a bonus for us.”
Therefore, India plans to have rivers in Nepal harnessed by having reservoir projects built, like Koshi High Dam, Karnali Chisapani Dam, Pancheshwar project, etc. and her wish is to have them implemented in the format of Koshi and Gandak barrages, which are analyzed below to throw light on their security ramifications.
Koshi Agreement and the Barrage
Koshi Agreement was signed on April 25, 1954 between Governments of Nepal and India and it was amended on December 19, 1966. India wished to construct a barrage to tame Koshi River, known as “sorrow of Bihar” at that time and the basic objective of signing the agreement was to control flood in Bihar and to irrigate land therein and other lower riparian areas. Construction of the barrage was begun in 1958 and completed in 1962.
Security ramification of the agreement lies in Article 3 of Koshi Agreement, Subtitle of which is “Authority for Execution of Works and Occupation of Land and other Property”. The word “occupation” has been used unabashedly. It is stipulated in this Article that Nepal “shall permit the occupation, for such period as may be necessary of all such lands and places as may be required for the proper execution of the Project.” The project area of Koshi barrage is still under Indian “occupation”. It impinges national security as well as sovereignty, nationality and independence of Nepal. As the term of the Agreement is 199 years, according to Article 16(i), such “occupation” will last for more than another millennium!
This barrage submerges Nepal’s territory and forces displacement on local inhabitants every monsoon. Simply because India doesn’t open gates on the barrage, which, although in Nepali’s territory, is under Indian control, even when Koshi River is flooded. Of 56 gates hardly a few are opened even when flood crests the barrage. India “obliges” Nepal after repeated requests to open less than half of the gates.
As a result of late king Mahindra’s effort, Koshi Agreement was amended in December 1966. After its revision the title of Article 3 was changed by replacing word “occupation” with “use” [“Authority for Execution of Works and occupation use of Land and other Property”]. However the provision related to it was not tampered (with regard to occupation) and it was refurbished a little. Revised provision has retained the world “occupation”. Post revision, the provision reads: Nepal “shall permit the occupation, for such period as may be necessary of all such lands and places as may be required for the proper execution of the Project respective constructions.”
After construction of this barrage flood is controlled in Bihar in 2.1 million hectare, the value of which has not been worked out. Similarly, 1,321,000 hectare is irrigated in India and its value to India, based on Lesotho formula (25 MUSD/year for 18 cumecs) comes to 611 MUSD/year. While Nepal has borne the opportunity cost of submerged 9,807 ha land and water logged 33,000 ha land, the value of such loss to Nepal has not been calculated. Similarly, Nepal also suffers loss due to involuntary displacement. Only benefit to Nepal is about 6 MW power, value of which comes to 1.75 MUSD/year.
Gandak agreement and barrage
Gandak agreement was signed on December 4, 1959 (revised on April 30, 1964) to control flood in lower riparian area in India (the barrage is built at the border between Nepal and India) and to irrigate agricultural land, similar as under Koshi agreement. The barrage construction, envisaged by the agreement, was completed in 1968, which was started in 1963. Security ramification of this agreement lies in Article 6 of Gandak agreement, which is related to “Ownership, Operation and Maintenance of Works”. There is provision for “all works connected with the Project in the territory of Nepal will (to) remain the property of and be operated and maintained by the Government of India.” As the agreement stays in force for an indefinite period, the project is to be “operated and maintained” by Government of India (GoI) for indefinite period. A case of territory of a sovereign country under control of foreign nation for indefinite period, which impinges Nepal’s security as well as sovereignty, independence and nationality.
Like Koshi barrage, Gandaki barrage too is not opened to allow floodwater during monsoon with the same effect: submergence and involuntary displacement in Nepal.
Project implementation modality
Koshi and Gandak projects are not under BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) modality. These are bilateral projects of the governments of Nepal and India, financed by India. However, full control is exercised solely by India in the territory of sovereign Nepal. Nepal has no say in the operation and maintenance of these projects. This arrangement impinges Nepal’s sovereignty. Since these two barrages are bilateral projects, these should have been operated and maintained jointly.
Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project
Over 400 students from Nepal were sent to Roorkee College in preparation of implementation of Karnali (Chisapani)) multipurpose project in 1980s (its installed capacity is 10,800 MW) with Indian collaboration. But it has yet to be implemented. There is no official notation/record in this respect. However, unofficially it has been learnt that late king Birendra decided to shelve the project after learning that India planned to deploy Indian security force in the project area.
It can also be deduced from the writing of Jagat Mehta, former Indian external affairs secretary too. He has written that “Stray suggestions such that Karnali would be of such vital importance for India that it might have to be protected by Indian security forces only deepened the apprehensions that cooperation with India could jeopardize Nepal’s sovereignty” in his paper titled “India-Nepal relations: a victim of politics” included in the book titled “India-Nepal Relations – The Challenge Ahead”, published by Observer Research Foundation in 2004. This statement reflects fear psychosis on the part of India. India doesn’t wish to be dependent on Nepal and is apprehensive that Nepal too can, for example, shut off electricity supply to India.
India has never formally broached the idea of deploying Indian security force in Nepal’s territory, but it has already done so in Koshi and Gandak barrages. In similar manner she is highly likely to do so in future projects.
Security of investment
Nepal’s current federal MP Radheshyam Adhikari, representing Nepali Congress and Bibeksheel Sajha party, in Upper House had opined in January 2010 that “India can propose to deploy her own security force to protect her investment in Nepal” and he didn’t deem such proposal unnatural, in an article published in a vernacular weekly named “Yo Sata”.
By extension every country that invests in Nepal will be entitled to same security facility. This amounts to issuing rain cheque to all countries that invest in Nepal to deploy their security force to protect their investment. While Nepal is endeavouring to attract foreign investment, if this kind of concept is to become policy, foreign security force will swarm Nepal.
Important question that begs answer is, does this statement reflect policy of Nepali Congress party that he represents in the parliament (including Bibeksheek Sajha party)? Moreover, it raises another question: do other political parties of Nepal also subscribe to this idea of his? Nepal Communist Party is in the government now and one wonders if NCP too is agreeable to this sentiment! One cannot forget that NCP was instrumental in signing Mahakali treaty with present PM Mr KP Oli being one of the main protagonists. Will Indian security force be deployed in the powerhouse of Pancheshwar project that will be located in the east bank of Mahakali River (in Nepali territory)? As India plans to use Nepal’s share of electricity generated by this project, she will become dependent on this project and India doesn’t like being dependent on Nepal.
Arun 3 to be implemented by SJVN
Sutlej Jan Vilyui Nigam (SIVN), an Indian company, is investing in Arun 3 project. Going by the logic of Adhikari India will have right to deploy her security force in this project too, impairing sovereignty of Nepal in its project area.
If Adhikari “doctrine” is to gain currency, Nepal will become pockmarked with projects where foreign security force will be deployed. With every water resource project implemented with foreign investment, a little bit of Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality will be impinged.
Conclusion and recommendation
Bilateral projects implemented jointly with India have impinged Nepal’s sovereignty. India wants to implement more of such projects in Nepal for flood control and irrigation in India. Nepal now has “immense” water resource, mostly untapped. Continuing with current trajectory of policy and practice of bilateral “development” will mean Nepal’s water resource will be used up for benefit of India and Nepal's sovereignty, independence and nationality will further get undermined.
Nepal’s policy makers need to do introspection if Nepal should allow India to implement projects in Nepal in the manner of Koshi and Gandak barrages. Government of Nepal needs formulate clear and specific policy with regard to security ramification of harnessing water resources in order to ensure that Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality is not compromised.
Presented at the seminar organized by Association of Former Career Ambassadors of Nepal on June 29, 2018 and published in TelegraphNepal on July 1, 2018
However, harnessing water resource at bilateral level with India is seen to be fraught with security ramifications. Bilateral exploitation of water resource with India has compromised Nepal’s security at several levels due to transboundary nature of rivers. Then there is question of security of foreign investment.
Transboundary Rivers
India cannot generate much hydropower from rivers that flow from Nepal to India for lack of head (only low head projects are possible in India on these rivers). In reality, India hankers after stored water much more than electricity due to high population growth for drinking and sanitation and for irrigation to increase food crop production to feed over a billion mouths. Besides, India hopes to control flood in UP, Bihar, West Bengal, etc. by building dams in Nepal. Electricity to be generated by these is secondary for India. The then Indian water resource minister Saifudin Soz has admitted in September 2008, “Our main interest is flood control and irrigation. Those are our first and second priority. If we get hydroelectricity as by product, that will be a bonus for us.”
Therefore, India plans to have rivers in Nepal harnessed by having reservoir projects built, like Koshi High Dam, Karnali Chisapani Dam, Pancheshwar project, etc. and her wish is to have them implemented in the format of Koshi and Gandak barrages, which are analyzed below to throw light on their security ramifications.
Koshi Agreement and the Barrage
Koshi Agreement was signed on April 25, 1954 between Governments of Nepal and India and it was amended on December 19, 1966. India wished to construct a barrage to tame Koshi River, known as “sorrow of Bihar” at that time and the basic objective of signing the agreement was to control flood in Bihar and to irrigate land therein and other lower riparian areas. Construction of the barrage was begun in 1958 and completed in 1962.
Security ramification of the agreement lies in Article 3 of Koshi Agreement, Subtitle of which is “Authority for Execution of Works and Occupation of Land and other Property”. The word “occupation” has been used unabashedly. It is stipulated in this Article that Nepal “shall permit the occupation, for such period as may be necessary of all such lands and places as may be required for the proper execution of the Project.” The project area of Koshi barrage is still under Indian “occupation”. It impinges national security as well as sovereignty, nationality and independence of Nepal. As the term of the Agreement is 199 years, according to Article 16(i), such “occupation” will last for more than another millennium!
This barrage submerges Nepal’s territory and forces displacement on local inhabitants every monsoon. Simply because India doesn’t open gates on the barrage, which, although in Nepali’s territory, is under Indian control, even when Koshi River is flooded. Of 56 gates hardly a few are opened even when flood crests the barrage. India “obliges” Nepal after repeated requests to open less than half of the gates.
As a result of late king Mahindra’s effort, Koshi Agreement was amended in December 1966. After its revision the title of Article 3 was changed by replacing word “occupation” with “use” [“Authority for Execution of Works and occupation use of Land and other Property”]. However the provision related to it was not tampered (with regard to occupation) and it was refurbished a little. Revised provision has retained the world “occupation”. Post revision, the provision reads: Nepal “shall permit the occupation, for such period as may be necessary of all such lands and places as may be required for the proper execution of the Project respective constructions.”
After construction of this barrage flood is controlled in Bihar in 2.1 million hectare, the value of which has not been worked out. Similarly, 1,321,000 hectare is irrigated in India and its value to India, based on Lesotho formula (25 MUSD/year for 18 cumecs) comes to 611 MUSD/year. While Nepal has borne the opportunity cost of submerged 9,807 ha land and water logged 33,000 ha land, the value of such loss to Nepal has not been calculated. Similarly, Nepal also suffers loss due to involuntary displacement. Only benefit to Nepal is about 6 MW power, value of which comes to 1.75 MUSD/year.
Gandak agreement and barrage
Gandak agreement was signed on December 4, 1959 (revised on April 30, 1964) to control flood in lower riparian area in India (the barrage is built at the border between Nepal and India) and to irrigate agricultural land, similar as under Koshi agreement. The barrage construction, envisaged by the agreement, was completed in 1968, which was started in 1963. Security ramification of this agreement lies in Article 6 of Gandak agreement, which is related to “Ownership, Operation and Maintenance of Works”. There is provision for “all works connected with the Project in the territory of Nepal will (to) remain the property of and be operated and maintained by the Government of India.” As the agreement stays in force for an indefinite period, the project is to be “operated and maintained” by Government of India (GoI) for indefinite period. A case of territory of a sovereign country under control of foreign nation for indefinite period, which impinges Nepal’s security as well as sovereignty, independence and nationality.
Like Koshi barrage, Gandaki barrage too is not opened to allow floodwater during monsoon with the same effect: submergence and involuntary displacement in Nepal.
Project implementation modality
Koshi and Gandak projects are not under BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) modality. These are bilateral projects of the governments of Nepal and India, financed by India. However, full control is exercised solely by India in the territory of sovereign Nepal. Nepal has no say in the operation and maintenance of these projects. This arrangement impinges Nepal’s sovereignty. Since these two barrages are bilateral projects, these should have been operated and maintained jointly.
Karnali (Chisapani) Multipurpose Project
Over 400 students from Nepal were sent to Roorkee College in preparation of implementation of Karnali (Chisapani)) multipurpose project in 1980s (its installed capacity is 10,800 MW) with Indian collaboration. But it has yet to be implemented. There is no official notation/record in this respect. However, unofficially it has been learnt that late king Birendra decided to shelve the project after learning that India planned to deploy Indian security force in the project area.
It can also be deduced from the writing of Jagat Mehta, former Indian external affairs secretary too. He has written that “Stray suggestions such that Karnali would be of such vital importance for India that it might have to be protected by Indian security forces only deepened the apprehensions that cooperation with India could jeopardize Nepal’s sovereignty” in his paper titled “India-Nepal relations: a victim of politics” included in the book titled “India-Nepal Relations – The Challenge Ahead”, published by Observer Research Foundation in 2004. This statement reflects fear psychosis on the part of India. India doesn’t wish to be dependent on Nepal and is apprehensive that Nepal too can, for example, shut off electricity supply to India.
India has never formally broached the idea of deploying Indian security force in Nepal’s territory, but it has already done so in Koshi and Gandak barrages. In similar manner she is highly likely to do so in future projects.
Security of investment
Nepal’s current federal MP Radheshyam Adhikari, representing Nepali Congress and Bibeksheel Sajha party, in Upper House had opined in January 2010 that “India can propose to deploy her own security force to protect her investment in Nepal” and he didn’t deem such proposal unnatural, in an article published in a vernacular weekly named “Yo Sata”.
By extension every country that invests in Nepal will be entitled to same security facility. This amounts to issuing rain cheque to all countries that invest in Nepal to deploy their security force to protect their investment. While Nepal is endeavouring to attract foreign investment, if this kind of concept is to become policy, foreign security force will swarm Nepal.
Important question that begs answer is, does this statement reflect policy of Nepali Congress party that he represents in the parliament (including Bibeksheek Sajha party)? Moreover, it raises another question: do other political parties of Nepal also subscribe to this idea of his? Nepal Communist Party is in the government now and one wonders if NCP too is agreeable to this sentiment! One cannot forget that NCP was instrumental in signing Mahakali treaty with present PM Mr KP Oli being one of the main protagonists. Will Indian security force be deployed in the powerhouse of Pancheshwar project that will be located in the east bank of Mahakali River (in Nepali territory)? As India plans to use Nepal’s share of electricity generated by this project, she will become dependent on this project and India doesn’t like being dependent on Nepal.
Arun 3 to be implemented by SJVN
Sutlej Jan Vilyui Nigam (SIVN), an Indian company, is investing in Arun 3 project. Going by the logic of Adhikari India will have right to deploy her security force in this project too, impairing sovereignty of Nepal in its project area.
If Adhikari “doctrine” is to gain currency, Nepal will become pockmarked with projects where foreign security force will be deployed. With every water resource project implemented with foreign investment, a little bit of Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality will be impinged.
Conclusion and recommendation
Bilateral projects implemented jointly with India have impinged Nepal’s sovereignty. India wants to implement more of such projects in Nepal for flood control and irrigation in India. Nepal now has “immense” water resource, mostly untapped. Continuing with current trajectory of policy and practice of bilateral “development” will mean Nepal’s water resource will be used up for benefit of India and Nepal's sovereignty, independence and nationality will further get undermined.
Nepal’s policy makers need to do introspection if Nepal should allow India to implement projects in Nepal in the manner of Koshi and Gandak barrages. Government of Nepal needs formulate clear and specific policy with regard to security ramification of harnessing water resources in order to ensure that Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality is not compromised.
Presented at the seminar organized by Association of Former Career Ambassadors of Nepal on June 29, 2018 and published in TelegraphNepal on July 1, 2018
Thursday, June 14, 2018
Nepal’s electricity to force India to kneel
Some Nepali dream of bringing India to her knees by simply switching off supply, after she becomes dependent on Nepal’s electricity! Their idea is for Nepal to export electricity to India to make her dependent on Nepal. There are others that attribute Bhutan’s “prosperity” to her export of electricity to India!
India becoming dependent on Nepal
The first school of thought believe that in the way India almost succeeded to force Nepal to her knees by imposing 6-month long blockade in 2015, in the wake of massive earthquake, Nepal too can turn the table on India by using electricity. Wickedly noble thought! Just switch it off to force India to kneel. From juvenile perspective this sounds plausible.
In the aftermath of Indian blockade on Nepal from 1988, the then Nepal’s Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai did succeed to have India lift the blockade in 1990 by figuratively falling on his knees in Delhi. He even declared Nepal’s rivers common. Had he not been defeated in the general election, he would have concluded a treaty with India stipulating as such!
