सन्धिहरूको संसदीय अनुमोदन

नेपालका तत्कालीन अर्थमन्त्री र मिलेनियम च्यालेन्ज कर्पोरेसन (एमसिसी) नामक एक अमेरिकी संस्थाका कायममुकायम कार्यकारी प्रमुखद्वयबाट ५० करोड अमेरिकी डलर नेपाललाई अनुदान दिइने सम्झौतामा २०१७ सेप्टेम्बरमा दस्तखत भएको थियो (एक अमेरिकी दातृसंस्थाका कायममुकायम कार्यकारी प्रमुखले दस्तखत गरेको सम्झौतामा नेपालका मन्त्रीबाट समकक्षतामा तल झरेर किन दस्तखत गरे भन्ने प्रश्न अनुत्तरित छ)। उक्त सम्झौता संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्छ भनिनाले संसदीय अनुमोदनबारे सर्वत्र चासो बढेको छ र यही कारण एमसिसी सम्झौता थप विवादास्पद बनेको छ। संवैधानिक व्यवस्था नेपालको संविधानको धारा २७९ को उपधारा (१) मा नेपाल पक्ष रहेको सन्धि, सम्झौता संसद्ले अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृत वा समर्थन संघीय कानुनबमोजिम हुने व्यवस्था छ। (२) मा निम्न विषयमा गरिएका सन्धि, सम्झौता संघीय संसद्का दुवै सदनमा तत्काल कायम सम्पूर्ण सदस्य संख्याको दुईतिहाइ बहुमतले अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृत वा समर्थन गर्नुपर्ने सर्त छः (क)शान्ति र मैत्री, (ख)सुरक्षा एवं सामरिक सम्बन्ध, (ग)नेपाल राज्यको सिमाना र (घ) प्राकृतिक स्रोत तथा त्यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँट। तर राष्ट्रलाई व्यापक, गम्भीर वा दीर्घकालीन असर नपर्ने साधारण प्रकृतिका सन्धि वा सम्झौता प्रतिनिधिसभाको बैठकमा उपस्थित सदस्यको साधारण बहुमतबाट गर्न सकिन्छ। संघीय कानुनबमोजिम हुने भनिएको छ तर कानुन बनाइएको छैन। त्यस्तै कस्ता सन्धि, सम्झौताले राष्ट्रलाई व्यापक, गम्भीर वा दीर्घकालीन असर पर्छ र कस्तालाई सामान्य प्रकृतिका मानिने भन्नेबारे पनि कानुनले तोकेको छैन। उपधारा (२) मा उल्लिखित ४ विषयबाहेकका अन्यमा भएका सन्धि सम्झौता संसद्बाट अनुमोदन, सम्मिलन, स्वीकृत वा समर्थन गर्नुपर्दैन। यसअनुसार सरकारले गरेका सन्धि सम्झौताले राष्ट्रलाई व्यापक, गम्भीर वा दीर्घकालीन असर पर्ने भए पनि संविधानतः संसदीय अनुमोदन आवश्यक छैन। इतिहास भारत सरकाले गरेको कुनै पनि सन्धि सम्झौता भारतीय संसद्ले अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्दैन र भारत सरकारलाई नै प्राधिकार छ। पञ्चायती व्यवस्थामा देशको सार्वभौमसत्ता राजामा निहित रहने र कार्यकारिणी, व्यवस्थापिका र न्यायसम्बन्धी सबै अधिकार राजाबाट निसृत हुने हुनाले २०१९ सालको संविधान लागु रहँदासम्म तत्कालीन सरकारले दस्तखत गरेका सन्धिहरूको संसदीय अनुमोदन गरिँदैनथ्यो। त्यसअघि पनि अनुमोदन गर्न पर्दैनथ्यो। २०४७ सालको संविधानमा सरकारले गर्ने केही विषयका सन्धि सम्झौता सम्बन्धमा सरकारमाथि अङ्कुश लगाउन धारा १२६ मा संसदीय अनुमोदनको प्रावधान राखियो। २०७२ को संविधानको धारा २७९ मा त्यसैलाई अक्षरशः राखियो। २०५२ सालमा नेपाल–भारतबीच सम्पन्न महाकाली सन्धि २०५३ साल (सन् १९९६) मा संसद्बाट दुईतिहाइ बहुमतबाट अनुमोदन गरियो। त्यस क्रममा ४ बुँदे संकल्प प्रस्ताव पनि पारित गरिएको थियोः १) महाकाली मूलभूतरूपमा सीमा नदी हो (तर सन्धिमा अधिकांश भागमात्र सीमा नदी हो भनिएको)। २) सिङ्गोे महाकाली नदीको पानीमा नेपाल र भारतको बराबर हक लाग्छ (तर सन्धिको धारा ३ मा विद्यमान उपभोग्य उपयोगबाहेक नेपाल र भारतको बराबर हक लाग्छ भनिएको)। ३)पञ्चेश्वर आयोजनाबाट उत्पादित बिजुलीको मूल्य निर्धारण गर्दा ‘विस्थापित मूल्य’ सिद्धान्तको आधारमा गरिनुपर्छ (तर सन्धिको धारा ३ को उपधारा ४ मा मूल्य पछि पारस्परिक सहमतिबाट निर्धारण गरिनेछ भनिएको) र ४) महाकाली नदी आयोगमा नेपालको तर्फबाट समावेश हुने प्रतिनिधिहरू नेपाल सरकारद्वारा प्रमुख विपक्षीलगायत राष्ट्रिय मान्यता प्राप्त दलहरूको सहमतिमा तोकिनुपर्ने (सन्धिले नेपाल सरकारको तजबिजमा छाडेको)। संसद् रबरको छाप होइन महाकाली सन्धि अनुमोदन गर्दा माथि उल्लिखित संकल्प प्रस्ताव पारित गरिएबाट प्रष्ट हुन्छ कि संसद् सरकारले प्रस्तुत गरेको सन्धि, सम्झौता यथावत पारित गर्ने रबरको छाप होइन। ऐन निर्माणका क्रममा पनि सरकारले प्रस्तुत गरेका विधेयकसमेत संसद्ले यथावत पारित नगर्न सक्छ। संसद् तथा संसदीय समितिहरूमा व्यापक छलफल गरिन्छ र सांसदहरूले संशोधन प्रस्ताव गर्छन्। कतिपय विधेयक संशोधन गरेर ऐन जारी गरिन्छ। सांसदहरूले महाकाली सन्धि संसद्बाट दुईतिहाइ बहुमतले पारित गर्दा पूर्णतः बुद्धि/विवेक प्रयोग गरेर संकल्प प्रस्तावसहित अनुमादन गरेका छन् र संसद् भनेको फगत रबरको छापमात्र नभएको सिद्ध गरेका छन्। संविधानमा संसदीय अनुमोदन व्यवस्था भएपछि नेपाल सरकारले धेरै सन्धि सम्झौता गरेको छ तर ती कुनै पनि संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिएका छैनन्। सरकाले गरेका केही सन्धिः दोहोरो कर नलाग्ने सम्झौताः यो सम्झौता नर्वे, थाइल्यान्ड, श्रीलंका, अस्ट्रिया, चीन, पाकिस्तान, दक्षिण कोरिया, कतार, भारत, मरिसस र बंगलादेशसमेत ११ देशसँग भएका छन्। अधिकांश सम्झौतामा अन्त्य हुने तिथि नतोकिएकाले दीर्घकालीन प्रकृतिका छन्। लगानी प्रवर्द्धन तथा सुरक्षा सम्झौताः सन् २०११ अक्टोबरमा नेपालमा व्यापक विरोध भए पनि भारतसँग द्विराष्ट्रिय लगानी प्रवद्र्धन तथा सुरक्षा (बिप्पा) सम्झौता गरिएको थियो। यस अतिरिक्त संयुक्त अधिराज्य, फिनल्यान्ड, जर्मनी, फ्रान्स, कतार र मरिसससमेतका देशसँग यी सम्झौता भएका छन्। व्यापार तथा पारवहन सम्झौताः भारतसँगको पारबहन सम्झौता म्याद सन् १९८९ मार्चमा सकिएपछि नवीकरण नगरिँदा भारतले १६ महिना नेपालमाथि नाकाबन्दी (तेस्रो) गरेको थियो। यसबाट यो सम्झौता कति व्यापक र गम्भीर महत्वको हो भन्ने प्रष्टिन्छ। हाल प्रचलनमा रहेको पारबहन सम्झौता सन् १९९९ मा ७ वर्षका लागि गरिएकामा ७/७ वर्षमा स्वतः नवीकरण हुँदै सन् २०२० मा पुनः नवीकरण गरियो। यस अतिरिक्त अमेरिका, बेलायत, चीनलगायत १६ देशसँग यस्तो सम्झौता भएका छन्। यी कुनै पनि संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिएका छैनन्। जलस्रोतसम्बन्धी सन्धि/सम्झौता सन् १९९१ मा भएको टनकपुर सम्झौतामा विवाद हुँदा सर्वोच्च अदालतले सन् १९९२ मा संवैधानिक व्यवस्थाअनुसार संसद्बाट अनुमोदन वा समर्थन गराइनुपर्छ भनेर फैसला गरेकामा सरकारले उक्त सम्झौता संसद्मा अनुमोदन वा समर्थनका लागि प्रस्तुत नै गरेन। त्यसपछि टनकपुरसम्बन्धी सम्झौतामा भएका प्रावधानहरूसमेत समावेश गरेर महाकाली सन्धि गरेको थियो। सन् १९९७ मा भारतसँग भएको ऊर्जा व्यापार सम्झौताको धारा ८ अनुसार संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्ने थियो तर यस्तो प्रयासै गरिएन। सन् २०१४ मा भारतसँग अर्को ऊर्जा व्यापार सम्झौता गरियो। यसलाई पनि संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गराइएन। जबकि ऊर्जा उत्पादन भनेको प्राकृतिक स्रोत (जलस्रोत) को उपयोग हो भने यसको व्यापार गर्नु भनेको यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँट हो र यस विषयका सन्धि सम्झौता अनुमोदन गर्नैपर्ने व्यवस्था संविधानको धारा २७९ को उपधारा (२) को खण्ड (घ) ले गरेको छ। त्यस्तै पश्चिम सेती, अरूण तेस्रो, माथिल्लो कर्णाली, माथिल्लो मस्र्यांगदी आदि जलविद्युत् आयोजना निकासीमूलक हुने गरेर विदेशी निजी क्षेत्रसँग सम्झौता गरिए तर संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गराइएन। यी आयोजनाका लागि भारत सरकारसँग सम्झौता गरिएको भए सर्वोच्च अदालतबाट टनकपुर मुद्दामा सन् १९९२ मा प्रतिपादित नजिर लागु हुन्थ्यो र संसदीय अनुमोदन अनिवार्य हुन्थ्यो। नेपाल मामिलाका जानकर मानिएका भारतीय प्राध्यापक सुकदेव मुनीले संसदीय अनुमोदन प्रक्रिया छल्नकै लागि निजी क्षेत्रलाई नेपालको जलस्रोत क्षेत्रमा संलग्न गराएको स्वीकारेका छन्। वैदेशिक सहायता नेपालले विभिन्न देश र दातृनिकायबाट खरबौँ रूपैयाँ अनुदान लिएको छ। तर कुनै अनुदान सम्झौता संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिएको छैन। गत आर्थिक वर्षमात्र १ अर्ब ७५ करोड ६० लाख अमेरिकी डलर वैदेशिक सहायता प्राप्त भएको थियो। यस्तै नेपालको वैदेशिक ऋण ८ खरब ५ अर्ब पुगेको आँकडा छ। यसरी विभिन्न विदेशी संस्थाबाट ऋण लिन पटक पटक भएका सम्झौता पनि संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिएका थिएनन्। एमसिसीबाट वार्षिक १२ अर्ब ‘सित्तैँ’ पाइने भनिएको अनुदान लिन संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्ने भए आगामी पुस्ताले समेत बोझ बोक्नुपर्र्नेे दीर्घकालीन असर हुने गरेर ऋण लिँदा भने संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गर्नु नपर्ने भाष्य हाँस्यास्पद हो। एमसिसीको संसदीय अनुमोदन संसदीय अनुमोदन सम्बन्धमा संविधाको धारा २७९ ले किटानी व्यवस्था गरेको (माथि उल्लिखित) सन्धि सम्झौता मात्र संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्छ। त्यसैले अन्य सम्झौताको संसदीय अनुमोदन आवश्यक छैन। दीर्घकालीन असर हुने प्रकृतिका माथि उल्लिखित विभिन्न सन्धि संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गराइएन। जलस्रोतसम्बन्धी सम्झौतासमेत निजी क्षेत्रसँग गरिएको भनेर संसदीय अनुमोदन गराइएन। एमसिसी सम्झौतामा अर्धविराम, पूर्णविरामसमेत परिवर्तन हुन नसक्ने त्यसका पदाधिकारीको अडान छ। यस्तोमा संसद्ले यथावत अनुमोदन गर्नु भनेको संसद्लाई रबरको छाप बनाउनु हो। फेरि एमसिसी संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिए नजीर कायम हुन गएर सबै वैदेशिक दातृनिकायले आआफ्ना अनुदान सम्झौता नेपालको संसद्बाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने माग गर्न सक्छन् र संसदको काम नै यस्ता सम्झौता अनुमोदनका नाममा रबर छाप लगाएर बस्नमा सीमित हुनेछ। दातृनिकायले यस्तो माग राखे भने संसद्ले अनुमोदन नगरेसम्म अनुदानको रकम निकासा नभएर देशमा गम्भीर आर्थिक संकट सिर्जना हुन्छ। किनभने नेपालको बजेटको ठूलो हिस्सा वैदेशिक अनुदानबाट पूर्ति हुन्छ। सावैभौमिकता सार्वभौमिकताका धेरै आधारमध्ये राजनीतिक सार्वभौमिकता, भौगोलिक सार्वभौमिकता र आर्थिक सार्वभौमिकता मुख्य हुन्। यहाँ राजनीतिक सार्वभौमिकता सान्दर्भिक छ। नेपालको संविधानको धारा २ मा ‘नेपालको सार्वभौमिकता र राजकीय सत्ता नेपाली जनतामा निहित रहेको छ’ भनिएको छ र नेपाली जनतामा निहित रहेको सार्वभौमिकता र राजकीय सत्ता नेपाली जनताले मतदान गरेर निर्वाचित संसद्मा प्रतिबिम्बित हुन्छ। अनि केही अर्ब रूपैयाँ अनुदान लिन संसद्लाई रबरको छाप बनाएर सम्झौता अनुमोदन गराइँदा संसद्मा निहित सार्वभौमिकतामा आँच आउँछ र संसद्को मानमर्दन हुन्छ। साथै संविधानतः सरकारलाई स्वीकृत गर्ने प्राधिकार दिएको विषयमा संसद्ले अनुमोदन गर्दा त्यो प्राधिकार संसद्लाई फिर्ता जान्छ र त्यो हदसम्म संविधान नै वस्तुतः संशोधन हुन जान्छ। २०७८ माघ ४ गते नागरिकमा प्रकाशित