In this context, prime minister KP Oli turned out to be an exception, since he refused even to visit India till the blockade was lifted.
Indian fear psychosis
Not so surprisingly it is true that Indian rulers are apprehensive that if she were to become dependent on Nepal, she could be in trouble. Due to this fear psychosis she continues to exert control over structures built in sovereign Nepal as exemplified by barrages built on Koshi and Gandaki rivers.
People are ignorant of the fact that late king Birendra cancelled Karnali Chisapani storage multipurpose project (10,800 MW) after he was informed of Indian intention of deploying Indian security force in the project. Jagat Mehta, former Indian external affairs secretary has written that “Stray suggestions such that Karnali would be of such vital importance for India that it might have to be protected by Indian security forces only deepened the apprehensions that cooperation with India could jeopardize Nepal’s sovereignty” in his paper in his paper titled “India-Nepal relations: A victim of politics” included in the book titled “India-Nepal Relations – The Challenge Ahead”, published by Observer Research Foundation in 2004.
Security of hydropower project
In this backdrop, Nepal will not be in control of electricity supply to India. Rather, India will deploy her security force in projects that export electricity to her, thereby compromising Nepal’s sovereignty. Strangely, Nepal’s current federal MP Radheshyam Adhikari had opined in January 2010 that India can propose to deploy her own security force to protect her investment and he didn’t deem such proposal unnatural, in an article published in a vernacular weekly named “Yo Sata”. It is indeed strange and surprising that he sees no problem in compromising Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality.
Let’s take a close look Arun 3, under development by Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN). Its foundation was recently laid jointly by two PMs of Nepal and India online. Using above logic, it is possible that Indian security force will be deployed to protect Indian investment in this project.
In any case, full authority to decide as to when to generate electricity, how much to generate, whether to export or not, etc. will be vested in the project owner. Even if India doesn’t deploy her security force in it, government of Nepal cannot interfere in these decisions. Even in the projects that produce power for Nepal’s own consumption like Khimti, Bhote Koshi, etc. the decision as to how much to produce and when to do so are made by the owner. Nepal government has no authority to interfere. Except during emergencies, government cannot interfere in private businesses.
Power Purchase Agreement
Those with infantile dream forcing India to kneel don’t comprehend the mechanism of project implementation. A project cannot be implemented without obtaining generation license, condition precedents of which are signing of power purchase agreement (PPA) with electricity evacuator and achievement of financial closure. Once PPA is signed, the project is bound to supply electricity to the buyer as specified by PPA and failure to do so amounts to serious breach of contract amounting to default that could lead to eventual auction of the project. If something as disastrous happens, it will destroy Nepal’s image internationally.
Bhutan’s prosperity
Those enamoured of Bhutan model are unaware of main features of so-called “Bhutan model”. They are belabouring under mistaken impression that Bhutan implements export-oriented projects. Articles 8 and 9 respectively of agreements signed between Bhutan and India for development of Chukha and Tala projects clearly state that these projects export only surplus electricity after meeting Bhutan’s own needs.
Whereas, power development agreements (PDAs) related to Arun 3 and Upper Karnali state that these are export-oriented projects and only 12% and 21.9% electricity respectively is given to Nepal free of cost. These projects are not for internal consumption of Nepal, not designed to export surplus electricity. What adds insult to injury is the provision that even free energy to Nepal is to be exported.
Bhutan treats electricity as input of production and of the electricity consumed in Bhutan 80% is consumed by industries. Whereas, in Nepal only 40% of electricity consumed is used by industries. One should not lose sight of the fact that consumption of one unit of electricity can result in value addition by 86 US cents (equivalent to Rs 90 at current exchange rate) by multiplier effect coming into force. Hence, Bhutan became prosperous by using electricity in industries rather than by exporting.
Another reason behind Bhutan’s prosperity is the fact that these projects, built with 60% Indian grant and 40% soft loan, are owned by Royal Government of Bhutan. Therefore, all profit earned by these projects go into Bhutanese government treasury. However, it is not true in case of, for example Arun 3. All profit will be monopolized by SJVN. Nepal government could have shared the profit by way of income tax. But this project is entitled to 100% income tax exemption in first 10 years and 50% in following 5 years. Nepal’s fate will be limited to salivating at the quanta of profit such projects earn and repatriate.
Nepal will receive neither electricity, nor profit.
Electricity for Nepal
Some suffer from illusion that construction of export-oriented project will make electricity available in Nepal. Consumption of electricity in Nepal and export are mutually exclusive. Electricity will be available where the electricity is exported by these projects.
Bhutan has already achieved 100 per cent electrification, while it is claimed that 60 per cent have access to electricity in Nepal now and it will increase to 100 per cent in 5 years. The tragedy is that electricity may be accessible to 60 per cent but being unable to afford the cost of connection and utility bill many are forced to live in darkness.
Such darkness can only be dispelled by setting up industries where the electricity is produced to generate employment. No employment, no source of income to enable to afford electricity.
Mitigate trade deficit
Specifically looking at salient features of Arun 3, people with pipedream of bringing India to her knees also say that if Arun 3 exports 3,139 GWh electricity (total generation 4,019 GWh minus 880 GWh free to Nepal) at Rs 5/kWh, Nepal will receive Rs 15.69 billion/year. This is incorrect. As electricity exporter is Indian company and importer too will be Indian/foreigner, such payments will not even pass through Nepal.
Recently, MP Binod Chaudhary (Nepal’s sole multibillionaire) commenting on budget for next fiscal year in parliament reiterated the need to export electricity to mitigate trade deficit. He is not alone in believing as such. As explained above, export of electricity by project developed with foreign investment will not mitigate trade deficit effectively It can only happen with projects that are fully financed from sources within Nepal (for both equity and debt).
It can also be understood by comparing with commodity export: exporter would receive payment in Nepal through banking system and gets incorporated in current account of Nepal’s treasury impacting both trade and payment statistics. In case of exporting electricity from project developed with foreign investment, Nepal’s banking system will not see a rupee of the payment for exported electricity.
Risk of Nepal having to kneel
NEA has announced that there is no load shedding throughout Nepal, sometime back. That was deemed to be some sort of achievement. But almost 50 per cent electricity is being imported from India. The scenario will continue even when Arun 3 is commissioned which is export-oriented and Nepal will have to continue importing till projects are implemented exclusively for consumption in Nepal.
Nepal’s need for electricity, including latent demand, is huge. Former energy minister Top Bahadur Rayamajhi said that Nepal needs 5,000 MW. The requirement will be more if transportation is electrified. In 10 years Nepal can easily consume 10,000 MW. If double-digit economic growth is the ambition, even 20,000 MW will be like a drop in the ocean.
If Nepal continues on this trajectory (allowing to implement export-oriented projects and importing to meet Nepal’s need), Nepal will be in a tragicomic situation to have to import electricity of, for example Arun 3 via India. Insult will be added to the injury when Nepal is forced to import same electricity at higher price than it was exported at.
Another facet of this equation is that India would be in a position to turn off electricity supply anytime it is unhappy, thereby being able to force Nepal to kneel. Like the plan to export electricity in early 90s transforming into Nepal importing from India, plan to force India to bring to her knees could boomerang into Nepal having to kneel. Policy makers need to make course correction to avoid falling into such a trap, which will not only be ridiculous, but ludicrous too.
Therefore, allowing to develop projects as export-oriented amounts to shooting at one’s foot. Prudent course is to develop them for Nepal’s consumption and export any surplus.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
Published in People's Review of June 14, 2018
India becoming dependent on Nepal
The first school of thought believe that in the way India almost succeeded to force Nepal to her knees by imposing 6-month long blockade in 2015, in the wake of massive earthquake, Nepal too can turn the table on India by using electricity. Wickedly noble thought! Just switch it off to force India to kneel. From juvenile perspective this sounds plausible.
In the aftermath of Indian blockade on Nepal from 1988, the then Nepal’s Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai did succeed to have India lift the blockade in 1990 by figuratively falling on his knees in Delhi. He even declared Nepal’s rivers common. Had he not been defeated in the general election, he would have concluded a treaty with India stipulating as such!
In this context, prime minister KP Oli turned out to be an exception, since he refused even to visit India till the blockade was lifted.
Indian fear psychosis
Not so surprisingly it is true that Indian rulers are apprehensive that if she were to become dependent on Nepal, she could be in trouble. Due to this fear psychosis she continues to exert control over structures built in sovereign Nepal as exemplified by barrages built on Koshi and Gandaki rivers.
People are ignorant of the fact that late king Birendra cancelled Karnali Chisapani storage multipurpose project (10,800 MW) after he was informed of Indian intention of deploying Indian security force in the project. Jagat Mehta, former Indian external affairs secretary has written that “Stray suggestions such that Karnali would be of such vital importance for India that it might have to be protected by Indian security forces only deepened the apprehensions that cooperation with India could jeopardize Nepal’s sovereignty” in his paper in his paper titled “India-Nepal relations: A victim of politics” included in the book titled “India-Nepal Relations – The Challenge Ahead”, published by Observer Research Foundation in 2004.
Security of hydropower project
In this backdrop, Nepal will not be in control of electricity supply to India. Rather, India will deploy her security force in projects that export electricity to her, thereby compromising Nepal’s sovereignty. Strangely, Nepal’s current federal MP Radheshyam Adhikari had opined in January 2010 that India can propose to deploy her own security force to protect her investment and he didn’t deem such proposal unnatural, in an article published in a vernacular weekly named “Yo Sata”. It is indeed strange and surprising that he sees no problem in compromising Nepal’s sovereignty, independence and nationality.
Let’s take a close look Arun 3, under development by Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN). Its foundation was recently laid jointly by two PMs of Nepal and India online. Using above logic, it is possible that Indian security force will be deployed to protect Indian investment in this project.
In any case, full authority to decide as to when to generate electricity, how much to generate, whether to export or not, etc. will be vested in the project owner. Even if India doesn’t deploy her security force in it, government of Nepal cannot interfere in these decisions. Even in the projects that produce power for Nepal’s own consumption like Khimti, Bhote Koshi, etc. the decision as to how much to produce and when to do so are made by the owner. Nepal government has no authority to interfere. Except during emergencies, government cannot interfere in private businesses.
Power Purchase Agreement
Those with infantile dream forcing India to kneel don’t comprehend the mechanism of project implementation. A project cannot be implemented without obtaining generation license, condition precedents of which are signing of power purchase agreement (PPA) with electricity evacuator and achievement of financial closure. Once PPA is signed, the project is bound to supply electricity to the buyer as specified by PPA and failure to do so amounts to serious breach of contract amounting to default that could lead to eventual auction of the project. If something as disastrous happens, it will destroy Nepal’s image internationally.
Bhutan’s prosperity
Those enamoured of Bhutan model are unaware of main features of so-called “Bhutan model”. They are belabouring under mistaken impression that Bhutan implements export-oriented projects. Articles 8 and 9 respectively of agreements signed between Bhutan and India for development of Chukha and Tala projects clearly state that these projects export only surplus electricity after meeting Bhutan’s own needs.
Whereas, power development agreements (PDAs) related to Arun 3 and Upper Karnali state that these are export-oriented projects and only 12% and 21.9% electricity respectively is given to Nepal free of cost. These projects are not for internal consumption of Nepal, not designed to export surplus electricity. What adds insult to injury is the provision that even free energy to Nepal is to be exported.
Bhutan treats electricity as input of production and of the electricity consumed in Bhutan 80% is consumed by industries. Whereas, in Nepal only 40% of electricity consumed is used by industries. One should not lose sight of the fact that consumption of one unit of electricity can result in value addition by 86 US cents (equivalent to Rs 90 at current exchange rate) by multiplier effect coming into force. Hence, Bhutan became prosperous by using electricity in industries rather than by exporting.
Another reason behind Bhutan’s prosperity is the fact that these projects, built with 60% Indian grant and 40% soft loan, are owned by Royal Government of Bhutan. Therefore, all profit earned by these projects go into Bhutanese government treasury. However, it is not true in case of, for example Arun 3. All profit will be monopolized by SJVN. Nepal government could have shared the profit by way of income tax. But this project is entitled to 100% income tax exemption in first 10 years and 50% in following 5 years. Nepal’s fate will be limited to salivating at the quanta of profit such projects earn and repatriate.
Nepal will receive neither electricity, nor profit.
Electricity for Nepal
Some suffer from illusion that construction of export-oriented project will make electricity available in Nepal. Consumption of electricity in Nepal and export are mutually exclusive. Electricity will be available where the electricity is exported by these projects.
Bhutan has already achieved 100 per cent electrification, while it is claimed that 60 per cent have access to electricity in Nepal now and it will increase to 100 per cent in 5 years. The tragedy is that electricity may be accessible to 60 per cent but being unable to afford the cost of connection and utility bill many are forced to live in darkness.
Such darkness can only be dispelled by setting up industries where the electricity is produced to generate employment. No employment, no source of income to enable to afford electricity.
Mitigate trade deficit
Specifically looking at salient features of Arun 3, people with pipedream of bringing India to her knees also say that if Arun 3 exports 3,139 GWh electricity (total generation 4,019 GWh minus 880 GWh free to Nepal) at Rs 5/kWh, Nepal will receive Rs 15.69 billion/year. This is incorrect. As electricity exporter is Indian company and importer too will be Indian/foreigner, such payments will not even pass through Nepal.
Recently, MP Binod Chaudhary (Nepal’s sole multibillionaire) commenting on budget for next fiscal year in parliament reiterated the need to export electricity to mitigate trade deficit. He is not alone in believing as such. As explained above, export of electricity by project developed with foreign investment will not mitigate trade deficit effectively It can only happen with projects that are fully financed from sources within Nepal (for both equity and debt).
It can also be understood by comparing with commodity export: exporter would receive payment in Nepal through banking system and gets incorporated in current account of Nepal’s treasury impacting both trade and payment statistics. In case of exporting electricity from project developed with foreign investment, Nepal’s banking system will not see a rupee of the payment for exported electricity.
Risk of Nepal having to kneel
NEA has announced that there is no load shedding throughout Nepal, sometime back. That was deemed to be some sort of achievement. But almost 50 per cent electricity is being imported from India. The scenario will continue even when Arun 3 is commissioned which is export-oriented and Nepal will have to continue importing till projects are implemented exclusively for consumption in Nepal.
Nepal’s need for electricity, including latent demand, is huge. Former energy minister Top Bahadur Rayamajhi said that Nepal needs 5,000 MW. The requirement will be more if transportation is electrified. In 10 years Nepal can easily consume 10,000 MW. If double-digit economic growth is the ambition, even 20,000 MW will be like a drop in the ocean.
If Nepal continues on this trajectory (allowing to implement export-oriented projects and importing to meet Nepal’s need), Nepal will be in a tragicomic situation to have to import electricity of, for example Arun 3 via India. Insult will be added to the injury when Nepal is forced to import same electricity at higher price than it was exported at.
Another facet of this equation is that India would be in a position to turn off electricity supply anytime it is unhappy, thereby being able to force Nepal to kneel. Like the plan to export electricity in early 90s transforming into Nepal importing from India, plan to force India to bring to her knees could boomerang into Nepal having to kneel. Policy makers need to make course correction to avoid falling into such a trap, which will not only be ridiculous, but ludicrous too.
Therefore, allowing to develop projects as export-oriented amounts to shooting at one’s foot. Prudent course is to develop them for Nepal’s consumption and export any surplus.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
Published in People's Review of June 14, 2018
Monday, May 28, 2018
भारतलाई घुँडा टेकाउन बिजुली
एउटा तप्का नेपालीको भ्रम छ, नेपालबाट आयातीत बिजुलीमाथि भारतलाई निर्भर भए नेपालले बिजुली आपूर्ति बन्द गरिदिनासाथ भारत घुँडा टेक्न बाध्य हुन्छ ! अर्को तप्का ठान्छ भुटानले भारतलाई बिजुली निकासी गरेकोले समृद्ध भयो !
भारतको नेपालमाथि परनिर्भरता
जसरी नेपाललाई भारतले २०७२ सालमा नाकाबन्दी गरेर झण्डै घुँडा टेक्ने अवस्था श्रृजना ग¥यो, त्यसै गरेर नेपालले बिजुली आपूर्ति बन्द गरेर घुँडा टेक्न बाध्य पार्न सक्छ । नेपालमा निर्मित आयोजनाबाट मन परेको बेला आपूर्ति ग¥यो, रिस उठे आपूर्ति बन्द ग¥यो । बालसुलभ तरिकाबाट हेर्दा यो सम्भव परिदृष्य हो ।
स्मरणिय छ, २०४५ साल देखि भारतले गरेको नाकाबन्दी हटाउन २०४७ साल असारमा नेपालका तत्कालिन प्रधानमन्त्री कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईले दिल्ली गएर घुंडा टेके । यस क्रममा उनले नेपालका नदीनाला साझा पनि भने ! धन्न तिनी आमनिर्वाचनमा पराजित भएकोले नेपालका नदीनाला साझा भनेर सन्धी गर्न पाएनन् ।
यस सन्दर्भमा वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री ओली अपवाद ठहरे, २०७२ सालको महाभुकम्प लगत्तै भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी सामु घुंडा टेकेनन्, नाकाबन्दी नहटाएसम्म भारतभ्रमणमा नजाने अडान लिए ।
भारतीय शासकमा भय
रमाइलो के छ भने भारतीय शासकमा पनि भय छ कि नेपालमाथि निर्भर भइएमा नेपालले आपूर्ति बन्द गरेर अप्ठेरो पार्न सक्छ । यहि कारणले गर्दा भारतले सार्वभौम नेपालको भूभागमा आयोजनाहरु निर्माण गर्दा आफ्नै नियन्त्रणमा राख्छ । कोशी तथा गंडकी नदीहरुमा निर्मित बाँधहरुमा अहिले सम्म पनि भारतकै नियन्त्रण छ, जुन कुरा यो तप्काको मानिसको बिस्मृतिमा परेकोछ । यिनीहरु अनभिज्ञ छन् कि ७० को दशकमा भारतको सहयोगमा जलाशययुक्त १० हजार ८ सय मेगावाटको कर्णाली चिसापानी आयोजना निर्माण प्रारम्भ हुनै लागेको बेलामा भारतले उक्त आयोजनाको सुरक्षाको जिम्मा आफैलाई दिनुपर्ने माग गरेपछि तत्कालिन राजा वीरेन्द्रले आयोजना नै रद्द गरेका थिए । यस सम्बन्धमा भारतका तत्कालिन बिदेश सचिव जगत मेहताले एक पुस्तकमा प्रकाशित आफ्नो लेखमा सार्वजनिक गरेकाछन् ।
आयोजनाको सुरक्षा
यस परिवेशमा भारतमा आपूर्ति हुने बिजुली नियन्त्रण गर्ने अवस्थामा नेपाल हुने छैन । उल्टो नेपालले यस्ता आयोजना निर्माण गर्न दिने अवस्थामा नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तामाथि आँच आउने गरेर भारतीय सुरक्षाकर्मी नेपालमा परिचालित गर्नेछ । यस सन्दर्भमा स्मरणिय छ, सांसद राधेश्याम अधिकारीले “यो साता” नामक साप्ताहिकको जनवरी ५–११, २०१० को अंकमा “कर्णाली आयोजनामा माओबादी नीति” शिर्षकको लेखमा “भारतले आफ्नो लगानी सुरक्षित गर्न आवश्यक सुरक्षा आफैले गर्नुपर्ने प्रस्ताव पेश गर्नसक्छ । शक्ति राष्ट्रहरुद्वारा यस्ता प्रस्ताव राख्नुलाई अस्वाभाविक भन्ने गरिंदैन” भन्ने धारणा व्यक्त गरेकाछन् । यस तप्काका व्यक्तिहरु भारतको यस्तो मांग अस्वाभाविक ठान्दैनन् र सुरक्षा गर्न भारतलाई दिए हुन्छ भन्छन् । यसले नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्ता, स्वाधीनता तथा राष्ट्रियतामा आंच आउनेमा यो तप्कालाई कुनै चिन्ता छैन, जुन आश्चर्यजनक छ ।
अझ नेपाल र भारतका प्रधानमन्त्रीद्वयले अनलाइन शिलान्यास गरेको भारतीय लगानीमा निर्माण हुने निकासीमूलक अरुण तेश्रो आयोजना नियालौं । यो आयोजनाबाट कहिले, कति उत्पादन गर्ने, निकासी गर्ने कि नगर्ने भन्ने निर्णय गर्ने अधिकार ती आयोजनाका प्रवद्र्धकमा हुन्छ, नेपाल सरकारमा हैन । आयोजनाको सुरक्षाको व्यवस्था भारतले नगरे नै पनि यस्ता आयोजनाबाट के कति उत्पादन गर्ने र कहिले कसरी निकासी गर्ने भन्ने सम्बन्धमा नेपाल सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न मिल्दैन । गहिरिएर हेर्ने हो भने अहिले बिद्यमान खिम्ती, भोटेकोशी जस्ता आयोजनाको बिजुली नेपालको आन्तरिक खपतको लागि भएतापनि यी आयोजनाहरुबाट कहिले कति उत्पादन गर्ने, आपूर्ति गर्ने कि नगर्ने भन्ने निर्णय ती आयोजनाका प्रवद्र्धकहरुले गर्दै आएकाछन्, नेपाल सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न मिल्दैन । संकटकालमा बाहेक कुनै पनि निजी क्षेत्रको व्यवसायमा सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न सकिन्न ।
विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता
भारतले घुंडा टेक्ने दिवास्वप्न देख्नेहरु के बुझ्दैनन् भने आयोजना संचालनार्थ निर्माण गर्नु अघि प्रवद्र्धकले उत्पादन अनुमतिपत्र लिनुपर्छ जसकोलागि विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता सम्पन्न गरेर वित्तीय व्यवस्था गर्नुपर्छ । एक पटक विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता सम्पन्न भएपछि आयोजनाले तोकिए अनुरुप बिजुली खरिदकर्तालाई आपूर्ति गर्नुपर्छ । यसो गर्न नसकेमा आयोजनाले गम्भिर गल्ती गरेको मानिन्छ र ऋण लगानी गर्ने संस्थाले आयोजना नै लिलामसम्म गर्न सक्छ । यस्तो परिदृष्य देखा परेमा नेपालकै छवी ध्वस्त हुन्छ । त्यसैले भारतलाई घुंडा टेकाउने भन्दै यस्ता आयोजनाबाट हुने बिजुली आपूर्ति अवरुद्ध गर्न सकिन्न ।
भुटानको समृद्धि
अधिकांश भुटान मोडेलको चौकाचौंधमा परेकाहरु त्यो मोडेलका धेरै विशेषताबारे अनभिज्ञ छन् । यिनीहरुमा के भ्रम छ भने भुटानले पनि आयोजनाहरु निकासीमूलकको रुपमा कार्यान्वयन गर्छ । चुखा तथा ताला आयोजना निर्माण गर्न भुटान र भारत बीच सम्पन्न सम्झौताहरुका क्रमसः धारा ८ र ९ अनुसार भुटानको आवश्यकता पूर्ति गरेर बाँकी रहने बिजुली मात्र भारत निकासी गर्छ । त्यस बिपरित अरुण ३ र माथिल्लो कर्णाली आयोजना कार्यान्वयन गर्न सम्पन्न सम्झौता अनुसार क्रमसः १२ प्रतिशत र २१.९ प्रतिशत मात्र नेपालले निशुल्क उर्जाको रुपमा पाउंछ । नेपालमा खपत भएर बाँकी मात्र निकासी गरिने हैन । घाउमा नुनचुक दले जस्तै नेपालले पाउने भनिएको निशुल्क उर्जापनि निकासी नै गर्ने व्यवस्था छ ।
भुटानीहरुले विद्युतीय उर्जा पनि उत्पादन सामग्री हो भन्ने यथार्थ आत्मसात गरेकाछन् र भुटानमा खपत हुने बिजुलीको ८० प्रतिशत उद्योगहरुले उपभोग गर्छन् भने नेपालमा यसको अनुपात ४० प्रतिशत पुगेकोछैन । स्मरण रहोस्, उद्योगमा १ युनिट बिजुली खपत भएमा ८६ अमेरिकि सेन्ट (वर्तमान सटही दरमा ९१ रुपैया) बराबर मूल्य अभिवृद्धि हुन्छ, जुनबाट भुटान लाभान्वित भइरहेकोछ, भइरहने सुनिश्चित गरेकोछ । भुटानको समृद्ध भएको कारण यो हो, न कि निकासी ।
यस अतिरिक्त भुटान कसरी समृद्ध भयो भने भारतको ६० प्रतिशत अनुदान र ४० प्रतिशत सस्तो ब्याज दरमा वित्तीय व्यवस्था गरेर निर्मित यी आयोजनाहरुको स्वामित्व भुटान सरकारमा छ र जे जति मुनाफा हुन्छ, त्यो भुटानको राज्यकोषमा थपिन्छ । तर निर्माणाधीन अरुण ३ भारतीय सरकारको स्वामित्वको सतलज जलविद्युत निगमको स्वामित्वमा रहन्छ र यसबाट हुने सम्पूर्ण मुनाफा त्यसै कम्पनीको हुन्छ । नेपालले आयकर सम्म पाउन सक्नेमा पहिलो १० वर्ष पूर्ण छूट र त्यसपछिको ५ वर्ष ५० प्रतिशत छूट हुने हुनाले नेपालले त प्रवद्र्धकले कुम्ल्याएको मुनाफा हेर्दै ¥याल चुहाउंदै बस्नेमात्र हो ।
नेपालले न बिजुली पाउंछ, न मुनाफा नै ।
बिजुलीले उज्यालो
कतिपय भने यस्ता विद्युत आयोजना निर्माण भएर नेपाल उज्यालो हुने सपना देख्छन्, लोडसेडिंगबाट सांच्चिकै उन्मुक्ति पाउने अपेक्षा गर्छन । तर निकासी गरिएको बिजुलीले त पैठारी गर्ने देशमा उज्यालो छर्छ नेपालमा हैन भन्ने कुरा बुझ्दैनन् ।
अझ भुटानमा शतप्रतिशत विद्युतिकरण भैसकेको छ भने नेपालमा ६० प्रतिशत पुगेको दावी गरिन्छ र ५ वर्ष भित्र शतप्रतिशत जनताको बिजुलीमा पहुंच पुग्ने बताइएको छ, जुन राम्रो हो । तर कतिपय नेपालीको पहुंचमा बिजुली अहिले पनि भएतापनि (घरमाथिबाट बिजुलीको तार जान्छ वा नजिकै बिजुलीको लट्ठा छ) तिनको घर अँध्यारै । घरसम्म बिजुलीको तार तान्न र मिटर किन्न गच्छेले पुग्दैन र न हुन्छ विद्युत महशूल तिर्ने हैसियत ।
जबसम्म बिजुली जहाँ उत्पादन हुन्छ त्यहिं उद्योगधन्दा संचालन गरेर स्थानिय बासिन्दालाई रोजगारी दिइन्न, तिनको घरमा बिजुली वत्ति वाल्नु “ल्हासामा सुन छ, मेरो कान बुच्चै”को बिरोधाभासपूर्ण स्थितिले निरन्तरता पाउंछ ।
बालसुलभ बौद्धिकता
भारतलाई घुँडा टेकाउने सपना देख्ने बुद्धिजीवि हिसाब गर्दै भन्छ, अरुण तेश्रोबाट नेपाललाई वार्षिक १५ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानि हुन्छ (४ अर्ब युनिट बिजुली उत्पादन हुनेमा नेपालले निशुल्क पाउने ८८ करोड युनिट कटाएर ३ अर्ब १४ करोड युनिट बिजुली निकासी गर्ने हुनाले), युनिटको ५ रुपैयाको दरले । जुन सत्य होइन । बिजुली किन्ने भारतले र बेच्ने कम्पनी भारतीय हुनाले भुक्तानी भारतमा हुन्छ र त्यस्तो रकम नेपाल प्रवेशै गर्दैन, नेपालले आम्दानी गर्ने भनेको त धेरै परको कुरा ।
यस प्रसंगमा जोड्नु पर्छ लब्धप्रतिष्ठित अर्थशास्त्रीहरुले बिजुली निकासी गरेर व्यापार घाटा घट्छ भनेको । माथि भनिए झै अरुण ३ को १५ अर्ब रुपैयाको बिजुली निकासी भएपनि उक्त रकमले नेपाल प्रवेश पाउंदैन भने यसले व्यापार घाटा घटाएको ठहर्ने कि नठहर्ने । नेपालबाट बिभिन्न वस्तु निकासी गरिंदा भुक्तानी नेपालको ब्याँकिंग प्रणालीमा आउँछ र व्यापार तथा शोधनानन्तर हिसाबमा समाविष्ट हुन्छ । बिजुली निकासी गर्दा भने भुक्तानीले नेपाल प्रवेशै नगरेपछि यसको प्रभाव व्यापार र शोधनानन्तर हिसाबमा हुन्न । अनि कसरी व्यापार घाटा घट्छ ?
नेपालले घुंडा टेक्नु पर्ने खतरा
अहिले लोडसेडिंग समाप्त भयो भनिन्छ, झण्डै ५० प्रतिशत बिजुली भारतबाट पैठारी गरेर । तर नेपालमा अरुण ३ जस्ता निकासीमूलक आयोजनाहरु निर्माण सम्पन्न भएपछि पनि नेपालको आवश्यकता पैठारी गरेरै पूर्ति गरिनुपर्ने हुन्छ, नेपालकै उपभोगकोलागि भनेर आयोजना निर्माण नगरिएसम्म ।
बिजुलीको आवश्यकता उत्तरोत्तर बढ्दोछ । टोपबहादुर रायमाझी उर्जा मन्त्री हुंदा भनेका थिए नेपाललाई ५ हजार मेगावाट बिजुली आवश्यक छ । यातायात विद्युतिकरण गरेर पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ विस्थापन गर्न अझ धेरै चाहिन्छ । १० वर्ष पछि सजिलै १० हजार मेगावाट बिजुली नेपाललाई आवश्यक हुन्छ, २ अंके आर्थिक वृद्धि हासिल नहुंदै । आर्थिक वृद्धि २ अंक पु¥याउन त त्यसको दोब्बर बिजुली चाहिन्छ ।
तर नेपालले निकासीमूलक आयोजनाहरु निर्माण गरिरहे नेपालको आफ्नो आवश्यकता पूर्ति गर्न पैठारी गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । हास्यास्पद तब हुन्छ, जब नेपालबाटै निकासी गरिएको बिजुली नेपालले भारतबाट आयात गर्न परोस् । त्यसमा पनि नेपालबाट सस्तो दरमा निकासी हुने र त्यहि बिजुली नेपालले भारतबाट महंगोमा आयाता गर्दा डाडुमा पानी तताएर मर्ने स्थिति त सृजना हुन्छ नै ।
तर आफ्नै देशमा उत्पादित बिजुली भारतबाट किन्न परेको अवस्थामा भारतले चाहेमा आपूर्ति अवरुद्ध गर्न सक्छ र यस्तो अवस्थामा नेपालले पो घुंडा टेक्नु पर्ने अवस्था आउंछ !