Economic and Financial Assessment of MCC

The grant from Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to Nepal of US $500 million has two components: “electricity transmission project” with a budget of US $400 million and “road maintenance project”, estimated to cost US $52 million. There is a budget of $49 million for monitoring and evaluation and other administrative expenses. The plan of electricity transmission project is to build/erect a 315 kilometer long transmission line from Lapsiphedi to Ratmate in Kathmandu to Butwal via Damauli. Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) has already signed an agreement with Power Grid Corporation of India to connect Butwal in Nepal with Gorakhpur in India by another 135 kilometer long 400 kV transmission line. Main objective of the electricity transmission project is to build/erect infrastructure to enable Nepal to export electricity. The aim of MCC is said to be to alleviate poverty of 29 million Nepali. Million dollar question is: would the poverty in Nepal be reduced by exporting electricity to India? Electricity Market Some Nepali believe that there is no market for electricity in Nepal and, therefore, Nepal should export electricity to prosper and reduce poverty. Per capita electricity consumption in Nepal last year was 244 kWh (unit) while it was 1,181 kWh in India. Notwithstanding lower electricity consumption in Nepal and higher consumption in India, India is said to be eager to import electricity and Nepal has no use for its electricity and, therefore, needs to export. Nepal can only attain Indian economic level if installed capacity of electricity in Nepal is increased to 7,000 MW, which was 1,451 MW last fiscal year. Nepali political leaders pontificate that they would metamorphose Nepal into Singapore, which is well-nigh impossible without increasing electricity consumption to Singaporean level, which is 8,000 kWh per capita. For that purpose, Nepal's system would need 50,000 MW installed capacity. While Nepal’s economically feasible hydropower potential is only 43,000 MW. Some wonder how Nepal would be able to consume electricity on such a scale. There is a huge quantum of unmet and latent demand for electricity in Nepal. The unmet demand manifests in a number of industries that depend on diesel generators. The industries in operation still need 270 MW after 30 MW was made available to Hongshi Cement Industry. Similarly, faremers in Tarai use diesel pumps lift ground water for irrigation; installed capacity of which is 700 MW. There are many other instances of unmet demand. Nepal’s underdeveloped state itself indicates a huge quantum of latent demand for electricity. For instance, latent demand for electricity is inherent in displacement of firewood and LPG from kitchens. Similarly, except for major cities, industrial quality electricity is not available in most parts of Nepal to set up industries. The unmet and latent demand exists in all economic sectors, which manifests a market for electricity. Export to India Recently an agreement was signed with India to export 39 MW electricity at the average rate of Rs 4.33/kWh. The consumers in Nepal have to pay an average rate of Rs 10/kWh and NEA itself purchases electricity from IPPs at Rs 4.80/kWh in wet season and Rs 8.40/kWh in dry season. This is a model that is geared to colonize Nepal's electricity resource: deprive Nepal's economy from electricity and export the same at rock bottom price. The justification for the low rate was that it is surplus electricity. It is true that Nepal has off-peak and off-season surplus electricity. But NEA has yet to formulate a policy to market surplus electricity in Nepal. The marginal cost of surplus electricity is very low and the same could be marketed in Nepal at a lower rate. This itself would result in a win-win scenario for NEA, the consumers and the country. Every rupee earned by selling surplus electricity directly increases NEA’s net profit. Consumers would gain by using surplus electricity at low rate, which would also help change their electricity consumption behavior: use surplus electricity at low rate and reduce load on the system during peak hours, which is beneficial for NEA. And the country would benefit by the increase in the electricity consumption in terms of value addition in the economy. Monopsony Trap Nepal has both surplus electricity and huge quantities of unmet and latent demand for electricity. The phenomenon is due to a lack of reliable transmission and distribution infrastructure in most parts of the country. But a 400 kV transmission line from Dhalkebar in Nepal to Muzaffarpur in India is already operational and the plan is to build another one from Butwal to Gorakhpur in India under MCC. This would lead to the monopsony trap; single buyer for Nepal's electricity, since there is no infrastructure to market Nepal's own electricity in the country. Unconscionable Cost The cost of the 400 kV transmission line built by NEA from Dhalkebar to Bhitthamod was less than Rs 40 million per kilometer. But the transmission line under MCC is estimated to cost Rs 150 million per kilometer, which is unconscionably high. Although it is not advisable to build infrastructure to export instead of building infrastructure to increase consumption in Nepal, let’s examine the cost angle. Contrasted with the 400 kV transmission line from Dhalkebar to Bhitthamod in Nepal, the transmission line under MCC has to pass through hilly terrain. Therefore, transmission line to Butwal is estimated to cost about Rs 60 million per kilometer. Thus, the transmission line envisaged by MCC could be built for about Rs 19 billion. But MCC is planning to spend Rs 47 billion for the same! The question as to what would happen to the difference of over Rs 28 billion has yet been answered. Crippling NEA NEA is experienced in building 400 kV transmission line and possesses requisite human resources. Building a similar transmission line under MCC would cripple NEA. Where would MCC obtain skilled human resources for the works? It is unlikely that MCC would import human resources from abroad. Most probably MCC would lure trained human resources from NEA at inflated remuneration. This is best formula not only to cripple NEA but also to destroy it Correlation between Electricity Usage and Poverty There is a direct correlation between electricity use and GDP of countries. According to data compiled by the World Bank, Qatar’s per capita GDP in 2015 was $100,000 when her energy consumption was 200,000 kWh per capita, while both GDP and energy consumption per capita of Nepal was commensurately low. The chart below ably demonstrates direct correlation between the two.

Source: https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/energy-use-per-capita-vs-gdp-per-capita It is obvious that an increase in electricity consumption is not just for the sake of increasing it. Electricity acts as a driver of economic growth in all sectors of the economy. For example, electricity plays an important role in increasing production and productivity of agriculture, including by enhancing access to irrigation even in hilly terrain. Availability of irrigation makes intensive farming possible, which would generate round the year employment to the farmers that are currently employed in planting and harvesting seasons only. Increased agricultural production and productivity also means Nepal would be on the path to attain food security. Electricity also helps add value to agricultural produce by being able to store the produce safely for a long time which would enable the farmer to fetch higher value. Similarly, with the availability of electricity, it becomes possible to set up agro-processing industries, which would in turn generate additional employment, increase production in the country and help reduce balance of trade and payment deficits. Availability of electricity has also been a constraint in the industrialization of the country. Electricity is said to be available to 90% of the populace, but industrial quality of electricity is available only in certain industrial corridors in Tarai and some big cities. If industrial quality electricity could be made available in nook and crannies of the country, the country could be industrialized at a higher plane, resulting in appurtenant benefits to the country’s economy. Industrialization means generation of employment. too. Over 6 million youth of Nepal are employed abroad (no data available on employment of Nepali youth in India). Being able to bring them “home” would itself result in a great value addition to the economy. Industrialization increases production, which can displace import and increase export; both of which would result in significant reduction in trade and payment deficit. This too would add value in the economy in a significant manner. Import of petroleum products is single main cause of the trade and payment deficit. Displacement of petroleum products from the transportation sector by electricity would also contribute significantly in reducing trade and payment deficit as well as pollution. Tourism is touted as the largest source of convertible currency for Nepal. Availability of electricity in nook and crannies of the country would succeed to attract high value tourists and also lengthen their stay in Nepal, contrasted with “budget” tourists that mainly visit Nepal leading to increased revenue from tourism. Mainly LPG and firewood are used in kitchens in Nepal. A country like Nepal, with “abundant” hydropower potential and not producing a single drop of fossil fuel, should strive to displace imported LPG. LPG also emits carbon-monoxide, which is the cause of a number of ailments. Moreover, studies have proved that it is cheaper to cook on electricity than LPG. The chart below proves that cooking on electricity is cheaper by up to 50% compared to LPG:

Source: Center for Energy Studies, Institute of Engineering, Tribhuvan University Displacement of LPG would also result in win-win scenario for the consumers, NEA and the country. It benefits consumers due to cost effectiveness. NEA would benefit by being able to sell spilled energy, while the country would benefit by decrease in balance of payment and trade deficit. Similarly, firewood used in rural kitchens causes indoor pollution, which is mainly responsible for poor health of rural women resulting in unnecessary sickness and hospitalization etc. According to an informal estimate, the rural populace spends about 500 million working days in a year in the collection of firewood. If such time could be used for income generating activities, both the people and the country could prosper. This is another form of latent demand for electricity. Value addition in the economy A study commissioned by SARI energy program under USAID on “economic impact of poor power quality on industry” in 2003, amongst others it had concluded that “the industrial sector average value addition per unit of electricity use is approximately 86 USCts /kWh.” Therefore, exporting electricity from Nepal is tantamount to depriving Nepal of value addition in the economy by 86 US cents per unit for a meager average export tariff of 3.65 US cents per unit (equivalent to Rs 4.33/kWh). Conclusion Accepting MCC grant to build/erect 400 kV transmission line through to Butwal, which would in turn be connected to Gorakhpur in India to export electricity at low rate means we would not have adequate electricity to increase electricity consumption here and we would also fall in monopsony trap. Further, it is unconscionable to spend almost 3 times more than the cost at which NEA could have built the said transmission line. It is also not acceptable to cripple the only electric utility of Nepal to receive an annual grant of Rs 11 billion, which is less than 1% of Nepal’s annual budget. It is also obvious that Nepal’s poverty can be reduced by increasing electricity consumption in all sectors of her economy rather than exporting electricity. In this scenario Nepal would be cursed to remain underdeveloped if she were to accept the MCC grant in order to be able to export her electric resources. Therefore, MCC Compact needs to be amended to build transmission and distribution infrastructure in order for Nepal to be able to increase electricity consumption in the country and NEA should be allowed to execute the transmission and distribution infrastructure works at reasonable cost such that per capita energy consumption in Nepal could be raised and also drive Nepal’s GDP upwards. Published in New Spotlight Magazine on December 5, 2021