त्यसैले नेपालले निकासीमूलक बनाएर आयोजना निर्माण गर्न दिनु आत्मघाती हो भने निकासीमूलक नबाइकन आफूले उपभोग गरेर बचेउब्रेको वा बढी भएको बिजुली निकासी गर्नु बुद्धिमत्तापूर्ण हुन्छ ।
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
२०७५ जेठ १४ गतेको नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
भारतको नेपालमाथि परनिर्भरता
जसरी नेपाललाई भारतले २०७२ सालमा नाकाबन्दी गरेर झण्डै घुँडा टेक्ने अवस्था श्रृजना ग¥यो, त्यसै गरेर नेपालले बिजुली आपूर्ति बन्द गरेर घुँडा टेक्न बाध्य पार्न सक्छ । नेपालमा निर्मित आयोजनाबाट मन परेको बेला आपूर्ति ग¥यो, रिस उठे आपूर्ति बन्द ग¥यो । बालसुलभ तरिकाबाट हेर्दा यो सम्भव परिदृष्य हो ।
स्मरणिय छ, २०४५ साल देखि भारतले गरेको नाकाबन्दी हटाउन २०४७ साल असारमा नेपालका तत्कालिन प्रधानमन्त्री कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईले दिल्ली गएर घुंडा टेके । यस क्रममा उनले नेपालका नदीनाला साझा पनि भने ! धन्न तिनी आमनिर्वाचनमा पराजित भएकोले नेपालका नदीनाला साझा भनेर सन्धी गर्न पाएनन् ।
यस सन्दर्भमा वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री ओली अपवाद ठहरे, २०७२ सालको महाभुकम्प लगत्तै भारतले लगाएको नाकाबन्दी सामु घुंडा टेकेनन्, नाकाबन्दी नहटाएसम्म भारतभ्रमणमा नजाने अडान लिए ।
भारतीय शासकमा भय
रमाइलो के छ भने भारतीय शासकमा पनि भय छ कि नेपालमाथि निर्भर भइएमा नेपालले आपूर्ति बन्द गरेर अप्ठेरो पार्न सक्छ । यहि कारणले गर्दा भारतले सार्वभौम नेपालको भूभागमा आयोजनाहरु निर्माण गर्दा आफ्नै नियन्त्रणमा राख्छ । कोशी तथा गंडकी नदीहरुमा निर्मित बाँधहरुमा अहिले सम्म पनि भारतकै नियन्त्रण छ, जुन कुरा यो तप्काको मानिसको बिस्मृतिमा परेकोछ । यिनीहरु अनभिज्ञ छन् कि ७० को दशकमा भारतको सहयोगमा जलाशययुक्त १० हजार ८ सय मेगावाटको कर्णाली चिसापानी आयोजना निर्माण प्रारम्भ हुनै लागेको बेलामा भारतले उक्त आयोजनाको सुरक्षाको जिम्मा आफैलाई दिनुपर्ने माग गरेपछि तत्कालिन राजा वीरेन्द्रले आयोजना नै रद्द गरेका थिए । यस सम्बन्धमा भारतका तत्कालिन बिदेश सचिव जगत मेहताले एक पुस्तकमा प्रकाशित आफ्नो लेखमा सार्वजनिक गरेकाछन् ।
आयोजनाको सुरक्षा
यस परिवेशमा भारतमा आपूर्ति हुने बिजुली नियन्त्रण गर्ने अवस्थामा नेपाल हुने छैन । उल्टो नेपालले यस्ता आयोजना निर्माण गर्न दिने अवस्थामा नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्तामाथि आँच आउने गरेर भारतीय सुरक्षाकर्मी नेपालमा परिचालित गर्नेछ । यस सन्दर्भमा स्मरणिय छ, सांसद राधेश्याम अधिकारीले “यो साता” नामक साप्ताहिकको जनवरी ५–११, २०१० को अंकमा “कर्णाली आयोजनामा माओबादी नीति” शिर्षकको लेखमा “भारतले आफ्नो लगानी सुरक्षित गर्न आवश्यक सुरक्षा आफैले गर्नुपर्ने प्रस्ताव पेश गर्नसक्छ । शक्ति राष्ट्रहरुद्वारा यस्ता प्रस्ताव राख्नुलाई अस्वाभाविक भन्ने गरिंदैन” भन्ने धारणा व्यक्त गरेकाछन् । यस तप्काका व्यक्तिहरु भारतको यस्तो मांग अस्वाभाविक ठान्दैनन् र सुरक्षा गर्न भारतलाई दिए हुन्छ भन्छन् । यसले नेपालको सार्वभौमसत्ता, स्वाधीनता तथा राष्ट्रियतामा आंच आउनेमा यो तप्कालाई कुनै चिन्ता छैन, जुन आश्चर्यजनक छ ।
अझ नेपाल र भारतका प्रधानमन्त्रीद्वयले अनलाइन शिलान्यास गरेको भारतीय लगानीमा निर्माण हुने निकासीमूलक अरुण तेश्रो आयोजना नियालौं । यो आयोजनाबाट कहिले, कति उत्पादन गर्ने, निकासी गर्ने कि नगर्ने भन्ने निर्णय गर्ने अधिकार ती आयोजनाका प्रवद्र्धकमा हुन्छ, नेपाल सरकारमा हैन । आयोजनाको सुरक्षाको व्यवस्था भारतले नगरे नै पनि यस्ता आयोजनाबाट के कति उत्पादन गर्ने र कहिले कसरी निकासी गर्ने भन्ने सम्बन्धमा नेपाल सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न मिल्दैन । गहिरिएर हेर्ने हो भने अहिले बिद्यमान खिम्ती, भोटेकोशी जस्ता आयोजनाको बिजुली नेपालको आन्तरिक खपतको लागि भएतापनि यी आयोजनाहरुबाट कहिले कति उत्पादन गर्ने, आपूर्ति गर्ने कि नगर्ने भन्ने निर्णय ती आयोजनाका प्रवद्र्धकहरुले गर्दै आएकाछन्, नेपाल सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न मिल्दैन । संकटकालमा बाहेक कुनै पनि निजी क्षेत्रको व्यवसायमा सरकारले हस्तक्षेप गर्न सकिन्न ।
विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता
भारतले घुंडा टेक्ने दिवास्वप्न देख्नेहरु के बुझ्दैनन् भने आयोजना संचालनार्थ निर्माण गर्नु अघि प्रवद्र्धकले उत्पादन अनुमतिपत्र लिनुपर्छ जसकोलागि विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता सम्पन्न गरेर वित्तीय व्यवस्था गर्नुपर्छ । एक पटक विद्युत खरिद सम्झौता सम्पन्न भएपछि आयोजनाले तोकिए अनुरुप बिजुली खरिदकर्तालाई आपूर्ति गर्नुपर्छ । यसो गर्न नसकेमा आयोजनाले गम्भिर गल्ती गरेको मानिन्छ र ऋण लगानी गर्ने संस्थाले आयोजना नै लिलामसम्म गर्न सक्छ । यस्तो परिदृष्य देखा परेमा नेपालकै छवी ध्वस्त हुन्छ । त्यसैले भारतलाई घुंडा टेकाउने भन्दै यस्ता आयोजनाबाट हुने बिजुली आपूर्ति अवरुद्ध गर्न सकिन्न ।
भुटानको समृद्धि
अधिकांश भुटान मोडेलको चौकाचौंधमा परेकाहरु त्यो मोडेलका धेरै विशेषताबारे अनभिज्ञ छन् । यिनीहरुमा के भ्रम छ भने भुटानले पनि आयोजनाहरु निकासीमूलकको रुपमा कार्यान्वयन गर्छ । चुखा तथा ताला आयोजना निर्माण गर्न भुटान र भारत बीच सम्पन्न सम्झौताहरुका क्रमसः धारा ८ र ९ अनुसार भुटानको आवश्यकता पूर्ति गरेर बाँकी रहने बिजुली मात्र भारत निकासी गर्छ । त्यस बिपरित अरुण ३ र माथिल्लो कर्णाली आयोजना कार्यान्वयन गर्न सम्पन्न सम्झौता अनुसार क्रमसः १२ प्रतिशत र २१.९ प्रतिशत मात्र नेपालले निशुल्क उर्जाको रुपमा पाउंछ । नेपालमा खपत भएर बाँकी मात्र निकासी गरिने हैन । घाउमा नुनचुक दले जस्तै नेपालले पाउने भनिएको निशुल्क उर्जापनि निकासी नै गर्ने व्यवस्था छ ।
भुटानीहरुले विद्युतीय उर्जा पनि उत्पादन सामग्री हो भन्ने यथार्थ आत्मसात गरेकाछन् र भुटानमा खपत हुने बिजुलीको ८० प्रतिशत उद्योगहरुले उपभोग गर्छन् भने नेपालमा यसको अनुपात ४० प्रतिशत पुगेकोछैन । स्मरण रहोस्, उद्योगमा १ युनिट बिजुली खपत भएमा ८६ अमेरिकि सेन्ट (वर्तमान सटही दरमा ९१ रुपैया) बराबर मूल्य अभिवृद्धि हुन्छ, जुनबाट भुटान लाभान्वित भइरहेकोछ, भइरहने सुनिश्चित गरेकोछ । भुटानको समृद्ध भएको कारण यो हो, न कि निकासी ।
यस अतिरिक्त भुटान कसरी समृद्ध भयो भने भारतको ६० प्रतिशत अनुदान र ४० प्रतिशत सस्तो ब्याज दरमा वित्तीय व्यवस्था गरेर निर्मित यी आयोजनाहरुको स्वामित्व भुटान सरकारमा छ र जे जति मुनाफा हुन्छ, त्यो भुटानको राज्यकोषमा थपिन्छ । तर निर्माणाधीन अरुण ३ भारतीय सरकारको स्वामित्वको सतलज जलविद्युत निगमको स्वामित्वमा रहन्छ र यसबाट हुने सम्पूर्ण मुनाफा त्यसै कम्पनीको हुन्छ । नेपालले आयकर सम्म पाउन सक्नेमा पहिलो १० वर्ष पूर्ण छूट र त्यसपछिको ५ वर्ष ५० प्रतिशत छूट हुने हुनाले नेपालले त प्रवद्र्धकले कुम्ल्याएको मुनाफा हेर्दै ¥याल चुहाउंदै बस्नेमात्र हो ।
नेपालले न बिजुली पाउंछ, न मुनाफा नै ।
बिजुलीले उज्यालो
कतिपय भने यस्ता विद्युत आयोजना निर्माण भएर नेपाल उज्यालो हुने सपना देख्छन्, लोडसेडिंगबाट सांच्चिकै उन्मुक्ति पाउने अपेक्षा गर्छन । तर निकासी गरिएको बिजुलीले त पैठारी गर्ने देशमा उज्यालो छर्छ नेपालमा हैन भन्ने कुरा बुझ्दैनन् ।
अझ भुटानमा शतप्रतिशत विद्युतिकरण भैसकेको छ भने नेपालमा ६० प्रतिशत पुगेको दावी गरिन्छ र ५ वर्ष भित्र शतप्रतिशत जनताको बिजुलीमा पहुंच पुग्ने बताइएको छ, जुन राम्रो हो । तर कतिपय नेपालीको पहुंचमा बिजुली अहिले पनि भएतापनि (घरमाथिबाट बिजुलीको तार जान्छ वा नजिकै बिजुलीको लट्ठा छ) तिनको घर अँध्यारै । घरसम्म बिजुलीको तार तान्न र मिटर किन्न गच्छेले पुग्दैन र न हुन्छ विद्युत महशूल तिर्ने हैसियत ।
जबसम्म बिजुली जहाँ उत्पादन हुन्छ त्यहिं उद्योगधन्दा संचालन गरेर स्थानिय बासिन्दालाई रोजगारी दिइन्न, तिनको घरमा बिजुली वत्ति वाल्नु “ल्हासामा सुन छ, मेरो कान बुच्चै”को बिरोधाभासपूर्ण स्थितिले निरन्तरता पाउंछ ।
बालसुलभ बौद्धिकता
भारतलाई घुँडा टेकाउने सपना देख्ने बुद्धिजीवि हिसाब गर्दै भन्छ, अरुण तेश्रोबाट नेपाललाई वार्षिक १५ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानि हुन्छ (४ अर्ब युनिट बिजुली उत्पादन हुनेमा नेपालले निशुल्क पाउने ८८ करोड युनिट कटाएर ३ अर्ब १४ करोड युनिट बिजुली निकासी गर्ने हुनाले), युनिटको ५ रुपैयाको दरले । जुन सत्य होइन । बिजुली किन्ने भारतले र बेच्ने कम्पनी भारतीय हुनाले भुक्तानी भारतमा हुन्छ र त्यस्तो रकम नेपाल प्रवेशै गर्दैन, नेपालले आम्दानी गर्ने भनेको त धेरै परको कुरा ।
यस प्रसंगमा जोड्नु पर्छ लब्धप्रतिष्ठित अर्थशास्त्रीहरुले बिजुली निकासी गरेर व्यापार घाटा घट्छ भनेको । माथि भनिए झै अरुण ३ को १५ अर्ब रुपैयाको बिजुली निकासी भएपनि उक्त रकमले नेपाल प्रवेश पाउंदैन भने यसले व्यापार घाटा घटाएको ठहर्ने कि नठहर्ने । नेपालबाट बिभिन्न वस्तु निकासी गरिंदा भुक्तानी नेपालको ब्याँकिंग प्रणालीमा आउँछ र व्यापार तथा शोधनानन्तर हिसाबमा समाविष्ट हुन्छ । बिजुली निकासी गर्दा भने भुक्तानीले नेपाल प्रवेशै नगरेपछि यसको प्रभाव व्यापार र शोधनानन्तर हिसाबमा हुन्न । अनि कसरी व्यापार घाटा घट्छ ?
नेपालले घुंडा टेक्नु पर्ने खतरा
अहिले लोडसेडिंग समाप्त भयो भनिन्छ, झण्डै ५० प्रतिशत बिजुली भारतबाट पैठारी गरेर । तर नेपालमा अरुण ३ जस्ता निकासीमूलक आयोजनाहरु निर्माण सम्पन्न भएपछि पनि नेपालको आवश्यकता पैठारी गरेरै पूर्ति गरिनुपर्ने हुन्छ, नेपालकै उपभोगकोलागि भनेर आयोजना निर्माण नगरिएसम्म ।
बिजुलीको आवश्यकता उत्तरोत्तर बढ्दोछ । टोपबहादुर रायमाझी उर्जा मन्त्री हुंदा भनेका थिए नेपाललाई ५ हजार मेगावाट बिजुली आवश्यक छ । यातायात विद्युतिकरण गरेर पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ विस्थापन गर्न अझ धेरै चाहिन्छ । १० वर्ष पछि सजिलै १० हजार मेगावाट बिजुली नेपाललाई आवश्यक हुन्छ, २ अंके आर्थिक वृद्धि हासिल नहुंदै । आर्थिक वृद्धि २ अंक पु¥याउन त त्यसको दोब्बर बिजुली चाहिन्छ ।
तर नेपालले निकासीमूलक आयोजनाहरु निर्माण गरिरहे नेपालको आफ्नो आवश्यकता पूर्ति गर्न पैठारी गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । हास्यास्पद तब हुन्छ, जब नेपालबाटै निकासी गरिएको बिजुली नेपालले भारतबाट आयात गर्न परोस् । त्यसमा पनि नेपालबाट सस्तो दरमा निकासी हुने र त्यहि बिजुली नेपालले भारतबाट महंगोमा आयाता गर्दा डाडुमा पानी तताएर मर्ने स्थिति त सृजना हुन्छ नै ।
तर आफ्नै देशमा उत्पादित बिजुली भारतबाट किन्न परेको अवस्थामा भारतले चाहेमा आपूर्ति अवरुद्ध गर्न सक्छ र यस्तो अवस्थामा नेपालले पो घुंडा टेक्नु पर्ने अवस्था आउंछ !
त्यसैले नेपालले निकासीमूलक बनाएर आयोजना निर्माण गर्न दिनु आत्मघाती हो भने निकासीमूलक नबाइकन आफूले उपभोग गरेर बचेउब्रेको वा बढी भएको बिजुली निकासी गर्नु बुद्धिमत्तापूर्ण हुन्छ ।
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
२०७५ जेठ १४ गतेको नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
Thursday, May 17, 2018
Neo-colonization of Arun 3
Indian Prime Minister visited Nepal last week and laid foundation stone of Arun 3 hydropower project, 900 MW, jointly with Nepal’s PM, “online”. PM Oli has been stressing ad nauseam that he is not a capitulationist. But implementation of Arun 3 project is manifestation of just that: capitulationism in him.
Export-oriented project
It is expected to generate 4,018 GWh energy and under section 11.16.1 of Project Development Agreement (PDA), signed between GoN and the developer of project, Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN), Nepal is to receive 21.9% energy (about 879 GWh) free of cost and 3,138 GWh to be exported.
There is provision for export of free energy in section 11.16.4 and 11.16.5, while there is complete silence with regard to consumption of the free energy in Nepal. Hence, it is clear that whatever electricity is generated by it, all of it will be exported.
Nepal is yet to achieve self-reliant energy security, which can only be achieved by setting up energy intensive industries, displacing imported petroleum products by electrification of transportation and so on. Achievement of energy security and export of power generated as such is mutually exclusive. Nor does Nepal have electricity surplus, to be contemplating its export.
Most industries of the country are located in Province 1 and its need for electricity is highest. Unfortunately, this project will generate electricity in that very province, but that very province will be deprived from electricity generated by it.
Multiplier effect
According to a study report prepared by Nextant under USAID-SARI/E program “the industrial sector average value addition per unit of electricity use is approximately 0.86 US$/kWh”. Therefore, by exporting electricity generated by this project Nepal will be deprived of Rs 9,141 billion in value addition in 25-year period. Such an economic phenomenon of value addition is known to be caused by the multiplier effect created by electricity consumed.
For lack of employment in Nepal, Nepali youth are migrating abroad, which could have been mitigated by industrialization in Nepal, but for unavailability of energy. Lack of industrialization has negative multiplier effect on Nepal’s economy: rampant unemployment, fatal dependency on import, balance of payment and trade deficit, treasury deprived from potential source of revenue, etc.
On the other hand India will use electricity from this project to set up industries and youth from Nepal will get employed there as laborer, coolie, etc. and get exploited.
In this backdrop it is sheer foolhardy to deprive Nepal from multiplier effect by exporting electricity from Aurn 3.
Resource Colonization
Resource colonization has become a rare phenomenon in modern days. However, innovative ways are being devised for colonization of resources. An example is export of primary commodities at dirt-cheap price, which manifests in planned export of electricity from Arun 3, thereby depriving Nepal’s economy from much needed electricity – a modern source of energy – and perpetuating dependency on fossil fuel in the meantime. It will be silly to oppose export of electricity if Nepal’s demand, including latent demand to displace energy source ranging from fossil fuel (modern source of energy) to biomass (both unclean) for electricity is met to saturation level. Unfortunately, it will be sheer foolishness to assert as such at the moment.
Mirage of Benefits to Nepal
Protagonists of implementation of this project salivate at the potential benefits that Nepal supposedly stands to benefit, ranging from 197 MW free electricity worth Rs 155 billion to financial benefits of Rs 107 billion in royalties, Rs 77 billion as income tax and 9 billion as custom duty and VAT; a handsome total of Rs 348 billion within 25 years of “concession period”. Let’s examine the validity of such claim.
Free energy
Nepal is slated to receive 21.9% as free energy, claimed to be 197 MW by Investment Board of Nepal (IBN). However, it should not be forgotten that as a run of the river project, its generation in dry season would be around 300 MW only. Therefore, free energy to Nepal would be around 70 MW in dry season of up to 8 months and 197 MW in rainy season that lasts about 4 months.