एमसीसीको आर्थिक विवेचना

अमेरिकी सरकारको एमसीसी अन्तर्गत नेपाललाई दिइने ५० करोड अमेरिकी डलर अनुदान मध्ये ४० करोड डलर काठमाडौंको लप्सिफेदी देखि रातमाटेसम्म र त्यहाँबाट दमौली हुँदै बुटवलसम्म ३ सय १५ किलोमिटर लम्बाइको ४०० केभीको प्रशारण लाइन निर्माणार्थ हो । नेपाल विद्युत प्राधिकरणले बुटवलदेखि गोरखपुरसम्म १ सय ३५ किलोमिटर लम्बाइको ४०० केभीकै प्रशारण लाइन बनाउन भारतीय प्रशारण संस्थासंग सम्झौता हालै गरेकोछ । एमसीसीको प्रशारण लाइन आयोजनाको मुख्य उद्देश्य नेपालको बिजुली भारत निकासी गर्नु हो । साथै यसले गर्दा २ करोड ९० लाख नेपालीको गरिबी निवारण हुन्छ भन्ने अवधारणा रहेछ । त्यसैले महत्वपूर्ण यक्षप्रश्न के हो भने के नेपालको बिजुली निकासी गर्दा नेपालीको गरिबी निवारण हुन्छ ? बिजुलीको बजार नेपालमा बिजुलीको बजार छैन र बिजुली निकासी गरेर नेपालीको गरिबी निवारण गनुपर्छ भन्ने भाष्य २०४८ सालदेखि प्रचारमा छ । गत आर्थिक वर्ष नेपालको प्रति व्यक्ति बिजुली खपत २ सय ४४ युनिट मात्र थियो भने भारतमा ११ सय ८१ युनिट थियो । भारतले नेपालको भन्दा झंडै ५ गुणा बिजुली खपत गर्छ तथापि भारत नेपालबाट बिजुली आयात गर्न इच्छुक छ भनिन्छ । अनि नेपालमा भने खपत हुनसक्दैन भन्ने भाष्य नै हास्यास्पद हो । भारतको समकक्षमा पुग्न नेपालमा जडित क्षमता नै अन्दाजी ७ हजार मेगावाट चाहिन्छ, जुन गत वर्ष १४ सय ५१ मेगावाटमात्र थियो । नेपालका नेताहरु नेपाललाई सिंगापुर बनाउने प्रतिबद्धता जनाउँदा बिर्सन्छन् कि त्यहाँ प्रति व्यक्ति बिजुली खपत ८ हजार युनिट छ र नेपालमा त्यति खपत हुन जडित क्षमता नै ५० हजार मेगावाट आवश्यक हुन्छ । बिस्मृतिमा नपरोस् कि नेपालको आर्थिकरुपमा सम्भाव्य विद्युत उत्पादन क्षमता नै ४३ हजार मेगावाटमात्र छ । कतिपय बुद्धिजीवि नै नेपालमा त्यो परिमाणको बिजुली खपत हुनसक्छ भन्नेमा विश्वस्त छैनन । नेपालमा पूर्ति नभएको दुइ थरि बिजुलीको माग विद्यमान छ । कतिपय उद्योगहरु डिजेलबाट उत्पादित बिजुलीमा निर्भर छन् । जस्तै नवलपरासी स्थित होङ्सी सिमेन्ट उद्योगलाइै हालै ३० मेगावाट उपलब्ध गराइएकोछ, अझ ५० मेगावाट आवश्यक छ । यसै गरेर बिभिन्न उद्योगहरुलाई २ सय ७० मेगावाट आवश्यक छ । त्यस्तै तराइमा सिंचाइको लागि ७ सय मेगावाट जडित क्षमता बराबर डिजेल पम्प प्रयोग गरिन्छ । ९० प्रतिशत जनसंख्याको पहुँचमा बिजुली छ भनिए पनि उद्योग संचालन गर्न आवश्यक गुणस्तरको बिजुली तराइका केही जिल्लाहरु र केही प्रमुख शहरहरुमा मात्र उपलब्ध छ । पूरै देशमा उद्योग संचालन गर्न आवश्यक गुणस्तरको बिजुली उपलब्ध गराउन सके देशको कुना काप्चाहरुमा पनि उद्योगहरु स्थापना हुनसक्छ र यसबाट देशमा उत्पादन, रोजगारी इत्यादि वृद्धि हुन्छ । ६० लाख नेपाली युवा रोजगारीको लागि विदेशमा भौँतारिरहेका छन्, भारतमा यस्ता कति छन्, अज्ञात छ । यी युवालाई देशमा नै रोजगारी दिन सके मात्र पनि नेपालको अर्थतंत्रमा धेरै मूल्यअभिवृद्धि हुन्छ । साथै ठूलो मात्रामा औद्योगिकरण भए देशमा उत्पादन वृद्धि भएर आयात विस्थापित र निकासी वृद्धि हुन्छ, जसबाट व्यापार तथा शोधनान्तर घाटा कम हुन्छ । साथै अर्थतंत्रमा मूल्यअभिवृद्धि पनि हुन्छ । निकासी दर हालै भारतमा ३९ मेगावाट बिजुली औसत ४ रुपैया ३३ पैसामा निकासी गर्ने सम्झौता भयो । तर नेपाली उपभोक्ताहरुले भने औसत १० रुपैया तिर्नुपर्छ । अझ प्राधिकरणले नै निजीक्षेत्रबाट वर्षातमा ४ रुपैया ८० पैसा र सुख्खायाममा ८ रुपैया ४० पैसामा किन्दछ । भारतीय नीति नै नेपाली उपभोक्तालाई बिजुली उपभोग गर्नबाट बञ्चित गरेर आफूले सस्तोमा बिजुली किनेर नेपालको बिजुलीको औपनिवेशिक दोहन गर्ने हो र कतिपय नेता तथा बुद्धिजीवि यहि नीतिको पृष्ठपोषण गर्छन् । यसरी भारतलाई “खेर जाने” बिजुली निकासी गरेको हुनाले दर न्यून भएको हो भन्ने तर्क प्राधिकरणको रहेछ । तर प्राधिकरणले यस्तो खेर जाने बिजुली नेपालमा नै खपत गराउन आवश्यक नीति नै निर्माण गरको छैन । सस्तोमा निकासी गर्र्नु भन्दा नेपालमा नै सस्तोमा बिक्री गरे उपभोक्ताहरु, प्राधिकरण र देश लाभान्वित हुन्छ । एकल क्रेता पासो नेपालमा एकातिर बिजुली खेर गयो, जान्छ भनिदैछ भने अर्कोतिर पूर्वाधारको अभावको कारण आपूर्ति नभएको, हुन नसकेको माग धेरै छ । नेपालको ढल्केबारबाट भारतको मुजफ्फरपुरसम्म ४०० केभीको प्रशारण लाइन संचालनमा आइसकेकोछ र एमसीसी अन्तर्गत बुटवल पु¥याएर त्यहाँबाट भारतको गोरखपुर प्रशारण लाइन जोडेमा नेपाल एकल क्रेता पासोमा फँस्ने छ, नेपालमा खपत बढाउन पूर्वाधार अभाव हुने तर निकासीको लागि पूर्वाधार तयार भएमा । बिजुली खपत र गरिबी बिजुली खपत वृद्धि भए गरिबी निवारण बिच प्रत्यक्ष सम्बन्ध छ । खाडी देश कतारमा सन् २०१५ मा प्रति व्यक्ति बिजुली खपत २ लाख युनिट हुँदा प्रति व्यक्ति कूल ग्राहस्थ्य उत्पादन १ लाख अमेरिकी डलर थियो भने नेपालको स्थिति त दयनीय छ, जुन यथार्थ निम्न चार्टबाट प्रष्टिन्छः

श्रोतः https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/energy-use-per-capita-vs-gdp-per-capita बिजुली भनेको अर्थतंत्र नामक गाडी चलाउने चालक हो । बिुजुलीको उपयोग गरिए कृषि क्षेत्रको उत्पादन र उत्पादकत्व बढ्छ । बिजुली उपलब्ध भए सघन खेती सम्भव हुन्छ, पहाडी भेगमा समेत पानी तानेर सिंचाइ गरेर । सघन खेती हुँदा किसान वर्षैभरि व्यस्त हुन्छन्, खेतीमा व्यस्त नहुने मौसममा वैकल्पिक रोजगारी खोज्न पर्दैन । साथै कृषि उत्पादन वृद्धि हुँदा देशले खाद्यान्न सुरक्षा हासिल गर्नसक्छ । बिजुली मनग्गे उपलब्ध भए कृषकहरुले शित भंडार र विद्युतीय भकारी प्रयोग गरेर बढी मूल्य आउने बेलामा कृषि उपज बिक्री गरेर किसान समृद्ध बन्न सक्छन् । साथै कृषि प्रशोधन उद्योगहरु स्थापना गरेर पनि देशमा थप औद्योगिकरण हुनसक्छ । पेट्रोलियम पदार्थको आयातको कारण नै धेरै व्यापार र शोधनान्तर घाटाको भएको छ । यातायातको विद्युतिकरण गरेर पेट्रोलियम पदार्थको आयात धेरै हदसम्म घटाउन सकिन्छ, जसबाट विद्यमान प्रदुषण पनि तात्विकरुपमा घट्न जान्छ । समग्र यातायात विद्युतीकरण भए, यातायातबाट उत्सर्जन हुने प्रदुषण नियंत्रणमा आएर अनावश्यक औषधोपचारमा खर्च गर्न पर्दैन । देशको परिवत्र्य मुद्रा आयको ठूलो श्रोत पर्यटन हो भनिन्छ । तर नेपाल मुख्यतयाः झोले पर्यटक आउँछन् । देशको कुना काप्चाहरुमा उच्च गुणस्तरको बिजुली पु¥याउन सकिए बढी खर्च गर्ने पर्यटकहरुलाई आकृष्ट गरेर नेपालमा लामो अवधि बस्ने बनाउन सकिन्छ र यसबाट पर्यटनबाट हुने आयमा तात्विकरुपमा वृद्धि हुन्छ । नेपालका भान्छाहरुमा मुख्यतयाः ग्याँस र दाउरा प्रयोग गरिन्छ । नेपाल जस्तो जलविद्युतको प्रचुर सम्भावना भएको तर एक थोपा पनि पेट्रोलियम पदार्थ उत्पादन नगर्ने देशमा आयातीत ग्याँसलाई बिजुलीले विस्थापित गर्न जरुरी छ । स्मरणीय छ, ग्याँसले कार्बनमोनोक्साइड उत्सर्जन गर्छ जुन घातक प्रदुषण हो । त्रिभुवन विश्यविद्यालयको उर्जा अध्ययन केन्द्रले गरेको अध्ययन अनुसार ग्याँसबाट भन्दा बिजुलीले खाना बनाउँदा ५० प्रतिशतसम्म सस्तो पर्ने यथार्थ निम्न चार्टले प्रष्ट्याउँछः

श्रोतः उर्जा अध्ययन केन्द्र, इन्जिनियरिंग अध्ययन संस्थान, त्रिभुवन विश्वविद्यालय ग्याँस विस्थापित गरिए उपभोक्ताहरु, प्राधिकरण र देश लाभान्वित हुन्छ । खर्चमा बचत भएर उपभोक्ताहरु लाभान्वित हुन्छन् भने प्राधिकरणले खेर जाने बिजुली समेत बिक्री गरेर फाइदा गर्छ । अनि व्यापार र शोधनान्तर घाटा घटेर देशको अर्थतंत्र सुदृढ हुन्छ । त्यस्तै दाउराबाट खाना बनाउँदा आन्तरिक प्रदुषण भएर अनावश्यक बिरामी हुने, औषधोपचारमा खर्च हुन्छ । दाउरा संकलन गर्न मात्र एक वर्षमा ५० करोड कार्यदिन खेर जाने आकलन गरिएको छ । दाउरा संकलन गर्न नपरे उक्त समयमा आय आर्जन गरे जनता र देश समृद्ध हुन्छन् । अर्थतंत्रमा मूल्यअभिवृद्धि अमेरिकी सहायता नियोग अन्तर्गत गरिएको एक अध्ययन अनुसार उद्योगमा हुने प्रत्येक युनिट बिजुली खपतबाट ८६ अमेरिकी सेन्ट अर्थतंत्रमा मूल्यअभिवृद्धि हुन्छ । तर नेपालले औसत ४ अमेरिकी सेन्ट भन्दा कम, ४ रुपैया ३३ पैसामा बिजुली भारत निकासी गर्ने सम्झौता गरेको छ । यो परिदृष्यमा नेपालले बिजुली निकासी गर्नु भनेको अर्थतंत्रमा ८६ अमेरिकी सेन्टले हुने मूल्यअभिवृद्धि नै निकासी गर्नु हो, फगत ४ अमेरिकी सेन्ट भन्दा कम रकममा । अचाक्ली महँगो निकासी गर्ने उद्देश्यले प्रशारण लाइन बनाउनु देशको हितमा छैन भनेर माथि उल्लेख गरिसकियो । तथापि बनाउने नै हो भने यति अचाक्ली महँगो बनाउनु बुद्धिमानी होइन । किनभने प्राधिकरणले ढल्केबार देखि भिट्ठामोडसम्म ४०० केभीको प्रशारण लाइन प्रति किलोमिटर ४ करोड रुपैया भन्दा कम लागतमा बनाएको थियो । तर काठमाडौंदेखि बुटवलसम्म प्रशारण लाइन पहाडी भूभागबाट समेत लैजान पर्ने हुनाले प्रति किलोमिटर ६ करोड रुपैयासम्म लागत लाग्ने अनुमान छ र ३ सय १५ किलोमिटर निर्माण गर्न १९ अर्ब रुपैया जति मात्र लाग्नु पर्नेमा एमसीसी अन्तर्गत ४७ अर्ब रुपैया खर्च गर्ने तयारी गरिँदैछ, जुन औचित्यपूर्ण छैन । प्रश्न हो यसरी बढी लाग्ने २८ अर्ब रुपैया कहाँ जान्छ ? निष्कर्श यो अवस्थामा एमसीसीको अनुदान लिएर बुटवलसम्म प्रशारण लाइन बनाउनु, जुन भारतको गोरखपुरसंग जोडिनेछ, भनेको सस्तोमा बिजुली भारत निकासी गरेर नेपाल बिजुली खपत बढाउनबाट बंचित पार्नु हो । साथै नेपालभित्र प्रशारण लाइनको अभाव भएको अवस्थामा भारत निकासी गर्न थप एक प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण गर्दा नेपाल एकल क्रेता पासोमा फँस्न जान्छ । यस अतिरिक्त झंडै ३ गुणा बढी किन खर्च गर्ने भन्ने प्रश्न पनि उठ्छ । त्यसैले एमसीसी सम्झौता यथास्थितिमा स्वीकार गरिए नेपाल अविकशित रहन अभिशप्त रहन्छ । तसर्थ एमसीसी अनुदान नेपालमा बिजुली खपत बढाउन आवश्यक पूर्वाधार निर्माण गर्नको लागि लिइनुपर्छ, निकासी गर्न होइन । त्यो पनि प्राधिकरणलाई निर्माणको जिम्मा लगाएर बचत हुने २८ अर्ब रुपैयाबाट बिजुली खपत बढाउन आवश्यक अन्य पूर्वाधार निर्माण गरिनुपर्छ । बिजुली खपत वृद्धि गरेर नेपालको अर्थतंत्रमा मूल्यअभिवृद्धि गरी देशको कूल ग्राहस्थ्य उत्पादन बढाएर गरिबी निवारण गर्ने लक्ष्य लिइनुपर्छ । Ratna Sansar Shrestha नागरिक दैनिकमा २०७८ मार्ग २० गते प्रकाशित