Since, it is a peaking run of the river project, it can generate at installed capacity even in dry season. But for lack of water it would generate at full capacity only a few hours a day in dry season, whereas in wet season it can generate at full capacity, 24 hours a day. Effectively, free energy from it will be equivalent to 70 MW only from peaking run of the river scheme.
IBN has estimated that revenue from free energy will be Rs 155 billion, which is not correct. It will amount to Rs 110 billion only.
Rs 107 billion from royalty
IBN has estimated that Nepal would earn Rs 107 billion as royalties from it, which too is incorrect. According to section 11.26 of PDA, capacity royalty is Rs 400/kW for first fifteen year and Rs 1,800/kW from 16th year through 25th year. At this rate Nepal would earn Rs 12 billion in capacity royalty over 25 years. Similarly, rate of energy royalty in first 15 years is 7.5% and 12% from 16th through 25th year. Thus, energy royalty in 25 years will be Rs 19 billion if electricity is exported at Rs 5/kWh. Total revenue to GoN from royalties in 25 years comes to Rs 31 billion. The export rate will have to be Rs 25/kWh in order for Nepal to earn Rs 107 billion in royalties. Which is well neigh impossible!
It is possible that IBN clubbed even export tax revenue. But under section 9.3 of PDA, the rate of export tax is only 0.005% and revenue therefrom comes to Rs 20 million only in 25 years.
Income tax
Estimated cost of this project is Rs 104 billion and debt to equity ratio is 75:25. If average rate of net profit before tax is 40%, Nepal will receive only Rs 26 billion over 25 years. Because under section 3.2.4 of PDA, the project is exempt from income tax fully for first 10 years and it is entitled to 50% rebate from 11th through 15th year.
Rather, Nepal’s treasury stands to lose Rs 26 billion due to above-mentioned income tax exemption and rebate.
VAT and custom duty
IBN claim that Nepal would receive Rs 9 billion from VAT and custom duties is also incorrect. Pursuant to section 12(7) of Electricity Act, the project is exempt from VAT on import of plant, machinery and equipment and these attract only 1% custom duty. Due to these exemptions Nepal’s treasury will be deprived of estimated Rs 14 billion.
Whereas, in accordance with section 9.2 of PDA, the project is entitled to grant of Rs 5 million per MW; totaling Rs 4.5 billion. IBN has not disclosed this facility to public, among others.
The project is also entitled to 50% custom duty exemption on import of cement, steel bar, etc. It is expected to cost Rs 5 billion to Nepal’s treasury.
Benefit and opportunity cost
Total benefits that accrue to Nepal as analyzed above totals Rs 176 billion only, even including Rs 9 billion from custom duty and VAT.
However, IBN is silent with regard to direct costs and opportunity costs to Nepal’s economy. Opportunity costs are (1) Rs 26 billion in income tax exemption, (2) Rs 14 billion in VAT exemption and rebate on custom duty on plant machinery and equipment import and (3) Rs 5 billion due to custom duty exemption on cement and steel bar. Additionally, Nepal has to pay Rs 4.5 billion to the project for having paid VAT.
In sum Nepal stands to receive Rs 176 billion while the costs to Nepal is Rs 49 billion. Net estimated benefit to Nepal is Rs 126 billion only. Not whopping Rs 348 billion!
Devolution of ownership to GoN
Proponents of this project take solace in the fact that its ownership will devolve to Nepal after 25 years. It is comparable to the practice rampant in western Nepal under which a family gives away a daughter to the lender against loan taken, till repayment of the loan; known as Kamlari practice. The girl will practically spend her entire life working for the loan shark and will return to family in old age. Electro-mechanical equipment of this project too will be useless in 25 years. Besides, Nepal needs electricity right now to achieve self-reliant energy security.
Some experts take consolation in the provision of section 11.17.2 of PDA under which Nepal can buy up to 10% electricity. However, it will amount to only 70 MW in wet season and around 30 MW in dry season. Almost like a drop in the ocean in view of Nepal’s need.
From Arun 3 to Arun 3
Some people are still lamenting the fact that the World Bank cancelled 201 MW Arun 3 in August 1995. But that cancellation was in Nepal’s interest. Because the estimated cost was Rs 560/MW (cost overrun could have pushed it to Rs 800/MW), very exorbitant compared to the cost of this one: Rs 110/MW. Had that been implemented, brokers, peddlers, politicos and bureaucrats would have skimmed off amongst themselves Rs 400/MW.
Besides, the World Bank had imposed a covenant under which Nepal was proscribed from undertaking any project larger than 10 MW. Therefore, due to cancellation of that project Nepal succeeded to build Modi (14 MW), Kali Gandaki A (144 MW) and Middle Marsyangdi (70 MW) under NEA. Similarly, private sector implemented Khimti (60 MW), Bhote Koshi (45 MW), Chilime (22 MW) and Mai Khola (22 MW). In this manner due to cancelation of 201 MW project, 377 MW got added to Nepal’s system.
It is not to say that Arun 3 should be cancelled once more. Ground reality needs to be understood. Nepal doesn’t benefit from this project by Rs 348 billion in 25 years. Net benefit is only Rs 127 billion. Whereas Nepal would be deprived from benefit from multiplier effect of Rs 9,141 billion. Therefore, Arun 3 needs to be liberated from resource colonization.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
Published in People’s Review on May 17, 2018
Export-oriented project
It is expected to generate 4,018 GWh energy and under section 11.16.1 of Project Development Agreement (PDA), signed between GoN and the developer of project, Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam (SJVN), Nepal is to receive 21.9% energy (about 879 GWh) free of cost and 3,138 GWh to be exported.
There is provision for export of free energy in section 11.16.4 and 11.16.5, while there is complete silence with regard to consumption of the free energy in Nepal. Hence, it is clear that whatever electricity is generated by it, all of it will be exported.
Nepal is yet to achieve self-reliant energy security, which can only be achieved by setting up energy intensive industries, displacing imported petroleum products by electrification of transportation and so on. Achievement of energy security and export of power generated as such is mutually exclusive. Nor does Nepal have electricity surplus, to be contemplating its export.
Most industries of the country are located in Province 1 and its need for electricity is highest. Unfortunately, this project will generate electricity in that very province, but that very province will be deprived from electricity generated by it.
Multiplier effect
According to a study report prepared by Nextant under USAID-SARI/E program “the industrial sector average value addition per unit of electricity use is approximately 0.86 US$/kWh”. Therefore, by exporting electricity generated by this project Nepal will be deprived of Rs 9,141 billion in value addition in 25-year period. Such an economic phenomenon of value addition is known to be caused by the multiplier effect created by electricity consumed.
For lack of employment in Nepal, Nepali youth are migrating abroad, which could have been mitigated by industrialization in Nepal, but for unavailability of energy. Lack of industrialization has negative multiplier effect on Nepal’s economy: rampant unemployment, fatal dependency on import, balance of payment and trade deficit, treasury deprived from potential source of revenue, etc.
On the other hand India will use electricity from this project to set up industries and youth from Nepal will get employed there as laborer, coolie, etc. and get exploited.
In this backdrop it is sheer foolhardy to deprive Nepal from multiplier effect by exporting electricity from Aurn 3.
Resource Colonization
Resource colonization has become a rare phenomenon in modern days. However, innovative ways are being devised for colonization of resources. An example is export of primary commodities at dirt-cheap price, which manifests in planned export of electricity from Arun 3, thereby depriving Nepal’s economy from much needed electricity – a modern source of energy – and perpetuating dependency on fossil fuel in the meantime. It will be silly to oppose export of electricity if Nepal’s demand, including latent demand to displace energy source ranging from fossil fuel (modern source of energy) to biomass (both unclean) for electricity is met to saturation level. Unfortunately, it will be sheer foolishness to assert as such at the moment.
Mirage of Benefits to Nepal
Protagonists of implementation of this project salivate at the potential benefits that Nepal supposedly stands to benefit, ranging from 197 MW free electricity worth Rs 155 billion to financial benefits of Rs 107 billion in royalties, Rs 77 billion as income tax and 9 billion as custom duty and VAT; a handsome total of Rs 348 billion within 25 years of “concession period”. Let’s examine the validity of such claim.
Free energy
Nepal is slated to receive 21.9% as free energy, claimed to be 197 MW by Investment Board of Nepal (IBN). However, it should not be forgotten that as a run of the river project, its generation in dry season would be around 300 MW only. Therefore, free energy to Nepal would be around 70 MW in dry season of up to 8 months and 197 MW in rainy season that lasts about 4 months.
Since, it is a peaking run of the river project, it can generate at installed capacity even in dry season. But for lack of water it would generate at full capacity only a few hours a day in dry season, whereas in wet season it can generate at full capacity, 24 hours a day. Effectively, free energy from it will be equivalent to 70 MW only from peaking run of the river scheme.
IBN has estimated that revenue from free energy will be Rs 155 billion, which is not correct. It will amount to Rs 110 billion only.
Rs 107 billion from royalty
IBN has estimated that Nepal would earn Rs 107 billion as royalties from it, which too is incorrect. According to section 11.26 of PDA, capacity royalty is Rs 400/kW for first fifteen year and Rs 1,800/kW from 16th year through 25th year. At this rate Nepal would earn Rs 12 billion in capacity royalty over 25 years. Similarly, rate of energy royalty in first 15 years is 7.5% and 12% from 16th through 25th year. Thus, energy royalty in 25 years will be Rs 19 billion if electricity is exported at Rs 5/kWh. Total revenue to GoN from royalties in 25 years comes to Rs 31 billion. The export rate will have to be Rs 25/kWh in order for Nepal to earn Rs 107 billion in royalties. Which is well neigh impossible!
It is possible that IBN clubbed even export tax revenue. But under section 9.3 of PDA, the rate of export tax is only 0.005% and revenue therefrom comes to Rs 20 million only in 25 years.
Income tax
Estimated cost of this project is Rs 104 billion and debt to equity ratio is 75:25. If average rate of net profit before tax is 40%, Nepal will receive only Rs 26 billion over 25 years. Because under section 3.2.4 of PDA, the project is exempt from income tax fully for first 10 years and it is entitled to 50% rebate from 11th through 15th year.
Rather, Nepal’s treasury stands to lose Rs 26 billion due to above-mentioned income tax exemption and rebate.
VAT and custom duty
IBN claim that Nepal would receive Rs 9 billion from VAT and custom duties is also incorrect. Pursuant to section 12(7) of Electricity Act, the project is exempt from VAT on import of plant, machinery and equipment and these attract only 1% custom duty. Due to these exemptions Nepal’s treasury will be deprived of estimated Rs 14 billion.
Whereas, in accordance with section 9.2 of PDA, the project is entitled to grant of Rs 5 million per MW; totaling Rs 4.5 billion. IBN has not disclosed this facility to public, among others.
The project is also entitled to 50% custom duty exemption on import of cement, steel bar, etc. It is expected to cost Rs 5 billion to Nepal’s treasury.
Benefit and opportunity cost
Total benefits that accrue to Nepal as analyzed above totals Rs 176 billion only, even including Rs 9 billion from custom duty and VAT.
However, IBN is silent with regard to direct costs and opportunity costs to Nepal’s economy. Opportunity costs are (1) Rs 26 billion in income tax exemption, (2) Rs 14 billion in VAT exemption and rebate on custom duty on plant machinery and equipment import and (3) Rs 5 billion due to custom duty exemption on cement and steel bar. Additionally, Nepal has to pay Rs 4.5 billion to the project for having paid VAT.
In sum Nepal stands to receive Rs 176 billion while the costs to Nepal is Rs 49 billion. Net estimated benefit to Nepal is Rs 126 billion only. Not whopping Rs 348 billion!
Devolution of ownership to GoN
Proponents of this project take solace in the fact that its ownership will devolve to Nepal after 25 years. It is comparable to the practice rampant in western Nepal under which a family gives away a daughter to the lender against loan taken, till repayment of the loan; known as Kamlari practice. The girl will practically spend her entire life working for the loan shark and will return to family in old age. Electro-mechanical equipment of this project too will be useless in 25 years. Besides, Nepal needs electricity right now to achieve self-reliant energy security.
Some experts take consolation in the provision of section 11.17.2 of PDA under which Nepal can buy up to 10% electricity. However, it will amount to only 70 MW in wet season and around 30 MW in dry season. Almost like a drop in the ocean in view of Nepal’s need.
From Arun 3 to Arun 3
Some people are still lamenting the fact that the World Bank cancelled 201 MW Arun 3 in August 1995. But that cancellation was in Nepal’s interest. Because the estimated cost was Rs 560/MW (cost overrun could have pushed it to Rs 800/MW), very exorbitant compared to the cost of this one: Rs 110/MW. Had that been implemented, brokers, peddlers, politicos and bureaucrats would have skimmed off amongst themselves Rs 400/MW.
Besides, the World Bank had imposed a covenant under which Nepal was proscribed from undertaking any project larger than 10 MW. Therefore, due to cancellation of that project Nepal succeeded to build Modi (14 MW), Kali Gandaki A (144 MW) and Middle Marsyangdi (70 MW) under NEA. Similarly, private sector implemented Khimti (60 MW), Bhote Koshi (45 MW), Chilime (22 MW) and Mai Khola (22 MW). In this manner due to cancelation of 201 MW project, 377 MW got added to Nepal’s system.
It is not to say that Arun 3 should be cancelled once more. Ground reality needs to be understood. Nepal doesn’t benefit from this project by Rs 348 billion in 25 years. Net benefit is only Rs 127 billion. Whereas Nepal would be deprived from benefit from multiplier effect of Rs 9,141 billion. Therefore, Arun 3 needs to be liberated from resource colonization.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha
Published in People’s Review on May 17, 2018
Tuesday, May 8, 2018
अरुण ३ को औपनिबेसिक दोहन
अधिकांश नेपाली उत्साहित छन्, निकासीमूलक ९ सय मेगावाट जडित क्षमताको अरुण ३ आयोजनाको शिलान्यास हुन लागेकोमा । तर सुन्निएकोलाई मोटाएको ठाने पछि पछुताउनु पर्छ । त्यसैले कुरा गहनरुपमा बुझ्न वान्छनिय छ ।
निकासीमूलक आयोजना
यसबाट करिब ४ अर्ब २ करोड युनिट बिजुली उत्पादन हुन्छ । आयोजना विकास सम्झौता (पीडीए)को दफा ११.१६.१ मा नेपालले २१.९ प्रतिशत (करिब ८८ करोड युनिट) बिजुली निशुल्क पाउने प्रावधान छ । ३ अर्व १४ करोड युनिट निर्यात गरिन्छ ।
पीडीएको दफा ११.१६.४ र ११.१६.५ मा निशुल्क उर्जा निकासी गर्ने व्यवस्था छ भने नेपाल भित्रै यस्तो बिजुली खपत गर्ने सम्बन्धमा पीडीए मौन । प्रष्ट छ, यसबाट उत्पादित सम्पूर्ण बिजुली निकासी गरिन्छ ।
नेपालले आत्मनिर्भर उर्जा सुरक्षा हासिल गरेको छैन । यसको लागि उर्जा सघन उद्योगहरुको स्थापनामात्र नगरी यातायात विद्युतिकरण गरेर आयातित पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ विस्थापन गरिनुपर्छ । तर नेपालमा बन्न लागेको यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरेर नेपालले आत्मनिर्भर उर्जा सुरक्षा हासिल गर्ने मृगमिरिचिका मात्र हो ।
प्रादेशिक हिसाबले प्रदेश १ मा सबभन्दा धेरै उद्योगधन्दा छन् र बिजुलीको आवश्यकता पनि तद्अनुरुप बढी । त्यहि प्रदेशमा निर्माण भएतापनि त्यो प्रदेश समेत यसको बिजुलीबाट बंचित हुनेछ । यो भनेको प्रदेश १ को औपनिबेसिक दोहन हो, बिद्युत उपभोग गर्नबाट बिमुख पारेर भारत निकासी !
अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि
अमेरिकि सहयोग नियोगको एक अध्ययन प्रतिबेदन अनुसार १ युनिट बिजुली खपत भएमा ८६ अमेरिकि सेन्ट (रु ९१) बराबर अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुन्छ । तर यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरिने भएकोले नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र वार्षिक ३ खर्ब ६५ अर्बले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुनबाट बंचित हुन्छ । लगानी बोर्डले यो आयोजनाबाट नेपाललाई हुने तथाकथित लाभको आकलन गर्दा २५ वर्षे आँकडा दिएको पृष्ठभूमिमा यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरिंदा २५ वर्षमा ९१ खर्ब ४१ अर्ब रुपैयाले multiplier effect काे कारणले हुने मूल्य अभिबृद्धिबाट नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र बंचित हुन्छ । यो पाटोलाई उपेक्षा गरेर हौसिनेहरुले पछि पछुताउने अवसर पाउने छैनन् ।
विद्युतीय उर्जाको अभावमा नेपालमा औद्योगिकरण नभएकोले बेरोजगार युवा बिदेश पलायन हुन्छन् । आयातीत पेट्रोलियम पदार्थमाथिको निर्भरताले देशको अर्थतन्त्रको रुग्ण छ, व्यापार/शोधनान्तर घाटा चुलिंदोछ । खाडी र पूर्वी एशियाली देशहरुमा रोजगारीको लागि नजानेहरु भारत जान्छन् । यो आयोजनाको बिजुली पनि उपभोग गरेर भारतले औद्योगिकरण गर्छ र भारतको अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुन्छ । अनि नेपाली युवा भारतमा दरबान, चौकिदार, कुल्ली, मजदूर बनेर शोषित हुन्छन् ।
यसै कारण सामान्य राजनैतिक–अर्थशास्त्रीय भाषामा प्राकृतिक श्रोतको यस्तो दोहनलाई औपनिबेसिक दोहन भनिन्छ । उर्जा, कच्चा पदार्थ र युवा जनशक्ती निकासी गर्दा हुने परिणिति ।
नेपाललाई आयोजनाबाट लाभ
लगानी बोर्डले यो आयोजना निर्माण भए नेपाल २५ वर्षमा जम्मा ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्बले लाभान्वित हुन्छ भनेको छ । यो आकलन कत्तिको यथार्थपरक छ हेरौं ।
निशुल्क उर्जा
लगानी बोर्डले निशुल्क उर्जा २१.९ प्रतिशतबापत १ सय ९७ मेगावाट पाउने उल्लेख गरेको पूर्ण सत्य होइन । यो आयोजनाले सुख्खायाममा पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन गर्दैन, पानीको अभावमा । सुख्खायाममा ३ सय मेगावाट जति उत्पादन हुन्छ र त्यतिखेर नेपालले पाउने ७० मेगावाट भन्दा कम हुन्छ । यो आयोजनामा सानो जलाशय पनि निर्माण गरिएर सुख्खायाममा पनि पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन हुनसक्छ । तर वर्षातमा चौबिसै घण्टा पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन हुन्छ भने सुख्खायाममा पूर्ण क्षमतामा केहि घण्टामात्र उत्पादन हुन्छ, जुन ७० मेगावाटले चौबिसै घण्टा उत्पादन गर्ने बराबर हुन्छ । वस्तुतः नेपालले १ सय ९७ मेगावाट पूर्ण क्षमतामा चौबिसै घण्टा र बाह्रै महिना पाउंछ भन्नु भ्रामक हो ।
लगानी बोर्डले निशुल्क उर्जाबाट १ खर्व ५५ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानी हुने आकलन गरेको पनि मिलेको छैन, करिब १ खर्ब १० अर्ब मात्र हुन्छ ।
१ खर्ब ७ अर्ब रुपैया रोयल्टी
लगानी बोर्डले गरेको २५ वर्षमा नेपालले पाउने रोयल्टीको हिसाब पनि मिल्दैन । पीडीएको दफा ११.२६ अनुसार पहिलो १५ वर्ष प्रति किलोवाट ४ सय रुपैया क्षमता रोयल्टी र साह्रौं वर्ष देखि प्रति किलोवाट १८ सयको दरले २५ वर्षमा साढे १२ अर्ब रुपैया क्षमता रोयल्टी प्राप्त हुन्छ । यस्तै उर्जा रोयल्टीको दर पहिलो १५ वर्ष साढे ७ प्रतिशत र साह्रौं वर्ष देखि १२ प्रतिशत हो । बिजुली ५ रुपैयामा निकासी गरिए २५ वर्षमा उर्जा रोयल्टीबापत झण्डै १९ अर्व रुपैया जति प्राप्त हुन्छ । यसरी २५ वर्षमा पाइने क्षमता र उर्जा रोयल्टी जम्मा ३१ अर्ब रुपैया मात्र हुन्छ, १ खर्ब ७ अर्ब होइन । प्रति युनिट बिजुली २५ रुपैयामा निकासी गरिएमात्र लगानी बोर्डको हिसाब मिल्छ । तर भारतले कुनैपनि आयोजनाको बिजुली २५ रुपैया प्रति युनिटमा किन्ने सम्भावना छैन ।
लगानी बोर्डले निकासी करको रकम समेत यसमा समाबेश गरेको हुन सक्छ, तैपनि मिल्दैन । किनभने पीडीएमा निकासी करको दर ०.००५ प्रतिशत मात्र तोकिएको छ र यो दरमा वार्षिक निकासी कर ८ लाख रुपैया जति हुन्छ र २५ वर्षमा २ करोड रुपैयामात्र ।
आयकर ७७ अर्ब
१ खर्ब ४ अर्ब रुपैया लागत अनुमान गरिएको यो आयोजनामा ७५ प्रतिशत ऋण र २५ प्रतिशत स्वपूंजी लगानी गरिन्छ । स्वपूंजीको औसत ४० प्रतिशत नै खूद मुनाफा आर्जन गरेमा नेपालले २५ वर्षमा २६ अर्ब रुपैया आयकर पाउंछ । किनभने पीडीएको दफा ३.२.४ अनुसार पहिलो १० वर्ष आयकर पूर्णरुपमा छूट हुन्छ भने एघारौं वर्ष देखि पन्ध्रौं वर्षसम्म आयकरमा ५० प्रतिशत छूट छ । आयकर ७७ अर्ब रुपैया हुन स्वपूंजीमा औसत १ सय प्रतिशत भन्दा बढी खूद मुनाफा हुनुपर्छ, जुन सम्भव छैन ।
बरु पहिलो १० वर्ष शतप्रतिशत छूट र एघारौं वर्ष देखि पन्ध्रौं वर्षसम्म ५० प्रतिशत छूटले गर्दा नेपालले आयकर बापत २५ वर्षमा २६ अर्ब रुपैया गुमाउंछ ।
मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसार
राज्यले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसारबापत ९ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानी गर्ने लगानी बोर्डको आकलन मिल्दैन । किनभने विद्युत ऐनको दफा १२(७) अनुसार प्लान्ट, मेशिनरी, उपकरण आदि पैठारी गर्दा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर पूर्णतः छूट हुन्छ भने भंसार महसूल १ प्रतिशत मात्र लाग्छ । यसको कारण राज्यमाथि बरु १४ अर्ब रुपैया भार पर्ने अनुमान छ ।
पीडीएको दफा ९.२ मा आयोजनाका प्रवर्द्धकले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर तिरेबापत अनुदान स्वरुप प्रति मेगावाट ५० लाख रुपैया पाउने व्यवस्था भएकोले जम्मा ४ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया उक्त आयोजनाले पाउंछ, जुन कुरा लगानी बोर्डले उल्लेख गर्न आवश्यक देखेन ।
लगानी बोर्डले उल्लेख गर्न आवश्यक नठानेको अर्को सुविधा हो सिमेन्ट, छड आदिको आयातमा ५० प्रतिशत भंसार छूट, जसको भार राज्यको कोषमा ५ अर्ब रुपैया पर्ने अनुमान छ ।
पाउने, गुम्ने
माथि विश्लेषण गरिए झै नेपालले प्राप्त गर्ने १ खर्ब ७६ अर्ब रुपैया मात्र हुन्छ, भंसार र मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर ९ अर्ब समेत ।
तर नेपालले उक्त आयोजनालाई दिने बिभिन्न सुविधा बारे भने लगानी बोर्डको मौनता शंकास्पद छ । माथि उल्लेख गरिए झै (१) आयकर छूट बापत २६ अर्ब रुपैया, (२) मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसार छूटको कारण १४ अर्ब रुपैया, (३) सिमेन्ट, छड आदिको आयातमा छूटले गर्दा ५ अर्ब रुपैया र (४) आयोजनाले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर तिरेबापत अनुदान स्वरुप पाउने ४ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया समेत गरेर राज्यले साढे ४९ अर्ब रुपैया गुमाउंछ ।
आयोजनाबाट नेपालले पाउने १ खर्ब ७६ अर्ब र गुमाउने साढे ४९ अर्ब हुनाले नेपालले खूद पाउने १ खर्ब २६ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया मात्र हो । ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्ब रुपैया हैन ।
कमलरीकरण
यसरी वस्तुगतरुपमा विश्लेषण गर्नेलाई विकासबिरोधिको बिल्ला भिराउंदै के भनिन्छ भने २५ वर्ष पछि आयोजना नेपालको भइहाल्छ । आर्थिक कारणले आफूले पाल्ने हैसियत नभएर छोरीलाई साहुको घरमा कमलरी बन्न पठाए जस्तै हो यो भनाइ ! उत्पादनशील समयमा पराइको सेवामा लगाएर दशकौं पछि फिर्ता लिने ! पहिलो, नेपाललाई बिजुलीको आवश्यकता नभएकोले निकासी गरिने होइन । दोश्रो २५ वर्ष पछि उक्त आयोजनाको इलेक्ट्रो–मेकानिकल मेशिनरी, उपकरण आदि थोत्रिएर कामै नलाग्ने हुन्छ । नेपाललाई यो आयोजनाको बिजुलीको आवश्यकता तत्काल अहिले छ भने किन निकासी गर्ने ?
हुन त कतिपय उर्जा विशेषज्ञले नेपालले यो आयोजनाको बिजुली किन्न सक्ने विकल्प औंल्याउंछन् । तर पीडीएको दफा ११.१७.२ अनुसार ९० प्रतिशत बिजुली निकासी गरेर बचेकोमात्र नेपालले किन्छु भन्न पाउने व्यवस्था छः वर्षात ४ महिना ७० मेगावाट र बाँकी समय ३० मेगावाट जति, जुन नेपालको आवश्यकताको तुलनामा हात्तिको मुखमा जिरा हो ।
अरुण ३ देखि अरुण ३ सम्म
यस सन्दर्भमा कतिपयले सन् १९९५ मा विश्व ब्याँकले २ सय १ मेगावाट जडित क्षमता भएको अरुण ३ रद्द गरेकोमा दुख मनाउने गरेको पाइन्छ । यस पंक्तिकार भने उक्त आयोजना खारेजी नेपालको स्वार्थ अनुकूल देख्छ । यसको अनुमानित प्रति मेगावाट लागत साढे ११ करोड रुपैया हो भने त्यसको ५६ करोड रुपैया । त्यो आयोजना सम्पन्न हुंदा ८० करोड पुग्थ्यो । खारेज नभएको भए दलाल, भ्रष्टाचारीहरुले १ मेगावाटमा झण्डै ४० करोड रुपैया भन्दा बढी रकम भागशान्ती जय नेपाल गर्थे र त्यसको भार उपभोक्ताले बोक्नु पथ्र्यो ।
उक्त खारेजी अर्को कारणले पनि नेपालको हितमा थियो । विश्व ब्यांकको शर्त थियो त्यो आयोजनाको निर्माण नसकिएसम्म १० मेगावाट भन्दा ठूला अन्य आयोजना निर्माण गर्न नपाउने । अर्थात उक्त आयोजना कार्यान्वयनमा गएको भए विद्युत प्राधिकरणकोे मोदी (१४ मेगावाट), काली गंडकी (१४४) र मध्यमस्याङ्गदी (७०) तथा निजी क्षेत्रका खिम्ती (६०), भोटेकोशी (४५), चिलिमे (२२) र माई खोला (२२) निर्माण हुने थिएन । यसरी २ सय १ मेगावाट क्षमताको अरुण ३ त्यतिबेला रद्द भएकोले नेपालमा ३ सय ७८ मेगावाट थपियो ।
यो लेखको उद्देश्य अरुण ३ फेरि पनि रद्द गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने हैन । लगानी बोर्डले भने झै नेपाल २५ वर्षमा ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्ब ले लाभान्वित हुने नभएर खूद १ खर्ब २७ अर्ब रुपैया मात्रले लाभान्वित हुन्छ भने २५ वर्षको अवधिमा ९१ खर्ब ४१ अर्ब रुपैयाले mगतिष्उष्भिच भााभअत कारणले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुनबाट नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र बंचित हुन्छ । यो त विशुद्ध घाटाको व्यापार भयो । त्यसकारण अरुण ३ को औपनिबेसिक दोहनबाट मुक्त हुने गरेर निर्माण गरिनुपर्छ ।
२०७५ बैशाख २५ गतेको नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
निकासीमूलक आयोजना
यसबाट करिब ४ अर्ब २ करोड युनिट बिजुली उत्पादन हुन्छ । आयोजना विकास सम्झौता (पीडीए)को दफा ११.१६.१ मा नेपालले २१.९ प्रतिशत (करिब ८८ करोड युनिट) बिजुली निशुल्क पाउने प्रावधान छ । ३ अर्व १४ करोड युनिट निर्यात गरिन्छ ।
पीडीएको दफा ११.१६.४ र ११.१६.५ मा निशुल्क उर्जा निकासी गर्ने व्यवस्था छ भने नेपाल भित्रै यस्तो बिजुली खपत गर्ने सम्बन्धमा पीडीए मौन । प्रष्ट छ, यसबाट उत्पादित सम्पूर्ण बिजुली निकासी गरिन्छ ।
नेपालले आत्मनिर्भर उर्जा सुरक्षा हासिल गरेको छैन । यसको लागि उर्जा सघन उद्योगहरुको स्थापनामात्र नगरी यातायात विद्युतिकरण गरेर आयातित पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ विस्थापन गरिनुपर्छ । तर नेपालमा बन्न लागेको यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरेर नेपालले आत्मनिर्भर उर्जा सुरक्षा हासिल गर्ने मृगमिरिचिका मात्र हो ।
प्रादेशिक हिसाबले प्रदेश १ मा सबभन्दा धेरै उद्योगधन्दा छन् र बिजुलीको आवश्यकता पनि तद्अनुरुप बढी । त्यहि प्रदेशमा निर्माण भएतापनि त्यो प्रदेश समेत यसको बिजुलीबाट बंचित हुनेछ । यो भनेको प्रदेश १ को औपनिबेसिक दोहन हो, बिद्युत उपभोग गर्नबाट बिमुख पारेर भारत निकासी !
अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि
अमेरिकि सहयोग नियोगको एक अध्ययन प्रतिबेदन अनुसार १ युनिट बिजुली खपत भएमा ८६ अमेरिकि सेन्ट (रु ९१) बराबर अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुन्छ । तर यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरिने भएकोले नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र वार्षिक ३ खर्ब ६५ अर्बले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुनबाट बंचित हुन्छ । लगानी बोर्डले यो आयोजनाबाट नेपाललाई हुने तथाकथित लाभको आकलन गर्दा २५ वर्षे आँकडा दिएको पृष्ठभूमिमा यो आयोजनाको बिजुली निकासी गरिंदा २५ वर्षमा ९१ खर्ब ४१ अर्ब रुपैयाले multiplier effect काे कारणले हुने मूल्य अभिबृद्धिबाट नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र बंचित हुन्छ । यो पाटोलाई उपेक्षा गरेर हौसिनेहरुले पछि पछुताउने अवसर पाउने छैनन् ।
विद्युतीय उर्जाको अभावमा नेपालमा औद्योगिकरण नभएकोले बेरोजगार युवा बिदेश पलायन हुन्छन् । आयातीत पेट्रोलियम पदार्थमाथिको निर्भरताले देशको अर्थतन्त्रको रुग्ण छ, व्यापार/शोधनान्तर घाटा चुलिंदोछ । खाडी र पूर्वी एशियाली देशहरुमा रोजगारीको लागि नजानेहरु भारत जान्छन् । यो आयोजनाको बिजुली पनि उपभोग गरेर भारतले औद्योगिकरण गर्छ र भारतको अर्थतन्त्रमा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुन्छ । अनि नेपाली युवा भारतमा दरबान, चौकिदार, कुल्ली, मजदूर बनेर शोषित हुन्छन् ।
यसै कारण सामान्य राजनैतिक–अर्थशास्त्रीय भाषामा प्राकृतिक श्रोतको यस्तो दोहनलाई औपनिबेसिक दोहन भनिन्छ । उर्जा, कच्चा पदार्थ र युवा जनशक्ती निकासी गर्दा हुने परिणिति ।
नेपाललाई आयोजनाबाट लाभ
लगानी बोर्डले यो आयोजना निर्माण भए नेपाल २५ वर्षमा जम्मा ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्बले लाभान्वित हुन्छ भनेको छ । यो आकलन कत्तिको यथार्थपरक छ हेरौं ।
निशुल्क उर्जा
लगानी बोर्डले निशुल्क उर्जा २१.९ प्रतिशतबापत १ सय ९७ मेगावाट पाउने उल्लेख गरेको पूर्ण सत्य होइन । यो आयोजनाले सुख्खायाममा पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन गर्दैन, पानीको अभावमा । सुख्खायाममा ३ सय मेगावाट जति उत्पादन हुन्छ र त्यतिखेर नेपालले पाउने ७० मेगावाट भन्दा कम हुन्छ । यो आयोजनामा सानो जलाशय पनि निर्माण गरिएर सुख्खायाममा पनि पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन हुनसक्छ । तर वर्षातमा चौबिसै घण्टा पूर्ण क्षमतामा उत्पादन हुन्छ भने सुख्खायाममा पूर्ण क्षमतामा केहि घण्टामात्र उत्पादन हुन्छ, जुन ७० मेगावाटले चौबिसै घण्टा उत्पादन गर्ने बराबर हुन्छ । वस्तुतः नेपालले १ सय ९७ मेगावाट पूर्ण क्षमतामा चौबिसै घण्टा र बाह्रै महिना पाउंछ भन्नु भ्रामक हो ।
लगानी बोर्डले निशुल्क उर्जाबाट १ खर्व ५५ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानी हुने आकलन गरेको पनि मिलेको छैन, करिब १ खर्ब १० अर्ब मात्र हुन्छ ।
१ खर्ब ७ अर्ब रुपैया रोयल्टी
लगानी बोर्डले गरेको २५ वर्षमा नेपालले पाउने रोयल्टीको हिसाब पनि मिल्दैन । पीडीएको दफा ११.२६ अनुसार पहिलो १५ वर्ष प्रति किलोवाट ४ सय रुपैया क्षमता रोयल्टी र साह्रौं वर्ष देखि प्रति किलोवाट १८ सयको दरले २५ वर्षमा साढे १२ अर्ब रुपैया क्षमता रोयल्टी प्राप्त हुन्छ । यस्तै उर्जा रोयल्टीको दर पहिलो १५ वर्ष साढे ७ प्रतिशत र साह्रौं वर्ष देखि १२ प्रतिशत हो । बिजुली ५ रुपैयामा निकासी गरिए २५ वर्षमा उर्जा रोयल्टीबापत झण्डै १९ अर्व रुपैया जति प्राप्त हुन्छ । यसरी २५ वर्षमा पाइने क्षमता र उर्जा रोयल्टी जम्मा ३१ अर्ब रुपैया मात्र हुन्छ, १ खर्ब ७ अर्ब होइन । प्रति युनिट बिजुली २५ रुपैयामा निकासी गरिएमात्र लगानी बोर्डको हिसाब मिल्छ । तर भारतले कुनैपनि आयोजनाको बिजुली २५ रुपैया प्रति युनिटमा किन्ने सम्भावना छैन ।
लगानी बोर्डले निकासी करको रकम समेत यसमा समाबेश गरेको हुन सक्छ, तैपनि मिल्दैन । किनभने पीडीएमा निकासी करको दर ०.००५ प्रतिशत मात्र तोकिएको छ र यो दरमा वार्षिक निकासी कर ८ लाख रुपैया जति हुन्छ र २५ वर्षमा २ करोड रुपैयामात्र ।
आयकर ७७ अर्ब
१ खर्ब ४ अर्ब रुपैया लागत अनुमान गरिएको यो आयोजनामा ७५ प्रतिशत ऋण र २५ प्रतिशत स्वपूंजी लगानी गरिन्छ । स्वपूंजीको औसत ४० प्रतिशत नै खूद मुनाफा आर्जन गरेमा नेपालले २५ वर्षमा २६ अर्ब रुपैया आयकर पाउंछ । किनभने पीडीएको दफा ३.२.४ अनुसार पहिलो १० वर्ष आयकर पूर्णरुपमा छूट हुन्छ भने एघारौं वर्ष देखि पन्ध्रौं वर्षसम्म आयकरमा ५० प्रतिशत छूट छ । आयकर ७७ अर्ब रुपैया हुन स्वपूंजीमा औसत १ सय प्रतिशत भन्दा बढी खूद मुनाफा हुनुपर्छ, जुन सम्भव छैन ।
बरु पहिलो १० वर्ष शतप्रतिशत छूट र एघारौं वर्ष देखि पन्ध्रौं वर्षसम्म ५० प्रतिशत छूटले गर्दा नेपालले आयकर बापत २५ वर्षमा २६ अर्ब रुपैया गुमाउंछ ।
मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसार
राज्यले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसारबापत ९ अर्ब रुपैया आम्दानी गर्ने लगानी बोर्डको आकलन मिल्दैन । किनभने विद्युत ऐनको दफा १२(७) अनुसार प्लान्ट, मेशिनरी, उपकरण आदि पैठारी गर्दा मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर पूर्णतः छूट हुन्छ भने भंसार महसूल १ प्रतिशत मात्र लाग्छ । यसको कारण राज्यमाथि बरु १४ अर्ब रुपैया भार पर्ने अनुमान छ ।
पीडीएको दफा ९.२ मा आयोजनाका प्रवर्द्धकले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर तिरेबापत अनुदान स्वरुप प्रति मेगावाट ५० लाख रुपैया पाउने व्यवस्था भएकोले जम्मा ४ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया उक्त आयोजनाले पाउंछ, जुन कुरा लगानी बोर्डले उल्लेख गर्न आवश्यक देखेन ।
लगानी बोर्डले उल्लेख गर्न आवश्यक नठानेको अर्को सुविधा हो सिमेन्ट, छड आदिको आयातमा ५० प्रतिशत भंसार छूट, जसको भार राज्यको कोषमा ५ अर्ब रुपैया पर्ने अनुमान छ ।
पाउने, गुम्ने
माथि विश्लेषण गरिए झै नेपालले प्राप्त गर्ने १ खर्ब ७६ अर्ब रुपैया मात्र हुन्छ, भंसार र मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर ९ अर्ब समेत ।
तर नेपालले उक्त आयोजनालाई दिने बिभिन्न सुविधा बारे भने लगानी बोर्डको मौनता शंकास्पद छ । माथि उल्लेख गरिए झै (१) आयकर छूट बापत २६ अर्ब रुपैया, (२) मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर र भंसार छूटको कारण १४ अर्ब रुपैया, (३) सिमेन्ट, छड आदिको आयातमा छूटले गर्दा ५ अर्ब रुपैया र (४) आयोजनाले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि कर तिरेबापत अनुदान स्वरुप पाउने ४ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया समेत गरेर राज्यले साढे ४९ अर्ब रुपैया गुमाउंछ ।
आयोजनाबाट नेपालले पाउने १ खर्ब ७६ अर्ब र गुमाउने साढे ४९ अर्ब हुनाले नेपालले खूद पाउने १ खर्ब २६ अर्ब ५० करोड रुपैया मात्र हो । ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्ब रुपैया हैन ।
कमलरीकरण
यसरी वस्तुगतरुपमा विश्लेषण गर्नेलाई विकासबिरोधिको बिल्ला भिराउंदै के भनिन्छ भने २५ वर्ष पछि आयोजना नेपालको भइहाल्छ । आर्थिक कारणले आफूले पाल्ने हैसियत नभएर छोरीलाई साहुको घरमा कमलरी बन्न पठाए जस्तै हो यो भनाइ ! उत्पादनशील समयमा पराइको सेवामा लगाएर दशकौं पछि फिर्ता लिने ! पहिलो, नेपाललाई बिजुलीको आवश्यकता नभएकोले निकासी गरिने होइन । दोश्रो २५ वर्ष पछि उक्त आयोजनाको इलेक्ट्रो–मेकानिकल मेशिनरी, उपकरण आदि थोत्रिएर कामै नलाग्ने हुन्छ । नेपाललाई यो आयोजनाको बिजुलीको आवश्यकता तत्काल अहिले छ भने किन निकासी गर्ने ?
हुन त कतिपय उर्जा विशेषज्ञले नेपालले यो आयोजनाको बिजुली किन्न सक्ने विकल्प औंल्याउंछन् । तर पीडीएको दफा ११.१७.२ अनुसार ९० प्रतिशत बिजुली निकासी गरेर बचेकोमात्र नेपालले किन्छु भन्न पाउने व्यवस्था छः वर्षात ४ महिना ७० मेगावाट र बाँकी समय ३० मेगावाट जति, जुन नेपालको आवश्यकताको तुलनामा हात्तिको मुखमा जिरा हो ।
अरुण ३ देखि अरुण ३ सम्म
यस सन्दर्भमा कतिपयले सन् १९९५ मा विश्व ब्याँकले २ सय १ मेगावाट जडित क्षमता भएको अरुण ३ रद्द गरेकोमा दुख मनाउने गरेको पाइन्छ । यस पंक्तिकार भने उक्त आयोजना खारेजी नेपालको स्वार्थ अनुकूल देख्छ । यसको अनुमानित प्रति मेगावाट लागत साढे ११ करोड रुपैया हो भने त्यसको ५६ करोड रुपैया । त्यो आयोजना सम्पन्न हुंदा ८० करोड पुग्थ्यो । खारेज नभएको भए दलाल, भ्रष्टाचारीहरुले १ मेगावाटमा झण्डै ४० करोड रुपैया भन्दा बढी रकम भागशान्ती जय नेपाल गर्थे र त्यसको भार उपभोक्ताले बोक्नु पथ्र्यो ।
उक्त खारेजी अर्को कारणले पनि नेपालको हितमा थियो । विश्व ब्यांकको शर्त थियो त्यो आयोजनाको निर्माण नसकिएसम्म १० मेगावाट भन्दा ठूला अन्य आयोजना निर्माण गर्न नपाउने । अर्थात उक्त आयोजना कार्यान्वयनमा गएको भए विद्युत प्राधिकरणकोे मोदी (१४ मेगावाट), काली गंडकी (१४४) र मध्यमस्याङ्गदी (७०) तथा निजी क्षेत्रका खिम्ती (६०), भोटेकोशी (४५), चिलिमे (२२) र माई खोला (२२) निर्माण हुने थिएन । यसरी २ सय १ मेगावाट क्षमताको अरुण ३ त्यतिबेला रद्द भएकोले नेपालमा ३ सय ७८ मेगावाट थपियो ।
यो लेखको उद्देश्य अरुण ३ फेरि पनि रद्द गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने हैन । लगानी बोर्डले भने झै नेपाल २५ वर्षमा ३ खर्ब ४८ अर्ब ले लाभान्वित हुने नभएर खूद १ खर्ब २७ अर्ब रुपैया मात्रले लाभान्वित हुन्छ भने २५ वर्षको अवधिमा ९१ खर्ब ४१ अर्ब रुपैयाले mगतिष्उष्भिच भााभअत कारणले मूल्य अभिबृद्धि हुनबाट नेपालको अर्थतन्त्र बंचित हुन्छ । यो त विशुद्ध घाटाको व्यापार भयो । त्यसकारण अरुण ३ को औपनिबेसिक दोहनबाट मुक्त हुने गरेर निर्माण गरिनुपर्छ ।
२०७५ बैशाख २५ गतेको नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
Thursday, March 8, 2018
Neocolonial Path to “Power”
Portugal is the first country that established colonies in modern history (in 15th century), followed by Spain, France, England, Netherland, etc. Even today there are 61 colonies, including Puerto Rico (US colony). Strangely, in the latest plebiscite held on June 11, 2017, only 1.5% Puerto Ricans voted in favor of independence; voter turnout was 23%.
Besides, to satiate their imperialistic tendencies and expand empires, colonies were established with the aim of, inter alia, exploiting resources of colonies to be used for the prosperity of the “empires”. Colonial powers extracted and exploited resources recklessly and at infinitesimal cost (using cheap or slave/conscripted labor of the colonies) and sold such resources at huge profit or used for industrialization and development of the respective colonialists. Basically, colonial powers would appropriate primary commodities of the colonies.
Resource Colonization
Looking back, a huge quantum of natural resources of colonies were extracted and siphoned off by colonizers, basically squeezing economies of the colonies. For example, economist Utsa Patnaik opines that Britain drained more than 9 trillion sterling pounds from India over 173 years, equivalent to present day US $ 12.38 trillion (Global Research, February 2018).
Nowadays there are fewer instances of colonial powers using colonial approach of extraction and exploitation of natural resource. In other words, resource colonization has become a rare phenomenon. However, innovative ways are being devised for colonization of resources. One example is export of primary commodities at dirt-cheap rate from small neighboring countries to big neighbors.
Examples: Arun 3, UKP, etc.
Nepal has issued license for export-oriented hydropower projects like Arun 3, Upper Karnali, etc. These would, obviously, export electricity – a primary commodity – depriving Nepal’s economy from much needed source of energy; perpetuating dependency on fossil fuel – a modern source of energy. It will be silly to oppose export of electricity if Nepal’s demand, including latent demand to switch energy source from fossil fuel and firewood, for electricity has been met to saturation level. Unfortunately, it cannot be asserted as electricity as a source of energy comprises only 3.32% and renewables 3.03%, while traditional sources of energy like firewood, agro and animal residue comprise about 77% and imported modern source of energy like petroleum product and coal about 17%.
However, unfortunately, Nepal is becoming a victim of neocolonial approach; the problem is more of self-inflicted nature. Because, Nepali hydrocrats are happy to tread neocolonial path by allowing implementation of export-oriented hydropower projects to a monopsony market. The hydrocrats don’t tire of salivating at the potential prosperity that export of electricity would afford by replicating the so called “Bhutan” model; completely forgetting that Bhutan is on neo-colonial path: harnessing her water resource for export of electricity to India.
Bhutan is Source of Power for India
Export of electricity, a primary commodity, also amounts to resource colonization. Bhutan, a protectorate of India (there is no point in beating around the bush about it), is supposedly becoming prosperous by exporting electricity to India. It is crystal clear that Bhutan is not an independent country comprising sovereign people, especially regarding defense and foreign affairs.
It doesn’t come as a surprise that the people in Bhutan aren’t proud of this geopolitical fact of life; nor care to be reminded of it. In their resentment with it, with which they are destined to live till some distant future, they even try to equate themselves to Nepal thereby attempting to pull Nepal (a sovereign and independent country) down a notch or two to their own level. There is no point in being upset with them when people in Nepal, professing to be patriots, go about advocating that Nepal must metamorphose into another Bhutan by replicating Bhutan model! Bhutanese people must be awestruck to learn of people in Nepal wanting to stoop to their level – demonstrating their willingness to cede Nepal’s sovereignty and independence, which Bhutan would give anything to achieve. The protagonists of replicating Bhutan model in Nepal need to wake up from their slumber induced by the warmth of wet bed and remember that once the mattress cools off it will become very uncomfortable as is being amply demonstrated by what is transpiring in Bhutan.
However, as Bhutan plans to be the source “power” for India, Bhutanese people must feel magnanimous. For a country as tiny as Bhutan, being able to “power” India – the giant neighbor must be a matter of great pride.
Wield “Power” over India
The proponents of Bhutan model in Nepal are going about saying that Nepal can wield immense power (not political power) over India if Nepal were to export power in huge quantum, as the power-switch will be in Nepal’s control: just turn off the switch to bring India down to her knees! What a silly dream!
It is beyond the comprehension of such naïve people that India will easily circumvent such possibility by “demanding” to deploy her own security personnel in such project(s). Most people are not aware that 10,800 MW Karnali Chisapani project was shelved in 1970s by late king Birendra upon learning of Indian plan to deploy Indian security force in the project (are recounted by Jagat S. Mehta former secretary of ministry of external affairs of India, in his paper on “India-Nepal Relations: A Victim of Politics” published in the book titled India-Nepal Relations: The Challenge Ahead in 1996). Clearly, Nepal will not be in a position to bring India to her knees by controlling power-switch, because Indian security personnel will control such device.
Moreover, in the case of implementation of export-oriented projects by foreign investors, the power-switch will be controlled by the proponents of the respective projects, not by functionaries of GoN. Examples of Upper Karnali and Arun 3, under “development” by GMR and SJVN respectively suffice. The power-switches of these power plants, if built will be controlled by these corporates. These naïve people need to remember that Koshi and Gandak barrages built in sovereign territory of Nepal are under control of GoI.
Power is Input for Economic Activity
But gems of truth are coming from Bhutan itself. Kuensel online of July 22, 2009, writing under the heading “Power-profit home advantage”, has stated “contrary to existing notions, a new study says it is economically more beneficial for Bhutan to supply power to its industries than export to India. The study, by the ministry of economic affairs (MoEA) and the royal audit authority, compares revenue foregone by the government in not exporting subsidized electricity against the money gained as taxes from 15 major industries, which represent 95 percent of industrial power consumption. Here, in spite of the subsidy, the net benefit is about Nu 64 million. In the second model, it compares cost of production and distribution of electricity to the tax revenue gained from industries. Here again, there is a benefit of Nu 152.8 million over and above cost of production.”
“Electricity is the only plentiful raw material, which can be used by our industries to compete with external competitors by value adding on the reasonably priced power,” said the then economic affairs minister Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. Minister Wangchuk was echoing ground reality obtaining in Nepal.
The then economic affairs secretary Dasho Sonam Tshering is reported to have said, “Value addition on both electricity and local raw materials, like in the case of Penden and Dungsam cement plants, will be more sustainable in the long run, even if electricity prices change in the region”. He even is reported to have alluded to Norway, which “also used its hydropower to initially bankroll its industrial development through power intensive metallurgy and fertilizers”. GoN formulated hydropower policy to open the sector to private sector with the help of Norwegian experts, but failed to learn from the example of Norway.
Nextant USAID-SARI/Energy study conducted in 2003 has concluded that average economic value addition of electricity in the industry is 84 US¢ kWh. In this backdrop it is sheer foolishness to dream of prosperity by exporting electricity, while same, costing about 8 US¢, can result in economic value addition by about 10 times. This is why this scribe calls export of electricity reverse resource colonization.