सार्वभौमिकताको मूल्यमा एमसीसी

अमेरिकि सरकारको ५० करोड डलर अनुदान सहयोगमा ४ सय केभीको प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण र सडक बिस्तार तथा सुधार गर्न सेप्टेम्बर १४, २०१७ मा नेपाल सरकारले अमेरिकि सरकारको एमसीसीसंग सम्झौता (कम्प्याक्ट) सम्पन्न गरिएपछि सेप्टेम्बर २९, २०१९ मा यसको कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन सम्भौता पनि गरियो ।
एमसीसीको समालोचना गर्न गुण दोष केलाउनु पर्नेमा स्थान तथा समय अभावको कारण तथा यसबाट देशलाई हुने लाभका सम्बन्धमा धेरै लेखहरु प्रकाशित भइसकेको हुनाले प्रस्तुत लेखमा एमसीसीको सार्वभौमिकता पर्ने प्रभावको तथा लागत बारे विवेचना गरिएकोछ ।

संसदीय अनुमोदन
यो सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्छ भनिंदैछ र त्यस उद्देश्यले २०७६ साल असार ३० गते यो सम्झौता प्रतिनिधिसभाको विधेयक शाखामा दर्ता गराइयो । तर यो पूर्वशर्त भनिएको प्रावधान यस सम्झौतामा कहिं कतै पनि उल्लेख गरिएका ेछैन; सम्झौताको दफा ७.२ मा बिभिन्न पूर्वशर्तहरु उल्लेख गरिएकाछन् तर संसदीय अनुमोदनको पूर्वशर्त उल्लेख छैन । त्यस्तै अनुसूचि ४ र ५ मा समेत थप पूर्वशर्तहरुको व्यवस्था भएतापनि संसदीय अनुमोदनको पूर्वशर्त उल्लेख छैन ।
संविधानको धारा २७९ मा निम्न विषयहरुमा गरिएका सन्धी वा सम्झौताको संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्ने व्यवस्था छः
(क) शान्ति र मैत्री
(ख) सुरक्षा एवं सामरिक सम्बन्ध
(ग) नेपाल राज्यको सीमाना, र
(घ) प्राकृतिक श्रोत तथा त्यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँड
उपरोक्त विषय बाहेकका सन्धी वा सम्झौताको संसदीय अनुमोदन आवश्यक छैन । किनभने संविधानतः नै बाँकी विषयहरुका सन्धी वा सम्झौताहरु नेपाल सरकारलाई स्वीकृत गर्न अधिकार छ । अर्थात संविधानले नै सरकारलाई स्वीकृत गर्ने प्राधिकार दिएको विषयमा संसदले अनुमोदन गर्दा सरकारमा निहित अधिकार संसदलाई फिर्ता जाने देखिनाले सरकारको अवमूल्यन हुन जान्छ ।
सन् १९९७ मा भारतसंग उर्जा व्यापार सम्झौत सम्पन्न गर्दा सो सम्झौताको धारा ८ मा नेपालमा संसदबाट अनुमोदन भएपछि लागू हुने किटानी व्यवस्था गरिएको थियो । तर संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराउने प्रयास गरिएन, बरु तुहाइयो । अनि सन् २०१४ मा अर्को उर्जा व्यापार सम्झौत सम्पन्न गरियो जसमा संसदीय अनुमोदनको व्यवस्था थिएन ।
उर्जा उत्पादन भनेको प्राकृतिक श्रोत (जलश्रोत) को उपयोग हो भने यसको व्यापार गर्नु भनेको यसको उपयोगको बाँडफाँड हो र यस विषयका सन्धी सम्झौता अनुमोदन गर्नै पर्ने व्यवस्था संविधानको धारा २७९ ले गरेकोछ । तथापि संसदलाई पूर्णत उपेक्षा गरेर यो सम्झौताको संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराइएन । यस्तै अरुण तेश्रो, माथिल्लो कर्णाली आदि जलविद्युत आयोजना निकासीमूलक हुने गरेर निर्माण गर्ने सम्झौताहरु बिदेशी संस्थाहरुसंग गरिए । तर संसदीय अनुमोदन गराइएन ।
यसरी संविधानले नै संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नपर्ने भनिएका सम्झौताहरु अनुमोदन नगराउने, तर संविधानले सरकारलाई नै अख्तियार दिएको आधारमा सरकारले सम्झौता स्वीकृत गर्न पाउनेमा संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराउने प्रयास गरेर संविधान र संसदको खिल्ली उडाइंदैछ ।
साथै यो सम्झौताको संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराएर नजीरकोरुपमा स्थापित गरेपछि आगतमा अन्य दाताहरुले गर्ने आआफ्ना अनुदान सम्झौताहरु पनि संसदबाट अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने सम्भावना उच्च छ र सबै अनुदान सम्झौता संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराउँदा सरकारको हैसियत नै खस्कने अवस्था आउँछ ।

सामरिक सम्बन्ध
एमसीसीसंग भएको सम्झौता अमेरिकाको हिन्द—प्रशान्त रणनीति (इन्डो—प्याशिफिक स्ट्राटेजी)संग आबद्ध छ कि छैन भन्ने सम्बन्धमा व्यापक विवाद छ । अमेरिकाको इन्डो—प्याशिफिक राज्य मंत्री लगायतका पदाधिकारीहरुले किटानीका साथ एमसीसी इन्डो—प्याशिफिक स्ट्राटेजीसंग आबद्ध छ भनेका छन् । तर नेपाल सरकारका मंत्री लगायतका पदाधिकारीहरुले एमसीसी इन्डो—प्याशिफिक स्ट्राटेजीसंग आबद्ध छैन भनेकाछन् । अमेरिकि सरकारका पदाधिकारीले आबद्ध छ भन्ने, नेपाल सरकारका पदाधिकारीले आबद्ध छैन भन्ने अचम्मको स्थिति विकाश भएकोछ ।
नेपालको संविधानको धारा २७९ को उपधारा (२) को खण्ड (ख) मा सामरिक सम्बन्धका सम्झौताको संसदीय अनुमोदन आवश्यक हुने प्रावधान भएको परिप्रेक्षमा नेपाल सरकारका पदाधिकारीले संसदीय अनुमोदनको प्रयास गर्नुबाट पनि यो सम्झौता सामरिक (रणनैतिक) सम्बन्धको हो भन्ने देखिन्छ र इन्डो—प्याशिफिक स्ट्राटेजीसंग एमसीसी आबद्ध रहेको हुनाले नै सरकारले संसदीय अनुमोदनको लागि अनवरत प्रयास गरेको हुनुपर्छ ।

संसदको गरिमा
संविधानले नै ४ निश्चित विषयका सन्धी सम्झौताहरुको मात्र संसदीय अनुमोदनको व्यवस्था गरेकोछ । तथापि एमसीसी सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नै पर्ने हठ गरिंदैछ । सरकारले नै स्वीकृत गर्ने प्राधिकार पाएको सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गरे संसदको अवमूल्यन हुन्छ र यसको गरिमामा आँच आउँछ । संसद भनेको संविधान लगायत ऐन कानून निर्माण गर्ने विधायीका हो । यसले बैदेशिक सहायता सम्झौता अनुमोदन गरेर बसे संसदको गरिमामा खलल पर्छ ।
स्मरणीय छ, भारतमा कुनै पनि सन्धी सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्न पर्दैन, सरकारलाई नै अधिकार छ । नेपालमा पनि २०४७ सालको संविधान निर्माण गरिंदा सरकारमाथि अंकुश राख्न माथि उल्लिखित ४ विषयहरुमा बाहेकका अन्य विषयमा सम्झौता आदि स्वीकृत गर्ने प्राधिकार सरकारलाई नै दिइएको हो, जुन व्यवस्थाले अद्यापि निरन्तरता पाइ आएकोछ । तर पनि संविधानले नै आवश्यक नगरेको सम्झौता संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराउने प्रयास गरिंदैछ ।
साथै यो एउटा बैदेशिक अनुदान सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गरेर गलत नजीर स्थापित गरे यसपछि अनुदान दिने सबै मित्र राष्ट्रहरुले आआफ्ना अनुदान सम्झौता नेपालको संसदबाट अनुमोदन गर्नै पर्ने पूर्वशर्त राख्ने सम्भावना उच्च हुनाले संसद जस्तो गरिमामय संस्थाको काम नै बैदशिक अनुदान सम्झौता अनुमोदन गरेर बस्नेमा परिणत हुने देखिन्छ । सरकारले गरेका सबै अनुदान सम्झौताहरुमा संसदले अनुमोदनका छाप लगाउँदै बस्ने हुन गएर संसदको हैसियत नै खुम्चिने भएर संसदको पनि अवमूल्यन हुन्छ ।

सम्झौता अन्त्य
सम्झौताको दफा ५.१ (क) ले अमेरिकि सरकारलाई एक पक्षियरुपमा यो सम्झौता अन्त्य गर्ने अधिकार दिएकोछ । नेपालको संसदले अनुमोदन गरिसकेको (गर्ने गल्ति गरिएमा) सम्झौता अमेरिकि सरकारले एक पक्षियरुपमा अन्त्य गरेको खण्डमा संसदको अवहेलना हुन जान्छ । यस्तो एकपक्षिय व्यवस्था भएको सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नु संसदको मानमर्दन गर्नु हो ।

सम्झौता संशोधन
सम्झौताको दफा ६.२ (क) र (ख) यो सम्झौता संशोधन गर्ने प्रावधान छ । संसदले अनुमोदन गरेमा त्यसपछि सम्झौता संशोधन गएिमा संसदको अवहेलना हुन्छ । कि हरेक संशोधन संसदबाट अनुमोदन गराइनुपर्ने हुन्छ, जुन सम्भव छैन ।

कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन सम्झौता
संसदबाट मूल सम्झौता अनुमोदन अनिवार्य शर्त हो भनिएकोछ तर उक्त सम्झौता संसदबाट अनुमोदन नभइकन कसरी कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन सम्भौता गरियो ? यसबाट संसदले जस्तोसुकै सम्झौता पनि अनुमोदन गर्छ भन्ने गलत अवधारणा राखेको ठहर्छ, संसदलाई “टेकन फर ग्रान्टेड” गरिएको छ । यसबाट पनि संसदका अवहेलना भएकोछ । कथं संसदले यो सम्झौता अनुमोदन गरेन भने यो कार्यक्रम कार्यान्वयन सम्झौता नै निरर्थक हुन्छ ।
साथै परराष्ट्रमंत्री र अर्थमंत्रीद्वयले गरेर जम्मा १६ वटा पूरक सम्झौताहरु गरेकाछन् भनिन्छ, जसमध्ये धेरै वटा गोप्य राखिएकाछन् । यदि यो सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्ने हो भने, यो सम्झौता संसदबाट अनुमोदन नभइकन किन पूरक सम्झौता गरिए ? साथै संसदले अनुमोदन गरिनुपर्ने सम्झौताका पूरक सम्झौताहरु गोप्य राखेर संसदलाई उपलब्ध नगराइकन कसरी सम्झौता अनुमोदन गर्न मिल्छ ?

एमसीए नेपाल गठन आदेश
एमसीसीसंग भएको सम्झौता कार्यान्वयन गर्न एमसीए नेपाल नामक नयाँ संस्थागत संरचना स्थापना गर्न २०७५ बैशाखमा सरकारबाट गठन आदेश जारी गरियो । सम्झौता संसदले अनुमोदन गर्नुपर्नेमा संसदले अनुमोदन नगर्दै नयाँ संस्था स्थापना गरेर संसदको अवमूल्यन गरिएकोछ । कथं संसदले यो सम्भौता अनुमोदन गरेन भने यो गठन आदेश नै निष्फल हुन्छ । यसबाट पनि संसदको मानमर्दन हुने काम गरेकै देखियो । साथै संसदले सम्झौता अनुमोदन नगर्दै उक्त विकास समितिले १ अर्ब रुपैया भन्दा बढी खर्च गरिसकेकोछ भनिन्छ । संसदले अनुमोदन नगर्दै खर्च गर्न मिल्छ ? साथै संसदले अनुमोदन गरेन भने खर्च गरिसकेको १ अर्ब रुपैया अमेरिकि सरकारले सोधभर्ना समेत नदिने हुनाले राज्यको कोषको दुरुपयोग समेत हुन जान्छ ।

अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून
नेपाल एक सार्वभौमसत्ता सम्पन्न स्वाधीन राज्य हो र नेपालमा हुने गरिने सबै कृयाकलाप नेपालको संसदले निर्माण गरेको संविधान ऐन कानून बमोजिम कार्यान्वयन गरिन्छ । तर एमसीसीसंग भएका सम्झौताहरुको कार्यान्वयन भने अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून बमोजिम गर्नुपर्ने व्यवस्था सम्झौताको दफा दफा ६.४ मा उल्लेख छ । सार्वभौम राज्य नेपालको आफ्नै कानून हुँदाहँुदै नेपाल राज्यभित्र नै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून बमोजिम यो सम्झौता कार्यानन्वयन गर्नु नै पनि संसदको अवहेलना हो । नेपालमा कार्यान्वयन हुने परियोजनामा नेपालको कानून बमोजिम कार्यान्वयन नगरेर अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून अनुसार गर्दा नेपाल कानूनको अस्तित्व र महत्तामाथि नै प्रश्न उठ्छ ।
साथै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून बमोजिम कार्यान्वयन गर्नुपर्ने यस सम्झौता सम्बन्धमा कुनै विवाद भएमा नेपालको न्यायपालिकाले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून अनुसार न्याय निरोपण गर्नुपर्ने हुन्छ, जुन सम्भव छैन । अथवा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय अदालतबाट न्याय निरोपण गराउनु पर्ने हुन्छ । तर सम्झौताको अर्को पक्ष अमेरिकाले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून नै मान्दैन । यस्तो अवस्थामा कसरी अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून अनुसार न्याय निरोपण गर्न मिल्छ ? सम्झौताका दुइ पक्ष मध्ये अमेरिकाले नमान्ने अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून नेपाल माथि कसरी थोपर्न मिल्छ ?

प्रशारण निर्देशनालय
नेपाल विद्युत प्राधिकरण को आफ्नै प्रशारण निर्देशनालय छ । यसले ६६ केभी देखि ४०० केभीसम्मका प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण र संचालन गदै आएकोछ । तथापि यो सम्झौता अन्तर्गत ४०० केभीको ३ सय किलोमिटर लम्बाइको प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण गर्न छुट्टै विकास समिति खडा गरिएकोछ । यो प्राधिकरणलाई पंगु बनाउने प्रयास हो । तर प्राधिकरण र उर्जा मंत्रालय तथा प्राधिकरणका युनियनहरुले यस सम्बन्धमा मौनता साधेका छन् । भएकै संस्थाको क्षमता बृद्धि गर्दै श्रोत साधन सम्पन्न बनाउने कि भएका संस्थालाई पंगु बनाउंदै नयां स्थापना गर्दै जाने भन्ने प्रश्न अनुत्तरित छ । स्मरणीय छ, यसरी पटके रुपमा निश्चित अवधिको लागि (यो सम्झौताको अवधि ५ वर्ष हो) नयां संस्था स्थापना गर्दा संस्थागत स्मृति पनि गुम्दै जान्छ ।

प्रशारण लाइनको लागत
सन् २०१४ मा प्रकाशित एक समाचार अनुसार ढल्केबार मुजफ्फरपुर ४०० केभी प्रशारण लाइनको नेपाल खण्ड ४० किमिको लागत डेढ अर्ब रुपैया लागेको हुनाले प्रति किमि लागत पौने ४ करोड हुन आउँछ । तर यस सम्झौता अनुसार ३ सय किमि प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण गर्न ३९ करोड ८२ लाख अमेरिकि डलर लागत पर्ने हुनाले प्रति किमि लागत १३ लाख अमेरिकि डलर भन्दा बढी हुन्छ जुन बिद्यमान विनिमय दर अनुसार प्रति किमि लागत १६ करोड रुपैया हुन्छ । प्राधिकरणले प्रति किमि ४ करोड रुपैया भन्दा कममा निर्माण गर्न सक्ने प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण गर्न १६ करोड रुपैया लागत लाग्नु भनेको ४ गुणा महँगो हो, जुन भ्रष्टाचारजन्य काम हो ।

भ्रष्टाचारमुक्त नेपाल
एमसीसीको सम्झौता बमोजिम अनुदान निकासा पाउन नेपालको बिभिन्न कोणबाट मूल्यांकन गरिएकोेछ । जस अन्तर्गत ब्यापार नीति आदिमा नेपालले रातो कार्ड पाएको छ भने भ्रष्टाचारमा हरियो कार्ड (लब्धांक ६९ प्रतिशत) पाएको छ । वर्तमान अवस्थामा नेपालमा भ्रष्टाचार छैन भन्ने कुरा सत्तारुढ दलका कतिपय मानिसले नै पत्याउने अवस्था छैन । सर्वसाधारण त कोरोना महामारीमा पनि भए गरिएको भ्रष्टाचारबाट वाक्क भएकाछन् । एमसीसीको आँखाले भने भ्रष्टाचार देखेन छ ! के यसको अर्थ नेपालमा भ्रष्टाचार न्युनतम मात्र छ ? कि निश्चित प्रकारको भ्रष्टाचार एमसीसीलाई स्वीकार्य हो ? अनि प्राधिकरणले ४ करोड रुपैया भन्दा कममा निर्माण गर्ने प्रशारण लाइन १६ करोडमा निर्माण गर्नु भ्रष्टाचार मानिएन !

सावैभौमिकता
कतिपय मानिस लोभिएका छन् ५ वर्षमा ६० खर्ब रुपैया अनुदान पाइने भयो भनेर, जुन धेरै ठूलो रकम ठानिएकोछ । तर चालु आर्थिक वर्षको खर्च नै ९ खर्ब बढी छ भने एमसीसीबाट पाइने वार्षिक १२ अर्ब रुपैया धेरै ठूलो रकम होइन । त्यो पनि नेपाल विद्युत प्राधिकरणलाइै पंगु बनाएर, प्राधिकरणले निर्माण गर्दा भन्दा ४ गुणा लागतमा प्रशारण लाइन निर्माण गर्नु औचित्यपूर्ण छैन ।
सार्वभौमिकताका धेरै आधार मध्ये राजनैतिक सार्वभौमिकता, भौगोलिक सावैभौमिकता र आर्थिक सावैभौमिकताका मुख्य हुन् । यहाँ राजनैतिक सावैभौमिकता सान्दर्भिक छ । नेपालको संविधानको धारा २ मा “नेपालको सार्वभौमिकता र राजकीयसत्ता नेपाली जनतामा निहित रहेको छ” भनिएको छ र नेपाली जनतामा निहित रहेको सार्वभौमिकता र राजकीयसत्ता नेपाली जनताले मतदान गरेर निर्वाचत संसदमा प्रतिबिम्बित हुन्छ । र, सार्वभौमिकता सम्पन्न देशको आफ्नै ऐन कानून हुन्छ र तिनैलाई लागू गर्नु सार्वभौमिकताको परिचायक हो । तर एमसीसीले नेपालमा अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानून लागू गर्दा उपनिबेश राज्यहरुमा अर्कै देशको कानून लागू गरेको भन्दा फरक होइन । अझ जननिर्वाचित संसदको गरिमामा आँच पारेर, सरकारले स्वीकृत गर्न पाउने अधिकार कुण्ठित गरेर, नेपालको कानून असान्दर्भिक बनाएर वार्षिक १२ अर्ब रुपैया थाप्नु बुद्धिमानी मान्न सकिन्न । सार्वभौमिकताको मूल्य चुकाएर केहि अर्ब अनुदान लिनु गहतको झोलमा सार्वभौमिकता डुबाए जस्तो हुन जान्छ ।
सार्वभौमिकतामा आँच नआउने गरेर, सरकारले स्वीकृत गर्न पाउने अधिकार कुण्ठित नहुने भए, नेपाल कानूनलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानूनले विस्थापित नगर्ने भए र अच्चाकालि महँगो नहुने भए यस्तो सहायता लिनु उचित हुन्छ ।

२०७७ आषाढ २३ गतेको नागरिकमा प्रकाशित
Ratna Sansar Shrestha

A Power Paradox: Growth of the Hydro Sector in Nepal

Authors: Ratna Sansar Shrestha, Stephen Biggs, Scott Justice and Amanda Manandhar Gurung

Abstract
Nepal has tremendous hydropower potential yet paradoxically experiences, until recently, loadshedding of up to 18 hours daily in the dry season and has not achieved self-reliant energy security. This paper analyses this paradox by reviewing the growth of hydroelectricity sector in Nepal. It identifies four phases; the illustration of technical capacity, industrial training and early investments, major policy challenges and paradigm shiftand maturing hydropower sector.The spread of improved water mills as well as hydro installations is also reviewed briefly. The paper argues that Nepal will meet much of its projected national demand very soon (2018/19), but attaining self-reliant energy security after displacing fossil fuel is not in the horizon yet. While substantial hydro investments is in the pipeline; a strong, diverse hydro-mechanical manufacturing industry is established. But the electro-mechanical industry is non-existent.Policies have attracted substantial private investment in hydropower sector but it is not geared towards the use of electricity for overall economic development of Nepaland has yet to streamline policy with respect to lean season augmented flow of water for drinking and irrigation purposes within and outside Nepal. A more fundamental paradox is that Nepal government has yet to acknowledge these anomalies that hinder sustainable economic developments.

Keywords: Hydroelectricity, capital goods, policy, Nepal

Introduction
“The perennial electricity shortage, against a continuously rising demand within the country, has given birth to a power paradox of unrealized potential,” (The Rising Nepal, November 2014), is a statement that reflects the contradictory situation present in Nepal; a country so endowed with hydropower potential, suffers until recently, from regular power cuts for up to 18 hours a day .

As of 2011, about 63% of Nepalese households lacked access to electricity and, paradoxically, load shedding is limited to areas that have access to the electricity. Nepal is dependent on imported fossil fuel (coal and petroleum products including LPG) constituting 16.68% of the sources of energy, while electricity constitutes only 3.32% (GoN, 2017). Similarly, renewable (micro hydro, solar, wind, biogas, improved cook stove, etc.) constitute 3.03%. But dependency on traditional sources, such as biomass and animal/agro-residue, is a massive 76.9%. The concept of self-reliant energy security has three dimensions: (i) to make electricity accessible/available to all, not only for household use but also for power industries, agricultural and other activities in Nepal; ii) to drastically displace imported fossil fuel with hydropower, resulting in it becoming the source for 23% of the energy mix , iii) to move rural households away from traditional sources of energy.