Power for Domestic Consumption
On the other hand export-oriented development of hydropower in Bhutan has resulted in different negative externality. Under the headline “Power crisis looms large over Bhutan?” The Economic Times has reported, on June 16, 2008 that “A severe power shortage may hit Bhutan in view of new industries readying up to kick start operations even as India is banking on borrowing electricity from the Himalayan country by 2020.” It goes on to add that “Bhutan may talk of thousands of megawatts of power in the next few years but according to Bhutan Power Corporation Limited (BPCL) officials, the country will face a deficit in that period because a lot of upcoming industries will need power to operate.” BPCL executive director K B Wakhley has been reported to have said, “if all the industries in Pasakha and Phuentsholing come on stream, there will be a shortage of power," said.
Like ostrich, hydrocrats of Nepal are hiding their collective heads in the sand, but it will not make the potential disaster vanish and, therefore, people need to review this modality of hydropower development not only in Bhutan but also in Nepal.
Financially Unsustainable for India
Due to the unique geopolitical relationship between India and Bhutan three projects so far built in Bhutan, aggregating a capacity of 1,416 MW, are owned by Bhutan but funded by India through 60% grant and 40% soft loan touted as the ‘inter-government model’. However, Indian government has discovered that this is not a sustainable model. India has already reached financing fatigue after financing 1,416 MW under 60/40 model.
Reporting under the heading “India Bhutan hydropower cooperation fraying at the edges” Beth Walker reported on October 4, 2016 (Third Pole) that “60% grant component and 40% loan, have been reversed with loan component now comprising 60-70%” and adds that “hydropower has contributed to a steep rise in Bhutan’s debts, and the report notes Bhutan is ‘among 14 other countries that are fast heading towards a debt crisis.’”
In Nepal’s case, in the first place India has not offered such financing modality to Nepal. The simple reason is: Bhutan is an Indian protectorate. Secondly, financing a few thousand megawatts under such a model for about half a million people may be simpler, but replicating it for Nepal would be impossibility. Because for a population of 28 million, India will have to finance 52,864 MW under this modality (60% grant 40% soft loan), which would cost about US $ 53 billion at the rate of US $ 1,000/kW.
Paucity of Market in Nepal
Proponents of Bhutan model assert that Nepal lacks requisite market for her electricity generation potential of 43,000 MW. What such naïve people don’t forget is that Nepal’s per capita electricity consumption in 2014 was 139 kWh and even to reach the level of South Korea, where it is 10,497 kWh per capita, Nepal would need 85,598 MW according to a presentation made by current MD of NEA on February 22, 2018. Lest it be forgotten that economic status of Nepal and South Korea was at about same level about 4 decades ago and now Nepal youth vie for employment there, not the other way round.
Smarter Bhutanese
Under Article 8 and Article 9 of Chukha and Tala agreements respectively, Bhutan government sells only the surplus power from these projects, (over and above that required for use in Bhutan), although both of these projects were financed by government of India (GoI) with 60% as grant and 40% loan. Whereas, projects are designated as export-oriented in Nepal, depriving Nepal from much needed energy.
ADB report states that Bhutan has already achieved 100% electrification in 2015, whereas only about 50% of the people in Nepal have access to electricity. Similarly, industries in Bhutan consume 80% of the domestic power consumption while it is only about 36% in Nepal. Exporting electricity will make sense only after Nepal succeeds to replicate Bhutan’s profile of electricity consumption. At the moment most industries in Nepal are operating at 50% capacity and no new industry established for lack of electricity supply.
Most importantly, ownership of projects built with Indian funding is vested in Royal Government of Bhutan. It means that any and all profit earned by these projects enrich treasury of Bhutan. However, Bhutan model has been prostituted (with due respect to sensitivity) in Nepal, as GoN will not own the export-oriented projects; there will be flight of profit earned by such projects. This is the secret of Bhutan achieving prosperity that Nepal’s hydrocrats don’t seem to comprehend/appreciate.
Conclusion
Export of primary commodity like electricity, which is essential to “power” Nepal’s economy, including to displace imported fossil fuel and highly pollutant firewood, is tantamount to reverse colonization of resource, in the hope of forcing India to her knees that is naiveté at it best. Such people ignore the fact that input of electricity has potential to add value to the economy by ten times the cost input. People that salivating at Bhutan model, fail to comprehend that it has become unsustainable for India and she has already revised the model (70% loan, 30% grant), just to ensure that Bhutan doesn’t breach her special relation with India. Besides, India has not shown interest in replicating the Bhutan model in Nepal.
Hence, it is high time for the hydrocracy in Nepal to abandon naiveté and grow out of their shortsighted juvenile vision for Nepal’s hydropower development. Lest it becomes necessary to have to point out that the emperor isn’t actually wearing any gorgeous royal gown, as his subjects are led to believe; rather he is wearing nothing (just in birthday suit)! It is a recurring phenomenon and is applicable to all neo-emperors of decade old republic of Nepal too and their loyal naïve subjects.
Nepal should abandon neocolonial path before it is too late even to repent. Nepal’s main objective should be self-reliant energy security including to displace unclean/un-renewable energy sources ranging from fossil fuel to firewood. Bhutan model, the real one, has its merits and can be adopted, on the condition that Nepal doesn’t have to become an Indian protectorate.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha, FCA
Published in People's Review on March 8, 2018
Besides, to satiate their imperialistic tendencies and expand empires, colonies were established with the aim of, inter alia, exploiting resources of colonies to be used for the prosperity of the “empires”. Colonial powers extracted and exploited resources recklessly and at infinitesimal cost (using cheap or slave/conscripted labor of the colonies) and sold such resources at huge profit or used for industrialization and development of the respective colonialists. Basically, colonial powers would appropriate primary commodities of the colonies.
Resource Colonization
Looking back, a huge quantum of natural resources of colonies were extracted and siphoned off by colonizers, basically squeezing economies of the colonies. For example, economist Utsa Patnaik opines that Britain drained more than 9 trillion sterling pounds from India over 173 years, equivalent to present day US $ 12.38 trillion (Global Research, February 2018).
Nowadays there are fewer instances of colonial powers using colonial approach of extraction and exploitation of natural resource. In other words, resource colonization has become a rare phenomenon. However, innovative ways are being devised for colonization of resources. One example is export of primary commodities at dirt-cheap rate from small neighboring countries to big neighbors.
Examples: Arun 3, UKP, etc.
Nepal has issued license for export-oriented hydropower projects like Arun 3, Upper Karnali, etc. These would, obviously, export electricity – a primary commodity – depriving Nepal’s economy from much needed source of energy; perpetuating dependency on fossil fuel – a modern source of energy. It will be silly to oppose export of electricity if Nepal’s demand, including latent demand to switch energy source from fossil fuel and firewood, for electricity has been met to saturation level. Unfortunately, it cannot be asserted as electricity as a source of energy comprises only 3.32% and renewables 3.03%, while traditional sources of energy like firewood, agro and animal residue comprise about 77% and imported modern source of energy like petroleum product and coal about 17%.
However, unfortunately, Nepal is becoming a victim of neocolonial approach; the problem is more of self-inflicted nature. Because, Nepali hydrocrats are happy to tread neocolonial path by allowing implementation of export-oriented hydropower projects to a monopsony market. The hydrocrats don’t tire of salivating at the potential prosperity that export of electricity would afford by replicating the so called “Bhutan” model; completely forgetting that Bhutan is on neo-colonial path: harnessing her water resource for export of electricity to India.
Bhutan is Source of Power for India
Export of electricity, a primary commodity, also amounts to resource colonization. Bhutan, a protectorate of India (there is no point in beating around the bush about it), is supposedly becoming prosperous by exporting electricity to India. It is crystal clear that Bhutan is not an independent country comprising sovereign people, especially regarding defense and foreign affairs.
It doesn’t come as a surprise that the people in Bhutan aren’t proud of this geopolitical fact of life; nor care to be reminded of it. In their resentment with it, with which they are destined to live till some distant future, they even try to equate themselves to Nepal thereby attempting to pull Nepal (a sovereign and independent country) down a notch or two to their own level. There is no point in being upset with them when people in Nepal, professing to be patriots, go about advocating that Nepal must metamorphose into another Bhutan by replicating Bhutan model! Bhutanese people must be awestruck to learn of people in Nepal wanting to stoop to their level – demonstrating their willingness to cede Nepal’s sovereignty and independence, which Bhutan would give anything to achieve. The protagonists of replicating Bhutan model in Nepal need to wake up from their slumber induced by the warmth of wet bed and remember that once the mattress cools off it will become very uncomfortable as is being amply demonstrated by what is transpiring in Bhutan.
However, as Bhutan plans to be the source “power” for India, Bhutanese people must feel magnanimous. For a country as tiny as Bhutan, being able to “power” India – the giant neighbor must be a matter of great pride.
Wield “Power” over India
The proponents of Bhutan model in Nepal are going about saying that Nepal can wield immense power (not political power) over India if Nepal were to export power in huge quantum, as the power-switch will be in Nepal’s control: just turn off the switch to bring India down to her knees! What a silly dream!
It is beyond the comprehension of such naïve people that India will easily circumvent such possibility by “demanding” to deploy her own security personnel in such project(s). Most people are not aware that 10,800 MW Karnali Chisapani project was shelved in 1970s by late king Birendra upon learning of Indian plan to deploy Indian security force in the project (are recounted by Jagat S. Mehta former secretary of ministry of external affairs of India, in his paper on “India-Nepal Relations: A Victim of Politics” published in the book titled India-Nepal Relations: The Challenge Ahead in 1996). Clearly, Nepal will not be in a position to bring India to her knees by controlling power-switch, because Indian security personnel will control such device.
Moreover, in the case of implementation of export-oriented projects by foreign investors, the power-switch will be controlled by the proponents of the respective projects, not by functionaries of GoN. Examples of Upper Karnali and Arun 3, under “development” by GMR and SJVN respectively suffice. The power-switches of these power plants, if built will be controlled by these corporates. These naïve people need to remember that Koshi and Gandak barrages built in sovereign territory of Nepal are under control of GoI.
Power is Input for Economic Activity
But gems of truth are coming from Bhutan itself. Kuensel online of July 22, 2009, writing under the heading “Power-profit home advantage”, has stated “contrary to existing notions, a new study says it is economically more beneficial for Bhutan to supply power to its industries than export to India. The study, by the ministry of economic affairs (MoEA) and the royal audit authority, compares revenue foregone by the government in not exporting subsidized electricity against the money gained as taxes from 15 major industries, which represent 95 percent of industrial power consumption. Here, in spite of the subsidy, the net benefit is about Nu 64 million. In the second model, it compares cost of production and distribution of electricity to the tax revenue gained from industries. Here again, there is a benefit of Nu 152.8 million over and above cost of production.”
“Electricity is the only plentiful raw material, which can be used by our industries to compete with external competitors by value adding on the reasonably priced power,” said the then economic affairs minister Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk. Minister Wangchuk was echoing ground reality obtaining in Nepal.
The then economic affairs secretary Dasho Sonam Tshering is reported to have said, “Value addition on both electricity and local raw materials, like in the case of Penden and Dungsam cement plants, will be more sustainable in the long run, even if electricity prices change in the region”. He even is reported to have alluded to Norway, which “also used its hydropower to initially bankroll its industrial development through power intensive metallurgy and fertilizers”. GoN formulated hydropower policy to open the sector to private sector with the help of Norwegian experts, but failed to learn from the example of Norway.
Nextant USAID-SARI/Energy study conducted in 2003 has concluded that average economic value addition of electricity in the industry is 84 US¢ kWh. In this backdrop it is sheer foolishness to dream of prosperity by exporting electricity, while same, costing about 8 US¢, can result in economic value addition by about 10 times. This is why this scribe calls export of electricity reverse resource colonization.
Power for Domestic Consumption
On the other hand export-oriented development of hydropower in Bhutan has resulted in different negative externality. Under the headline “Power crisis looms large over Bhutan?” The Economic Times has reported, on June 16, 2008 that “A severe power shortage may hit Bhutan in view of new industries readying up to kick start operations even as India is banking on borrowing electricity from the Himalayan country by 2020.” It goes on to add that “Bhutan may talk of thousands of megawatts of power in the next few years but according to Bhutan Power Corporation Limited (BPCL) officials, the country will face a deficit in that period because a lot of upcoming industries will need power to operate.” BPCL executive director K B Wakhley has been reported to have said, “if all the industries in Pasakha and Phuentsholing come on stream, there will be a shortage of power," said.
Like ostrich, hydrocrats of Nepal are hiding their collective heads in the sand, but it will not make the potential disaster vanish and, therefore, people need to review this modality of hydropower development not only in Bhutan but also in Nepal.
Financially Unsustainable for India
Due to the unique geopolitical relationship between India and Bhutan three projects so far built in Bhutan, aggregating a capacity of 1,416 MW, are owned by Bhutan but funded by India through 60% grant and 40% soft loan touted as the ‘inter-government model’. However, Indian government has discovered that this is not a sustainable model. India has already reached financing fatigue after financing 1,416 MW under 60/40 model.
Reporting under the heading “India Bhutan hydropower cooperation fraying at the edges” Beth Walker reported on October 4, 2016 (Third Pole) that “60% grant component and 40% loan, have been reversed with loan component now comprising 60-70%” and adds that “hydropower has contributed to a steep rise in Bhutan’s debts, and the report notes Bhutan is ‘among 14 other countries that are fast heading towards a debt crisis.’”
In Nepal’s case, in the first place India has not offered such financing modality to Nepal. The simple reason is: Bhutan is an Indian protectorate. Secondly, financing a few thousand megawatts under such a model for about half a million people may be simpler, but replicating it for Nepal would be impossibility. Because for a population of 28 million, India will have to finance 52,864 MW under this modality (60% grant 40% soft loan), which would cost about US $ 53 billion at the rate of US $ 1,000/kW.
Paucity of Market in Nepal
Proponents of Bhutan model assert that Nepal lacks requisite market for her electricity generation potential of 43,000 MW. What such naïve people don’t forget is that Nepal’s per capita electricity consumption in 2014 was 139 kWh and even to reach the level of South Korea, where it is 10,497 kWh per capita, Nepal would need 85,598 MW according to a presentation made by current MD of NEA on February 22, 2018. Lest it be forgotten that economic status of Nepal and South Korea was at about same level about 4 decades ago and now Nepal youth vie for employment there, not the other way round.
Smarter Bhutanese
Under Article 8 and Article 9 of Chukha and Tala agreements respectively, Bhutan government sells only the surplus power from these projects, (over and above that required for use in Bhutan), although both of these projects were financed by government of India (GoI) with 60% as grant and 40% loan. Whereas, projects are designated as export-oriented in Nepal, depriving Nepal from much needed energy.
ADB report states that Bhutan has already achieved 100% electrification in 2015, whereas only about 50% of the people in Nepal have access to electricity. Similarly, industries in Bhutan consume 80% of the domestic power consumption while it is only about 36% in Nepal. Exporting electricity will make sense only after Nepal succeeds to replicate Bhutan’s profile of electricity consumption. At the moment most industries in Nepal are operating at 50% capacity and no new industry established for lack of electricity supply.
Most importantly, ownership of projects built with Indian funding is vested in Royal Government of Bhutan. It means that any and all profit earned by these projects enrich treasury of Bhutan. However, Bhutan model has been prostituted (with due respect to sensitivity) in Nepal, as GoN will not own the export-oriented projects; there will be flight of profit earned by such projects. This is the secret of Bhutan achieving prosperity that Nepal’s hydrocrats don’t seem to comprehend/appreciate.
Conclusion
Export of primary commodity like electricity, which is essential to “power” Nepal’s economy, including to displace imported fossil fuel and highly pollutant firewood, is tantamount to reverse colonization of resource, in the hope of forcing India to her knees that is naiveté at it best. Such people ignore the fact that input of electricity has potential to add value to the economy by ten times the cost input. People that salivating at Bhutan model, fail to comprehend that it has become unsustainable for India and she has already revised the model (70% loan, 30% grant), just to ensure that Bhutan doesn’t breach her special relation with India. Besides, India has not shown interest in replicating the Bhutan model in Nepal.
Hence, it is high time for the hydrocracy in Nepal to abandon naiveté and grow out of their shortsighted juvenile vision for Nepal’s hydropower development. Lest it becomes necessary to have to point out that the emperor isn’t actually wearing any gorgeous royal gown, as his subjects are led to believe; rather he is wearing nothing (just in birthday suit)! It is a recurring phenomenon and is applicable to all neo-emperors of decade old republic of Nepal too and their loyal naïve subjects.
Nepal should abandon neocolonial path before it is too late even to repent. Nepal’s main objective should be self-reliant energy security including to displace unclean/un-renewable energy sources ranging from fossil fuel to firewood. Bhutan model, the real one, has its merits and can be adopted, on the condition that Nepal doesn’t have to become an Indian protectorate.
Ratna Sansar Shrestha, FCA
Published in People's Review on March 8, 2018
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