Hydropower, manifesting the connection between water and energy, is not limited to Nepal, a sentiment illustrated by Gies : “This water-energy nexus has been coming into focus over the last couple years. The idea is that water and energy are inextricably linked: it takes water to make energy and energy to clean and move water”. But a recent article even deconstructs nexus debates, arguing that although “it is difficult to disagree with a vision of integration between water, food and energy systems”, not only is there little consensus about what it means in reality, as the “idea of ‘the nexus’ has been put forward by a range of proponents – each with his or her own perspectives and agendas”, but also, these debates “mask a bigger debate on resource inequality and access, contributing to social instability” . In Nepal, an activists’ group advocated to make the Melamchi drinking water scheme multipurpose – to avail 1,000 Million Litres Per Day (MLPD) additional drinking water for Kathmandu instead of just the envisioned 170 MLPD, to generate 250 MW hydropower, to rejuvenate the Bagmati River and to ensure water availability for irrigation in 40,000 hectares in the Terai in the dry season in order to harness the water, food and energy nexus . The group lobbied with several prime ministers, ministers and Parliamentary committees, with no results.

It is far beyond the scope of this paper to look at broader issues affecting water and energy policy at the national and regional level, however, we point to these policy arenas because decisions there determine the role different sizes of hydro units and distribution systems will play in future rural and broadly based economic development in Nepal. The scarcity of fresh water in the region for drinking, agricultural and industrial purposes also places renewed interest in Nepal’s water catchment, holding and release policies with regard to its own economic development and supplies to downstream users within and outside Nepal. Climate change has also highlighted long-term policy issues concerning the use of Nepal’s water resources as well as in other Himalayan countries .

And finally, the blockade by India in 2015-2016 drastically reduced the availability of petroleum products and other commodities in Nepal, highlighting the dependence on fossil fuel from India and renewed interest in alternative/renewable sources of energy, particularly electricity . Despite everything, Nepalis are still smarting from this blockade, but the state and even the public seems to be forgetting the lessons learnt from the blockade as no effort has been made towards self-sufficiency and switching of energy sources from imported to renewable generated in Nepal . In a report prepared by the Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC), the demand for petroleum products is projected to increase by 500% in 15 years with 2014/15 as base year .

The water flowing in numerous rivers and rivulets give rise to Nepal’s great natural assets, namely falling water to generate hydropower. Its history goes back hundreds of years with development of traditional Ghattas (water mill) that were traditional simple wooden-paddle water mills found along rivers and streams where the mechanical power (approximately 1-2 kW) is used for grinding grain, hulling/husking paddy, oil production and even turning large Buddhist prayer wheels . Bachmann tells the story where Engineer Akkal Man Narkarmi replaced the wooden parts with metallic ones, where the mill then becomes an “improved water mill” (IWM) and can generate electricity up to 3-5 kW (called pico hydro), sufficient for lighting and operating electric and electronic devices in isolated/remote settlements.

Also in the late 1960s with the introduction of cross flow turbines, micro hydro (5 kW to 100kW) and mini hydro (100kW to 1MW) schemes began to flourish for milling and to provide access to electricity (The Alternative Energy Promotion Centre (AEPC) is involved in its promotion inter alia by providing subsidies . Recent policy changes and accessible technology allows synchronous connection of mini hydro schemes to the national grid, enabling such schemes to generate power 24-hours a day and supply to the local and national grid. Yet, generally electricity from pico and micro hydro schemes are not supplied to the grid mainly due to transmission costs . Though the use of water for generating electricity in Nepal started in 1911, its development on a larger scale did not begin until the 1960s. Since then, Nepal’s technical, human resources and even financial capacity for hydropower development has increased dramatically.

Dr HM Shrestha estimated in 1966 that Nepal has a theoretical hydropower potential of 83,000 MW of which 43,000 MW was found economically and technically feasible . The total hydropower capacity of the grid, operated by Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), currently is 802 MW installed capacity . It is a paradox thus, that in a country endowed with so much potential, and a history of having the knowledge of hydropower for over 100 years, local demand for electricity from the national grid far exceeds the supply from the national grid at the current consumer tariff. This excess demand led to loadshedding of up to 18 hours a day in the country, particularly in the winter months when rivers are running low.

However, we suggest that presenting the energy paradox in this way is diverting attention from a more substantive paradox, which is: despite tremendous gains in local technical and institutional knowledge and even manufacturing in the hydropower arena, why is more positive recognition not given to the growing and strong hydro sector in Nepal? For at least the last ten years Nepal has even been exporting its hydro knowledge and complete systems to diverse places such as Afghanistan, India, Laos, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This paper does not attempt to answer this question, but rather highlight it as the more important, yet unacknowledged paradox.

There has been no loadshedding in the capital since the beginning of 2017 and Government expects that enough hydropower will soon be produced nationally to meet Nepal’s industrial and domestic demand, and its aim is to export 5,700 MW by 2021/22 (However, the end of load shedding in Kathmandu was not achieved by the ample production of Nepali electricity. Instead, it was achieved by importing 400 MW electricity from India . Furthermore, a supplementary Power Purchase Agreement was signed with India’s NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam (NVVN) on May 27, 2017 to import an additional 160 MW (cumulative 560 MW). The installed capacity in NEA’s system is around 800 MW, generating a little over one-third of that in the dry season. Thus, although loadshedding stands “mitigated”, Nepal is not energy secure, nor self-reliant. Current crude estimates for electricity required “for normal economic growth scenario of Nepal is more than 6,000 MW” to achieve self-reliant energy security . Ensuring availability of electricity for the entire population would require 2,700 MW under the business as usual scenario. Additionally, Nepali industries have 700 MW of standby generators and would need nearly 1,000 MW more to operate at full capacity; it would take an additional 1,000 MW to displace LPG from kitchens; 500 MW would be needed to electrify transportation; and 700 MW to displace diesel irrigation pumps in the Terai . In this backdrop, if Nepal exports power without meeting her own demand (both unmet and latent) to saturation level, it will amount to a paradox within a paradox; continuing to import fossil fuel while exporting hydropower.

The strong diverse hydro sector has grown and developed substantial technical capabilities for manufacture of hydro-mechanical with backstopping capabilities to negotiate with aid agencies and the corporate sector, including for energy, water policies and projects. But Nepal is not capable to negotiate with powerful neighbours, manifested in treaties signed with India to date and the multiple agreements signed with developers for export-oriented projects . In light of this background, we review the history of hydropower development in Nepal and suggest four phases:

1) Technical capability illustrated,
2) Substantial industrial training and early hydro investments,
3) Major challenges in policy and paradigm shift, and
4) Maturing hydro energy sector and technology game change.

Methodology
The main method was literature review of many secondary sources and personal experience of working in the industry . This includes published and grey documents from government agencies, such as National Planning Commission (NPC), Ministry of Energy, Water Resources, and Irrigation (MoEWRI), Water and Energy Commission Secretariat (WECS), Investment Board of Nepal (IBN), NEA, AEPC, NOC, various commissions, task force and donor projects . Unravelling data from government and donor projects was particularly challenging as often projects reported on their own activities, with little reference to national or other data that put the information into a broader national perspective. Local newspapers were reviewed, as in Nepal, many of the debates around hydropower are played out in the local press. Interviews were held with key informants in the industry such as local microhydro users, manufacturers, contractors, equipment suppliers, private and community owners of equipment, members of trade organizations, relevant aid organizations and independent power producers. Major seminars were also attended. This research started with a focus on the spread of microhydro for economic uses that significantly adds value to the economy in rural areas but was then extended to include small, medium, and large hydro in the endeavour to understand/analyse the paradox of abundant hydropower potential but failure to achieve self-reliant energy security and value addition in the macro economy. We have also taken a look at the growth of local hydro manufacturing and maintenance industries. Our analysis is still partial in so many ways, for example we have made no attempt to review overall energy policy in Nepal . We have attempted to analyse the power paradox with energy security (also implying security of energy supply) as a backdrop (energy security defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”) (IEA). Our focus is the availability of hydropower, because hydropower will and should play the dominant role in any future national energy policy of Nepal, reducing dependence on imported and subsidised fossil fuels. Although national tariff/pricing and subsidy policies are important issues relative to overall energy security, these are beyond the scope of this paper.

Results and Discussion

Classification
The classification of hydropower is based on the installed capacity of the system. Based on conventional classification, systems under 5 kW are pico hydro , 5 to 100 kW micro hydro, 100 kW to 1 MW mini hydro, 1 to 10 MW small hydro, 10 to 50MW medium hydro and above 50 MW large hydro . But the Task Force constituted by GoN in 2009 to prepare Generation Plan to generate 25,000 MW in 20 years recommended following capacity classification:

Task Force Recommendation
Micro: < 100kW Mini: 100kW - 1MW Small: 1 - 25MW Medium: 25 - 100 MW Large: 100- 1000MW Mega: >1000 MW

Critical issues
The reasons for the lack of investment in larger-scale hydropower in Nepal are many and we do not attempt its analysis here. There are others who have looked at these issues in considerable depth . However, we include a list of issues that repeatedly come into policy debates in Nepal concerning investment in large-scale schemes.

1. Whether to invest in hydropower for local economic development and domestic consumption or for export (hydro dollars) inter alia to mitigate the trade deficit
2. Powerful government ‘hydrocrats’ dominate policy debates and control advice from alternative sources of expertise.
3. Suspicions over the political or other motives of investors and consultants (including bilateral foreign governments).
4. The interrelatedness of hydropower considerations with multidimensional uses of Nepal’s water resources especially for lean season augmented flow like water storage, groundwater replenishment, drinking water supplies, irrigation (most of which have regional implications) including flood control .
5. The lack of diplomacy and negotiating capacities in Nepal, vis-à-vis dominant donors, and representatives of bordering and other countries in the region.
6. Memories and histories of fair and unfair development of past hydropower and water resources projects.
7. A lack of agreement on the frameworks and forecasting tools used to estimate financial, economic and social costs and benefits including positive and negative externalities and rates of return on hydro projects and large dams in general including under developed stage of discipline of financial engineering, which is not fully understood by most .
8. The changing economic and technical environment for investment. For example, some hydro and water resources schemes are proposed and built using one ranking of national priorities to justify the scheme, while a few years later, another ranking of national priorities might be more relevant. In addition, once built, the actual use and outcomes of projects often changes over time . This approach creates confusion amongst the project developers making them uncertain as to which project to be undertaken/implemented on which basis and when; thereby stunting the growth of the sector as a whole.
9. Changing composition of local and foreign investors .
10. Degree of public and private ownership in different parts (generation, distribution, transmission and use) of the hydropower sector (bundling and unbundling).
11. Balance of run of the river and storage projects .

As we discuss at the end of the paper, the growth and maturing of the hydro sector has given rise to a diverse, sustainable industry where load shedding of the type experienced in recent years should be over if policy and its implementation is properly geared to meet Nepal’s own demand and ensure self-reliant energy security. The planned commissioning of the 456 MW Upper Tamakoshi project in April 2019 (after a two-year delay due to earthquake and Indian blockade) will be a significant major step in that direction for supplying the national grid .

Phases in the Development of the Nepal’s Hydropower Industry

Technical capability illustrated (1911-early 1960s)
Perhaps the most well-known example of a mini hydro is the 500 kW Pharping Powerhouse established by the Rana rulers of Nepal in 1911 AD, a gift from the British government to illuminate Rana palaces in Kathmandu and some streets. It generated electricity for 70 years until 1981 when the water was diverted to supply drinking water. It is owned by the NEA and was rehabilitated in 2006. It is operated occasionally when water can be diverted from drinking water. There are now plans to turn it into a living museum . The second oldest power station in Nepal is a 640 kW run of the river scheme in Sundarijal commissioned in 1935, about 24 years after Pharping. It has been running ever since and the water from its tailrace is supplied to the Kathmandu valley.

Industrial training and early hydro investments (Mid 1960s-1990s)
While the Pharping and Sundarijal plants illustrated well the feasibility and use of hydropower in Nepal, it was not until the mid-1960s that an interest in developing a hydropower manufacturing capability started.

The changes that have taken place in the industry since the 1970s are quite dramatic. One of the first examples of the development of hydropower for industrial use is the very well-known 1 MW Tinau hydropower plant in Butwal. The project started with a 50 kW unit to replace the diesel generator and then developed into the 1 MW system, a run of the river scheme with Francis turbine. It is important, not only for supplying electricity, but for its major role in the development of Nepal’s hydropower industry. It was started in the mid-1960s under the leadership of a Norwegian engineer Odd Hoftun and in 1972 operated by the BPC, which he incorporated. It was handed over to the NEA in 1980. Except for a time in the early 1980s when it was badly damaged by a flood, it has been in operation. Its construction was conceived not only to provide electricity to a nearby major Terai town, Butwal, but also to build up local skills and industrial capacities in the nascent hydropower industry. Odd Hoftun, supported by United Mission to Nepal (an international NGO), initiated the establishment of the Butwal Technical Institute (BTI) in 1963, which has been one of the major sources of hydro engineering training in Nepal. It now possesses a large industrial park, where many private companies are providing manufacturing and maintenance services for all sizes of operations in the hydropower industry.

By the late 1970s, the cross-flow turbines had become the most common micro hydro turbine and two private companies, the Balaju Yantra Shala in Kathmandu and Development and Consulting Services (DCS) in Butwal played important roles in its development . Odd Hoftun also established Nepal Hydro and Electric Co. (NHE) in Butwal in 1985 as a turbine workshop. It now specializes in fabrication/manufacture of hydro-mechanical equipment including High Voltage (HV) substations and repair and maintenance of electro-mechanical equipment for hydropower generation, transmission and distribution. Furthermore, the company has significant involvement in manufacture of heavy steel structures. Both the Butwal and Patan Industrial Estates were established many years ago and several of the micro hydro repair and manufacturer companies are located in these estates . Several of these units have ISO 9001 certification, and some are moving into larger repair and manufacturing capabilities .

A well-known example of a locally managed mini grid is at Namche Bazaar, the gateway to Mt. Everest. Its first project, started in 1976, was washed away by the Dig Tsho glacier lake outburst flood in 1985. A new run of river power plant, 630 kW installed capacity, with 2 double jet Pelton turbines was built on Thame Khola between 1988-1994 with Austrian Government assistance. The electricity has given light and power including for ICT to the locals, hotels and bakeries in both Namche and Khumjung VDCs including a local hospital.

Major challenges to Policy and Paradigm Shift (Early to Late 1990s)
In 1991, Nepal’s total installed capacity stood at 244MW out of which 239MW was built and owned by NEA (including a 14.41 MW thermal power plant) and 5.1 MW hydro built with Norwegian government assistance and owned by BPC

1992 is a turning point in terms of the liberalization of the hydropower sector after the formulation of the Hydropower Development Policy (1992) and the promulgation of the Electricity Act, 1992 and Water Resource Act, 1992, liberalizing the sector to ensure hydropower development by attracting private sector investment in the ‘build, own, operate and transfer’ (BOOT) mechanism. Prior to this, the hydropower was in public domain . In 1996, the AEPC was established, and in 1998 a set of policies that were favourable to the development of the smaller scale hydropower industry in Nepal was also introduced.

International donors and investors have also changed their behaviour significantly in 1990s and they are now far more open to a broader range of options, as regards to technology, management systems and investments plans in the electricity sector. Reflecting on the behaviour of donors in the mid-1990s, when civil society groups challenged, and stopped a proposed World Bank Arun 3 dam, Pandey notes: “Among the more than 40 conditionalities for donor investment into ‘Baby Arun’ , the most problematic was: Outside the investment plan, NEA could not even study a hydropower project >10 MW without donor approval” .

The debates around the 201 MW Arun 3 confrontations illustrated well the issues involved. The disagreements at the time centred on the high per MW cost of the scheme, its environmental effects, the short and long-term distribution of benefits and costs - including effects on the growth of a local hydro industry. The debates on the pros and cons of the Arun 3 dam are still much alive and continue to influence national hydro energy policy debates and current negotiations on the development of hydro on the Arun River . The debate was settled by the World Bank by refusing to fund it as IFC had, in the meantime, committed to fund 60 MW Khimti project, thereby rendering Arun 3 and Khimti projects mutually exclusive, due to negative covenant of Arun 3 project, proscribing undertaking project >10 MW.

Similarly, with the establishment of AEPC and introduction of relevant policy, there was major support from international agencies for off grid hydro systems development as reflected through the programs of the AEPC . Strong local business associations grew, like Nepal Micro Hydro Development Association (NMHDA) and Independent Power Producers’ Association of Nepal (IPPAN) to lobby and promote their business interests.

Maturing Hydro EnergySector in new Millennium (2000 – present)
The last one and a half decade has seen the maturing of the Nepal’s hydropower sector. We look at this under three headings: supply, demand and institutions.

• Electricity Supply: Nepal Hydropower Generation
At the micro and mini hydro level, according to AEPC the total installed capacity, through till 2015/16 is 54.275 MW (AEPC, 2013). There is no reason to think that this off grid source of electricity will not continue to rise rapidly. Not only is this hydropower installed using Nepali expertise and equipment, but Nepali companies are now supplying and installing hydropower in many countries in the region.

At the macro level, under new policy allowing private investment in hydropower, 488 MW was added to the system in 22 years from 1992 through till 2014 - double of what was built over eight decades. During this period (1992-2014), NEA added 238 MW (including 39 MW thermal power plant), whereas independent power producers (IPPs) implemented power projects totalling 250 MW . In 2016, total installed capacity in NEA system stood at 855.886 MW (851.25 MW in the grid and 4.536 MW isolated) . Of which NEA hydro is 477.9 MW and thermal 53.4 MW. IPP hydro in the grid is 324.446 MW. Of 117 generation licenses issued for total installed capacity of 3,340.95 MW, 50 projects with total installed capacity of 324.446 MW have been commissioned through till 2015/16, electricity from most of these is sold to NEA under power purchase agreements (PPAs) .91 IPP hydropower projects are under construction with 1,721 MW installed capacity . Similarly, by November 30, 2016, the Department of Electricity Development (DoED) issued 276 survey licenses for various sizes of projects for 5,914 MW. Additionally, 159 licenses for survey of transmission lines and 63 licenses for construction of transmission lines have been issued through till July 2017.

It is projected that load shedding in Nepal will come to an end, when the Upper Tamakoshi hydro plant (456 MW) is commissioned along with smaller hydro plants such as the 50 MW Upper Marshyangdi project . After that, with forecasts of future investments in larger and smaller projects, certain segment of society believes that Nepal will not face major loadshedding for many years to come. But Nepal would still be very far from achieving self-reliant energy security that includes switching from fossil fuels used in households, transportation, and industries to hydropower. As regards large dams, negotiations have restarted with India on the 6,480 MW Pancheshwar project on the Mahakali River that separates the two countries on Nepal’s western border. Yet, despite India’s plans to develop it, eyeing stored water for large shortfalls in municipal, industry, and irrigation in North-Central India, the likelihood of its implementation is slim as India is coveting Nepal’s share of water under the Mahakali Treaty .

Till 1990s, supply was dominated by the NEA. But, of the total 562 MW from all projects completed since 1990s, only 42% came from the NEA, the rest was generated by the private sector. Of the total generated by private sector 34.7% includes foreign investment and 65.3% is Nepali investment only. There are now a very wide variety of Nepali investors, ranging from local institutional investors, such as Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Citizen Investment Trust (CIT) to commercial banks and special purpose companies and funds. There are also many Nepali construction companies that have grown steadily since the initial years of the training and hydro manufacturing initiatives in Butwal and Kathmandu in the mid-1970s .

A relatively recent phenomenon is the emergence of Chinese suppliers in the Nepal market with inexpensive hydro technology both for micro (Forster undated) and macro hydro. Of 324 MW IPP hydropower plants in operation, Chinese suppliers account for close to 200 MW. NEA seems to prefer non-Chinese suppliers except in the Chamelia Project. Attraction of IPPs towards Chinese equipment primarily could be attributed to their competitive pricing. Only time will tell if the quality and performance of Chinese equipment is comparable to non-Chinese.

In terms of backward economic linkage benefits accruing to Nepal, it will not accrue till such equipment is manufactured/fabricated in Nepal. NHE and few other companies are capable to fabricate and supply most hydro-mechanical equipment, except for turbine runners. There are no electro-mechanical manufacturers of large generators in Nepal.

• Electricity Demand
The demand for electricity from the national grid has grown rapidly, especially during the last decade and it is fair to assume that it will continue to rise rapidly . Unfortunately, Nepal lacks a dedicated institution tasked with responsibility to project future electricity demand, currently undertaken by NEA and WECS independently and jointly by NPC and Investment Board Nepal (IBN).

These three have come up with divergent figures for future electricity demand for 2030. According to a recent study conducted by NEA, the electricity demand (system peak load) in 2029/30 has been projected to be 4,280 MW . The WECS has projected electricity demand of 11,111 MW in 2030 based on Model for Analysis of Energy Demand (MAED), for reference scenario of 7.2% economic growth. The NPC and IBN’s joint energy demand forecast for 2030, also based on the (MAED), is 10,092 MW . The latter two reports are based on studies that start out by using consumption of biomass, fossil fuel and electricity as background but ends up projecting only electricity demand without regard to fuel switching to hydropower even after a few decades. Complete displacement of firewood, animal/agro-residue with clean energy has simply not been looked into, although due to indoor pollution these cause huge human tolls. In order to address the issue of this power paradox, Nepal needs a dedicated institution to prepare energy demand projections that aims to achieve self-reliant energy security with hydropower in every facet of household and industrial activities, and policy geared for government intervention to ensure the displacement of biomass and imported fossil fuel.

Electricity consumption in kilowatt hours (kWh) per capita in Nepal stood at 128.1 kWh per capita in 2013 according to the World Bank . To put this into context, Malaysia with a similar population consumed 4,345 kWh per capita. Even states in India consume more - with Assam at 209 kWh, Manipur 207 kWh and Uttar Pradesh at 387 kWh. In 2015-16, when the demand for electricity in Nepal was 1,385.3 MW, NEA’s installed capacity was only 855.9MW only one third of which was generated in the dry season.

The excess of demand over supply has resulted in the extensive loadshedding in winter months . While there are considerable losses of electricity due to faults and inefficiency in the national grid, even if these were greatly reduced there would still be excess demand over supply at existing tariff rates. Just how much electricity tariffs would have to rise so that supply meets demand is not often discussed in the Kathmandu press. This is partly because the electricity industry is a supply led industry. Preoccupation is with the supply of the service, with minimal concern with the management of demand. This is reflected by the normal method of reporting which is by electricity supplied (e.g. xx kW, or xx MW) or by the number of domestic households served (generally calculated by the average use of electricity for domestic purposes per household). This goes for both of the public-sector institutions concerned with electricity generation and the private sector. The demand for electricity by large and small industries is rarely part of public debates . The spread of microhydro under AEPC follows the supply approach of NEA and uses the number of households connected to the local mini grid as the main indicator of performance.

There is a presumption sometimes by domestic electricity consumers that it is their right to a source of electricity, either free, or at a low price. Under such a situation, when supply does not meet demand at prevailing tariffs rates, often a range of elite capture, corruption, rent seeking, and political patronage behaviour comes in. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these issues, which are common in many countries. However, it is interesting to note that the first hydropower unit established in 1911 was used only for domestic lighting for the palaces of then Rana rulers. This differed from the early days of the 1960/70s in the improvement of local Ghattas, which were used for economic production purposes.

In recent years, concern with reducing ‘leakages’ in the system and the productive use of electricity has been reflected by the NEA selling electricity in bulk to community electrification entities , which in turn retails to its consumer/members.

Paradoxically, the loadshedding of the last few years, and the recent Indian blockade has had advantages in regard to concentrating public discussion and in increasing awareness concerning the generation of electricity from national resources as well as the careful use of electricity. The large numbers of diesel and petrol generators of all sizes used during loadshedding and the blockade have not only been expensive, but have also changed perceptions concerning the supply, reliability and careful use of electricity for different purposes .

• Changes to Electricity Industry Public Sector Institutions
Alongside the development of a robust, diversified Nepali electricity supply industry there have also been many changes in government regulations, trade agreements, procedures and institutions associated with public discourses. These changes can be illustrated by events in the late 2000s and more recently.

Electricity Development Centre (EDC) was established in July 1993 under the then Ministry of Water Resources pursuant to Electricity Act, to develop and promote the hydropower sector by attracting private investment. This centre was also tasked with monitoring hydropower development work. It was renamed the Department of Electricity Development (DOED) in February 2000 . It is responsible for assisting the Ministry in implementation of overall government policies related to the power/electricity sector. The major functions of the DoED are to ensure transparency of the regulatory framework, promote and facilitate the private sector's participation in the power sector by providing "One Window" service and to issue licenses to hydropower projects and transmission and distribution networks; mainly to conduct feasibility studies and to construct the hydropower plants and to build the transmission and distribution network.

Electricity Tariff Fixation Commission (ETFC) was established in 1994 not as an independent/autonomous commission but to fix retail tariff. It has no jurisdiction over the bulk tariff at which NEA buys power from IPPs, nor has it the authority over import/export of power tariffs. With the promulgation of Nepal Electricity Regulatory Commission Act in 2017, a regulatory commission with comprehensive authority over the electricity sector will be constituted, which will supplant ETFC.

Power Transmission Company Nepal Limited (PTCNL) was registered in 2007 as a joint venture company with NEA owning 50% equity, Nepal’s Hydroelectricity Investment and Development Co. Ltd (HIDCL) owning 14%, India’s Power Grid Corporation Limited 26% and ILFS Energy Development Company Limited (IEDCL) 10%. It is responsible for developing and executing the transmission system in Nepal in order to facilitate the cross-border power exchange between Nepal and India, evacuating power from export-oriented projects under construction in Nepal and to import power from India to mitigate loadshedding in Nepal. Under its ownership, a 42.1 km section of Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur 400 kV double circuit Transmission Line within Nepalese territory was successfully completed in February 2016.

Investment Board of Nepal (IBN) was established in 2011 “as a high-level fast track agency with the objective of facilitating the economic development of Nepal by creating an investment-friendly environment by mobilising and managing domestic as well as foreign investment” (Office of the Investment Board). In its early years it faced many challenges, including calls from the MoWRE for it to be disbanded in 2013 , essentially due to the conflict between the Electricity Act and Investment Board Act, 2010. Under the former, all electricity projects were under the jurisdiction of MoWRE. But the latter has put hydropower projects of capacity of 500 MW or more under the purview of the IBN. The IBN has signed Project Development Agreements (PDAs) for the Upper Karnali (900 MW) project in September 2014 and for the Arun 3 (900 MW) project in November 2014 . It also has three other projects under preparation for negotiations that will generate a further 1,800 MW. Sadly, both of the projects for which IBN has already signed PDAs will not resolve the power paradox, as both of these projects are export oriented.

Power Trade Agreement (PTA); a second institutional change that raised electricity sector’s profile is the signing of the Power Trade Agreement with India in 2014 . Electricity and water agreements with India have a very chequered history as has been documented elsewhere . However, what is significant about this new agreement is that it has come about within the context of a more open discourse in the public domain in Nepal. This reflects a far broader debate than in the past on the political nature of recognizing Nepal’s water and electricity resource potential in the short, and possibly and more importantly, in the long term. This is especially important for the nation to understand that such export-oriented projects will not address the power paradox within Nepal. This is well illustrated by the caution and scepticism of some writers regarding the offer to Nepal by India of a US$ 1 billion line of credit in August 2014 for hydro development. Some thought that should go towards the stalled joint India-Nepal program for Pancheshwar Multipurpose project. However, another three projects emerged from the past and led one observer to note, “whether they were truly born in Singha Durbar, or further away in Delhi” Whatever the next stages of these water and electricity negotiations, it is clear that there are now greater scrutiny of India-Nepal government proposals, agreements and actions than in the past.

An important point that needs to be kept in mind is the fact that both Nepal and India are power deficit countries. Therefore, it is surprising how these two countries can trade in power, which they do not have, except during certain hours of the day or certain season . Moreover, if Nepal is to achieve self-reliant energy security, more power than it has potential from water resources is needed, thus obviating the prospect of exporting power from Nepal.

Electricity Generation Company (EGC) was established in 2016 with paid-up capital of Rs. 300 million and authorized capital of Rs. 20 billion. 30% of its equity is owned by various Ministries and public enterprises such as the NEA (10%), EPF (10%), Nepal Telecom (10%), CIT (5%), HIDC (4%), Rastriya Beema Sansthan (2%). 17% equity will be offered to general public, 10% to locals of districts affected by hydropower projects being developed by the company, 2% to highly impoverished people. Earlier, MoE had agreed in principle to award around 19 projects that are under the DoED’s basket to this company.

Institutions of Public Discourse; a further dimension of the positive maturing of the electricity sector is the growth of journals, professional organizations, newspaper coverage and public dissent. Groups in Nepal’s water and electricity sectors, for many years, had public debates on the direction and content of government and donor policies and practices - for example, the Arun 3 confrontation of the early 1990s. However, we suggest that this ‘either/or’ debate as some participants and observers portrayed it then, has now developed into a more mature debate where serious policy analysis is done and references to well established journals are made, such as Water Alternatives, reviews of books in Studies in Nepali History and Society (SINHAS) and HYDRO Nepal. The latter journal, which in the past had mainly articles focusing on technical issues, now has articles written also from legal, managerial, and socio-economic perspectives and empirically supported historical analysis concerning past negotiations and development . Documents produced by consultants for influential donor organizations, are now less restricted than in the past, which is a healthy development and reflects also a growing maturity of aid organizations.

National Information Commission (NIC) was established in 2008 to implement the Right to Information (RTI) Act, the NIC is responsible for the protection, promotion and practice of RTI in Nepal. The NIC has played a positive role by issuing directives to the IBN to make the PDA signed for Upper Karnali Project public. In this manner, information of vital public interest has been put in the public domain and brought for public scrutiny and discourse. It is also a sign of maturity as the government was required to be transparent in its dealings in the matters of hydropower development, disallowing it to hide behind the shield of commercial deal.

Another sign of maturity of the electricity sector are the recent protests of locals and construction workers demanding a fair share of the planned benefits of hydro investment project. For example, the work of 456 MW Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Project was held up for sometime, as the workers demanded more shares be allocated to them. In negotiations with the Nepal government, the Chairman of China’s Three Gorges Corporation, proposed that the GoN implement the resettlement and rehabilitation of the estimated 20,000 people that would be displaced by the 750MW West Seti Storage Hydropower project. GoN has not made any commitment in this respect as the project is yet to be implemented and no involuntary displacement has occurred. While policy level economic cost benefit analysis has generally underpinned government and donor policy decisions on dam investments, the selectivity and partial nature of the analysis, and whether compensations are paid is a notorious area of policy practice. The almost daily reporting in the local press on public and private projects and negotiating points concerning the hydropower sector reflects a healthy maturing of the electricity sector. Compared with only a few years ago, when powerful actors could make unsupported claims and promises and take actions, the current level of policy debates have become more technically and politically informed.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper examines the Nepal power paradox. But we suggest there is a deeper paradox, namely the paradox that such a statement can be made, given the sustained development of the hydropower sector over the last few decades, and a level of policy debate in the public domain that could be an example to many other countries in the world. We reviewed the history of hydropower development in Nepal and suggested four phases in the growth of the sector.

Policy Implications
Maintaining the momentum of technical and institutional change
Perhaps the biggest policy challenge is the supply-led orientation of most analysts in the hydropower industry that has led to preoccupation with domestic use of electricity versus export, with minimal concern for broad based economic development and, importantly, attaining self-reliant energy security by displacing biomass and fossil fuel. This orientation has been found both in NEA and AEPC. Fortunately, with many new institutions opening up, the policy debates is changing. The diversity of investors in the hydropower sector has increased substantially. These are ‘game changing’ institutional and political changes that are leading to strong, diversified hydropower. The biggest challenge is to capitalize on the opportunities that are now opening.

Ramping up of technology has also favourably impacted two areas. The availability of inexpensive Chinese technology has made many commercial hydropower projects feasible. As more of such equipment is ‘tested’, there is likely to be easier and cheaper access to these . The second area of technology change is growing likelihood of trans-Himalaya transmission lines . A decade ago the Himalayas were thought to be impenetrable for such energy trade. Yet, on a visit by the Nepali Prime Minister to China in March 2016, a joint communiqué was released where “China is to provide technical and financial supports to conduct feasibility study … to develop Arun Kimathanka Hydropower Project (434 MW) and build a 400 kV trans-border transmission line that supports exchange of up to 1500 MW via Rasuwagadhi - Kerung route”, which is currently being upgraded to become Nepal and China’s preferred overland trade route and where, in other reports, China is proposing to link Kathmandu by rail . If such projects prove to be economically feasible, then Nepal doubles the list of energy buyers, including to power such rail links.

Treating hydro manufacture and construction as a capital goods industry
The second policy challenge concerns maintaining the momentum to strengthen local manufacturing and the installation of hydro. There is now a relatively strong hydro-mechanical industry in Nepal. In addition, Nepali companies are providing hydro services abroad such as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Laos, India and Sri Lanka. One of the challenges for future policy is to balance the interests of this strong, flexible local hydro engineering industry with the challenges of outside contractors, sources of finance and the imports of generation, distribution equipment and electric appliances. Currently, as hydro-mechanical industries have produced turbine runners for projects smaller than 1 MW, the logical next level is production of such equipment for the small to medium hydro (1 to 100 MW) range. Secondly, Nepal needs to enter into production of electro-mechanical equipment (generators), perhaps, by collaborating with foreign industries.

National Energy Policy
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the macro larger energy policy context in which hydropower is located, both nationally and globally. Now that Nepal is moving into a period where local electricity generation is projected to be in excess of demand under a range of tariff regimes, the case for such subsidies should be weaker . It is probable that the recent blockade by India has resulted in a change in behaviour amongst energy consumers, whereby they have switched to electrical sources of energy, and are being more careful in its use . There is a policy opportunity, not only as a result of the blockade to change Nepal’s overall energy policy but also to mitigate trade and balance of payment deficit, to displace not only fossil fuel inter alia for electrification of transportation and displacing of LPG from kitchens in near future and firewood from rural kitchens eventually.

Managing the multiple and changing value and use of water and energy resources
The fourth policy challenge concerns managing the inescapable complexity of water and energy resource use in Nepal and the changing institutions involved. This is not only at the local level, with respect to micro hydro, but also at a macro level. Many of the same issues come up, concerning water rights and electricity, sustainability and equitable distribution of cost and benefits in the short and long run. What is significant about Nepal at this juncture in time is that it has a wealth of experience in addressing these issues, and more importantly, a healthy instructional academic and political institutional context where this information and knowledge is available and enters onto policy debates. The challenge for Nepal will be how to address, manage and change the bureaucratic ‘siloes’ of existing government agencies, donor projects, NGOs, academic institutions and private/public investors. Moving on and letting ‘water flow under the bridge’ in the changing hydropower, water resources and economic context of today is difficult. In the politics of hydropower, whether it is in the political, academic or commercial arenas, water does not easily flow under the bridge! What is helping a ‘moving on’ is the growth and maturing of the hydro sector, especially in the private sector but also a renewed interest of academics and others who influence policy in the complexities of natural resource development . Policy needs to be streamlined to ensure that projects related to water and energy supply, especially the large reservoir projects are built as multi-purpose projects not only to meet increasing dry season and peak demand for electricity but also to meet ever increasing demand for water for purposes like drinking and irrigation. Trans-boundary issues also need to be addressed with reference to receiving recompense for negative externalities and sharing positive externalities.

Technology ‘Game Changers’ in the electricity sector
The fifth policy challenge concerns the huge contemporary range of engineering equipment for the generation and use of electricity. Some of this equipment changes the way electricity is thought about and used. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable for a family in the mountains to speak to a migrant worker abroad. Now it is not only possible, but also normal, as a result of a mobile phone, recharged, for example, by a very small solar electricity unit on the top of the house. The change from incandescent bulbs to CFLs and now to LEDs greatly reduces usage and makes the saved electricity available for other uses. Similarly, the price of solar electricity has fallen significantly and is only now coming into a price range where it can be considered economically viable for irrigation purposes. More efficient induction cookers, which have spread recently due to the Indian blockade, increased the demand for electricity. The recent very rapid spread of the Chinese battery powered three-wheeler ‘baby taxis’ mainly on the Terai is an example of some of the major technical changes concerning electricity that are now taking place. It estimated that there may be as many as 10,000 of these three wheelers on the Nepal Terai . New (and old) equipment and knowledge for the careful use of electricity for water management in domestic and economic situations is getting more policy attention in Nepal. The challenge for policy analysts is to develop cost effective methods to keep up and learn from rapid changes already taking place on the ground. Further policy and other interventions should be expected for introduction of additional game changer technologies like cable car, ropeways, electric trolley buses, electric train in the valleys and plains, and electric and hybrid vehicles for urban..

Managing political risk
Finally, from a policy perspective there is the ever-present issue of how to manage risk . The April 2015 earthquake in Nepal highlighted risks associated with different patterns of hydropower development. The damage to dams and other physical infrastructure were some of the more obvious physical outcomes of the earthquake. However, other risk considerations concern the room for manoeuvre for Nepali policymakers in a context of powerful neighbours and donors, in an ever-changing global, economic and technological environment. The deep economic effects of the Indian blockade from 2015 to 2016 emphasized the risks to Nepal of low investment in hydro capability before the 1990s – although the technical feasibility of hydropower generation and use had been well demonstrated in 1911. We suggest that if the current trends in the development of the hydro sector continue on to self-reliant energy security, Nepal will be much less vulnerable to political risks in the future.

_ _

Ratna Sansar Shrestha, FCA Independent researcher, Chairperson of Nepal Hydro & Electric Ltd. and visiting faculty of School of Engineering, Kathmandu University
Corresponding E-mail: ratna.sansar@gmail.com

Stephen Biggs is Research Associate at Department of Development Studies, SOAS, University of London, WC1H 0XG, UK.

E-mail:biggs.s@gmail.com

Scott Justice is Agricultural Mechanization Specialist at CIMMYT, Nepal

E-mail:s.justice@cgiar.org

Amanda Manandhar Gurung is Executive Director at Chandra Gurung Conservation Foundation, Kathmandu, Nepal.

E-mail:amandamgurung@gmail.com

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Published in July Issue of Hydro Nepal Journal